PALS in Pakistan Part Eight – The Rogue Threat
An article about the politics of nuclear weapons in Pakistan.
A rogue commander could clearly still use weapons that had been disassembled, as they would be the ones required to re-assemble them if they were ever used. While storing the parts at separate sites would eliminate this risk, it is unlikely that Pakistan has or will implement this control mechanism, as this would severely restrict their ability to use the weapons quickly in a crisis. With PALS installed, any local commanders would be required to have codes from the national military establishment and thus could not launch without certain and explicit authorization. Other scenarios of stolen weapons are also more protected with PALS than without. In a disassembled state, it is possible that a terrorist group would be able to reassemble the weapon. This is highly likely, in fact, given that any group able to access Pakistan’s weapons would probably have contacts with scientists within Pakistan’s nuclear complex and would thus have access to the technical knowledge necessary to use the weapons. Weapons protected by PALS would be disarmed remotely when theft was discovered, and even qualified scientists are unlikely to be able to bypass the PAL without triggering one of the detonator charges that would render the bomb useless.
In a coup or government change scenario, disassembled weapons are also still vulnerable, as the new government would control the technicians who serviced the weapons and could easily make use of them. With PALS, any Islamic fundamentalist government would have to obtain the codes to gain access. This would give the United States a sort of "last line of defense", where we would be able to negotiate with the outgoing government to disable the weapons or withhold the codes. At the very least, in any of these scenarios the odds of avoiding a nuclear disaster are better with the PALS than without them. The other aspect of the assembly-status argument is the idea that the required reassembly would cause India to lash out somehow in response to the reassembly.
In a coup or government change scenario, disassembled weapons are also still vulnerable, as the new government would control the technicians who serviced the weapons and could easily make use of them. With PALS, any Islamic fundamentalist government would have to obtain the codes to gain access. This would give the United States a sort of "last line of defense", where we would be able to negotiate with the outgoing government to disable the weapons or withhold the codes. At the very least, in any of these scenarios the odds of avoiding a nuclear disaster are better with the PALS than without them. The other aspect of the assembly-status argument is the idea that the required reassembly would cause India to lash out somehow in response to the reassembly.
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- PALS and Pakistan Part One – Introduction to Permissive Action Links
- PALS in Pakistan Part Seven – A Dangerous World
- PALS in Pakistan Part Six – Objections to PALS
- PALS in Pakistan Part Five – Additional Nuclear Advantages
- PALS in Pakistan Part Four – A Nuclear Precedent
- PALS in Pakistan Part Three – Why Transfer PALS to Pakistan?
- PALS in Pakistan Part Two – Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal
- Pakistan Admits Nuclear Expert Traded With Iran
- Pakistani Nuclear Chief's African Visits Revealed
- Nuclear Inquiry Targets Father of Pakistani Bomb
- Revealed: How Pakistan Fuels Nuclear Arms Race
- Pakistan Denies Giving Nuclear Equipment to Libya
- Pakistan Admits It May Be Source of Iran's Nuclear Expertise
- US bans trade with Pakistani nuclear lab
- Pakistan Helped North Korea Make Bomb
- Iranians Admit Receiving Nuclear Warhead Blueprint From Disgraced Pakistani Expert
- IAEA Handed New Evidence on Iran
- North Korea 'had Nuclear Bombs Five Years Ago'
- Pyongyang Denies Buying Nuclear Secrets
- Abdul Qadeer Khan Admits Trading Nuclear Secrets
- Israel Will Stop at Nothing to Keep Nuclear Weapons from Iran
- ‘Enola Gay’ Pilot who Dropped Atomic Bomb Dies
- Nuclear Weapons : Are they easy to design?
- The Nuclear Issue in North Korea
- The Atom Bomb: A Brief History
- Nuclear Weapons: Weapons Of Mass Destruction




