How Iraq cheated in the past: an inspector's tale

From the outset, the weapons inspection process was a game of cat and mouse or "cheat and retreat".

Iraq was supposed to declare all its holdings of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long-range missiles, components of these, and their means of production and use. We, the inspectors, were then to take possession of these items and destroy them or otherwise render them unusable for weapons purposes and to undertake inspections to ensure all weapons had been declared.

Iraq's initial declarations were blatant lies. They declared no nuclear or biological programmes, and far fewer missiles and chemical weapons than we knew they had. We told them that, and started inspections to prove it.

The fourth nuclear inspection tried to gain access to a military site. The unarmed inspectors were blocked by armed Iraqi guards. They could see the Iraqis loading trucks with equipment and driving them out of the back gate. They tried to give chase, but were shot at. Meanwhile, aerial and satellite surveillance tracked the Iraqi convoy carrying the equipment.

Saddam refused access to the removed equipment. We informed the [UN] security council, who dispatched the Unscom chairman and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency to Baghdad to deliver a stern warning to Saddam - allow access or suffer "severe consequences" - UN code for military action. Faced with this, Saddam backed down.

The removed equipment proved to be calutrons - equipment for making weapons-grade uranium. Even faced with this incontrovertible proof of its plans to build nuclear weapons, the Iraqi regime dissembled, claiming that the calutrons were for a civil nuclear programme.

This pattern of "cheat and retreat" happened many times over the next seven years.

Iraq, faced with incontrovertible evidence that it was lying, would amend its declarations to take into account any new evidence. We would analyse their new declarations, and find them to be new lies. We would gather information from other sources, such as Iraq's former suppliers, to prove that Iraq was still lying. Iraq would again admit that it had not told the whole truth, and make a new declaration. Each of these declarations turned out to be just a new lie. With each iteration, Iraq would promise a new chapter of full cooperation, similar to its current promise of unconditional access to inspectors.

We forced Iraq to admit to programmes to produce nuclear and biological weapons, and additional chemical and missile programmes they had initially denied or not declared. Massive amounts of weapons, material and factories were destroyed.

However, as time went on, it became ever more difficult for inspections to find hidden materials. We used up all our good intelligence, and the stream of defectors slowed down, so there was less information to act upon.

And the Iraqis learnt how to take counter-measures to thwart our efforts. The lack of new "weapons finds" after 1995 emboldened the Iraqis to argue that there was nothing left to find, whereas it really meant they were hiding things better. Tonnes of materials for making the nerve agent VX and the biological agents anthrax and botulinum toxin were never accounted for.

The inspectors' task is more daunting now than when I was with Unscom. There are fewer external sources of information. Iraq's new suppliers know they are acting illegally and so will not cooperate. Iraq has learnt how to build weapons in ways which are harder to detect - underground, in radiation shielded buildings, in mobile facilities.

But hardest for the inspectors is that the international community is divided. Iraq only ever acceded to inspections because of the threat of military action. They have done so again, but will block the inspectors whenever they get close to finding something. Even in their letter accepting renewed inspections, the Iraqi government has signalled its "right" to limit access to certain sites. The letter refers to the need to respect Iraq's sovereignty and national dignity, code for no inspections of palaces or government ministry buildings.

Saddam will try to guess which sites will be inspected and sanitise them before the inspectors arrive so that Iraq can "prove" its full cooperation by allowing "unconditional access".

It will be back to the game of cat and mouse. The security council must remember that inspections are not the objective - confirmed disarmament is. Saddam has yet to cooperate with that goal.

· Tim Trevan was political adviser and spokesman from 1992-95 for the UN special commission for Iraq, whose main task was to monitor compliance with UN resolutions

Saddam's box of tricks

Britain and the United States claimed yesterday that Iraq's decision to grant access to arms inspectors "without conditions" is another ruse by Saddam Hussein to string along the United Nations. In the past Saddam has employed a series of tricks to defy the UN and he may be tempted to use them again:

· Pedantry
One of his oldest techniques is to wrangle over the wording of documents presented to the UN. Past form suggests Saddam may insist that the security council accept Iraq's offer exactly as spelt out in Monday night's letter. This would give Iraq a chance to string out negotiations because the letter calls for the implementation of the 1991 resolution 687 which said inspections should start within 90 days.

· Restrictions
The last round of inspections collapsed after Iraq demanded that the purpose of some inspections be put in writing. Iraq may also be tempted to restrict inspectors to military facilities. The Arab League said yesterday that civilian sites should be out of bounds, to the fury of Britain and America who believe that Saddam's palaces are used to hide weapons.

· Surveillance
Hans Blix, the chief weapons inspector, fears the Iraqis may demand that his officials are escorted, limiting their ability to carry out no-notice inspections.

· Dispersal
The new inspections team, the Unmovic, fears that the Iraqis may provide accommodation which is awkward and a long way from where the inspectors' helicopters are based - complicating impromptu inspections.

· Bugging
Mr Blix fears that his staff may be forced to use the Iraqi communications system, restricting their ability to talk freely to their headquarters in New York and Vienna.

· Divide and rule
Iraq is likely to try to ingratiate itself with Russia, France and China - the three permanent members of the security council who are sceptical of military action. Moscow said yesterday it saw no need for a fresh resolution.

· Arab solidarity
Iraq may try to build on the work of the Arab League, which was instrumental in the negotiations in the runup to Monday's letter. Improved relations with the Arab world will strengthen Iraq's hand in resisting Anglo-American attempts to draw up a tough new resolution which could include "coercive" inspections.

Saddam's overall aim, Britain and the US fear, would be to divide the five permanent members of the security council and delay any military assault until well into the New Year when the approach of summer will make the task more difficult for the allies.