PALS in Pakistan Part Six – Objections to PALS
An article about the politics of nuclear weapons in Pakistan.
Some arms control experts voice a variety of objections to transferring PALS technology to Pakistan and other states. These range from objections to the likelihood of Pakistan’s acceptance of the program to political objections to the ramifications that granting Pakistan PALS will have on other states that are considering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While there may be validity to some of these objections, the on balance effect of a technology transfer program dealing with PALS would be positive.
A first objection made is that Pakistan may be unwilling to accept an offer by the United States to give them this technology (Global Security Newswire). The logic behind this argument is that Pakistan would be unlikely to allow the U.S. to have detailed access to its nuclear weapons sites. Since PALS are usually an integrated part of the nuclear device, it would require on-site assistance by the United States that might discourage Pakistani acceptance. While Pakistan would probably indeed have concerns about allowing the U.S. unlimited access to its nuclear facilities, the PALS program could easily be designed to assuage these fears. First, while the U.S. would have to be involved in installing PALS on the Pakistani weapons, this doesn’t require constant access to every Pakistani nuclear weapons site. The installation would be a one-time procedure that could be performed at any location Pakistan requested. Additionally, if Pakistan refused even limited access to a single site, Pakistani scientists could be trained to install PALS themselves. While the technological specifications of PALS are restricted from the general public to prevent efforts to bypass the technology, giving the knowledge required to install and operate them to another country wouldn’t compromise our nuclear security. Many other countries such as France and Russia already have U.S. PALS technology, and since the Pakistani government already possesses nuclear weapons they have no real incentive to try to access ours (Bellovin).
A first objection made is that Pakistan may be unwilling to accept an offer by the United States to give them this technology (Global Security Newswire). The logic behind this argument is that Pakistan would be unlikely to allow the U.S. to have detailed access to its nuclear weapons sites. Since PALS are usually an integrated part of the nuclear device, it would require on-site assistance by the United States that might discourage Pakistani acceptance. While Pakistan would probably indeed have concerns about allowing the U.S. unlimited access to its nuclear facilities, the PALS program could easily be designed to assuage these fears. First, while the U.S. would have to be involved in installing PALS on the Pakistani weapons, this doesn’t require constant access to every Pakistani nuclear weapons site. The installation would be a one-time procedure that could be performed at any location Pakistan requested. Additionally, if Pakistan refused even limited access to a single site, Pakistani scientists could be trained to install PALS themselves. While the technological specifications of PALS are restricted from the general public to prevent efforts to bypass the technology, giving the knowledge required to install and operate them to another country wouldn’t compromise our nuclear security. Many other countries such as France and Russia already have U.S. PALS technology, and since the Pakistani government already possesses nuclear weapons they have no real incentive to try to access ours (Bellovin).

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- PALS and Pakistan Part One – Introduction to Permissive Action Links
- PALS in Pakistan Part Eight – The Rogue Threat
- PALS in Pakistan Part Seven – A Dangerous World
- PALS in Pakistan Part Five – Additional Nuclear Advantages
- PALS in Pakistan Part Four – A Nuclear Precedent
- PALS in Pakistan Part Three – Why Transfer PALS to Pakistan?
- PALS in Pakistan Part Two – Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal
- Pakistan Admits Nuclear Expert Traded With Iran
- Pakistani Nuclear Chief's African Visits Revealed
- Nuclear Inquiry Targets Father of Pakistani Bomb
- Revealed: How Pakistan Fuels Nuclear Arms Race
- Pakistan Denies Giving Nuclear Equipment to Libya
- Pakistan Admits It May Be Source of Iran's Nuclear Expertise
- US bans trade with Pakistani nuclear lab
- Pakistan Helped North Korea Make Bomb
- Iranians Admit Receiving Nuclear Warhead Blueprint From Disgraced Pakistani Expert
- IAEA Handed New Evidence on Iran
- North Korea 'had Nuclear Bombs Five Years Ago'
- Pyongyang Denies Buying Nuclear Secrets
- Abdul Qadeer Khan Admits Trading Nuclear Secrets




