Packers overcome Sherman's coaching blunder

It appears that some football coaches could use a re-fresher course in Math 101.

While watching the Green Bay-San Francisco wild-card playoff game last Sunday, I was absolutely stunned when Packers head coach Mike Sherman elected to go for a two-point conversion late in the third quarter. It was one of the most bizarre-and stupid-coaching decisions in the history of the NFL.

With 3:31 left in the third quarter, Green Bay scored a touchdown to take a 15-7 lead. Instead of kicking the extra point for a 16-7 advantage, the Packers went for a two-point conversion and failed. A successful extra point would have put Green Bay ahead by two scores; the failed conversion made it a one-score game.

San Francisco then drove for a touchdown early in the fourth quarter, and Jeff Garcia followed with a pass to Tai Streets for a two-point conversion that tied the score, 15-15, with 11:48 remaining. So instead of having a 16-14 lead and possession of the ball, the Packers were tied at 15 and thus faced the pressure of having to score once again.

Fortunately for Sherman, Brett Favre bailed the Packers out. He led a drive that resulted in a go-ahead field goal, then Green Bay later clinched the victory on a touchdown run by Ahman Green with less than two minutes to go.

After the game, Sherman tried to explain his controversial decision. "I was very frustrated with the missed extra point (after the Packers' first touchdown)," he said. "I wanted to get it back."

What Sherman obviously failed to realize was that the risk of going for the two-point conversion was not worth the potential gain. It was a mistake that could have cost his team the game and ended the Packers' season.

It also makes me wonder about Sherman's ability to serve as both head coach and general manager of the Packers. If he can't even figure out whether to kick an extra point or to go for a two-point conversion, how can he be expected to assemble a roster of 53 players and deal with the complicated salary-cap issues? Can he effectively analyze NFL prospects and make solid choices on draft day? And, is there any way he can come up with a defensive strategy to slow down the mighty Rams? (I wouldn't bet on it. I think I'll take St. Louis and lay the 10 points.)

Sherman's boneheaded decision reminded me of another coaching blunder that I witnessed a few years ago. It occurred during the college football season of 1999.

I was working on the sidelines in Ames as Iowa State played host to Colorado. The Cyclones trailed in the fourth quarter, 16-12, and were driving for a potential go-ahead score, but the drive eventually stalled. Iowa State faced a fourth-and-four situation from the Buffaloes' 24-yard line with about four minutes to play, leaving Coach Dan McCarney with a decision to make.

Much to the crowd's dismay, McCarney elected to try a 40-yard field goal that would have cut Colorado's lead to one point. Of course, the kick missed. But even if the Cyclones had converted the field goal, they still would have had to stop Colorado on the ensuing possession and force a punt, then move the ball back into field-goal range for a possible game-winning kick. That was an awful lot to ask.

When Iowa State lined up for the field-goal try, I immediately told one of my colleagues that the Cyclones were blowing their best opportunity to win the game. "They have to go for the first down," I said. "They need a touchdown to win, and this might be their only chance. If they kick the field goal, there's no guarantee that they'll get the ball back."

Colorado had already enjoyed a lot of success running the ball throughout the game, and I didn't have much faith in Iowa State's defense to stop the Buffaloes. And, sure enough, Colorado ran the ball down the Cyclones' throats following the missed field goal, picking up two or three first downs and killing the clock.

Thus, McCarney's decision to go for the field goal turned out to be a tremendously bad move. The Cyclones missed the field goal, then were unable to stop the Buffaloes. And even if Iowa State had made the kick and forced a punt by Colorado, the Cyclones still needed two more things to happen in order to win the game. They would have had to drive the ball into field-goal range, then make another kick.

Had I been coaching the Cyclones, I would have called for a pass into the end zone on fourth down from the 24-yard line. Even a Hail Mary would have had better odds of being successful than the chain of events that McCarney was hoping would happen.

Now, I don't pretend to be a football coach with all of the answers. I don't know the first thing about blocking schemes, zone blitzes or cover packages. But I am a football fan with a basic understanding of math.

If a team scores a touchdown to go ahead by eight points, then kick the extra point. And if a team trails by four points in the final minutes, then go for a touchdown to win the game.