Wishes, Hopes and Counter-negotiations Due to US Desire to Destroy Somalia

As the real MV FAINA negotiations have blown up, and new, counter-negotiations have been undertaken with the involvement of ominous forces, the MV FAINA crew spent Christmas far from their relatives and with increased concern about their fate.

The various reconnaissance flights undertaken herald only a disastrous development that has been long planned and eventually delayed for little time. With State Department officials comically pretending to be fully unaware of the ongoing counter-negotiations, and with the representatives of the pirates being pulled from discussion to discussion and from delay to delay, one can easily guess that the terrible hit will be given in due course of time – only to give president-elect Obama the glory of an early military success, deceiving the numerous supporters of the pro-African theory.

In this article, I re-publish the "Daily Press Briefing" in which Mr. McCormack stated that the US administration is unaware of the ongoing counter-negotiations, and the Ecoterra 88th Press Release Update that focuses on other developments off the Somali coast and relates to recent publications on the subject.

In a separate article, I will expand on why the US administration is fully aware of the ongoing counter-negotiations, and what ominous results are being sought after.

Daily Press Briefing – Department of State
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2008/113477.htm

QUESTION: Somalia? Pirates? Looks like there is a new twist in this saga of the high-jacked Ukrainian Vessel, MV Faina. There are numerous press reports stating a certain U.S. businesswoman, a CEO of the private security company Select Armor, whose name is Ballarin, I believe, is trying to negotiate with the pirates. The owner of the vessel, of the MV Faina, published an open letter to U.S. Ambassador in Kyiv yesterday, asking U.S. Government to interfere, because they say that her efforts basically undermine the process of trying to release the vessel. Anything on that? Where are you – what are you going to do in this situation? Have you seen this letter?

MR. MCCORMACK: I’m not – yeah, I’m not aware of these particular efforts.

QUESTION: Is she somehow representing the U.S. Government?

MR. MCCORMACK: Not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge, no.

QUESTION: Well, are you going to do anything about it?

MR. MCCORMACK: I’m not sure that it’s within our purview to do anything about it. I’m sure we’ll take a look at it. I’m not aware of the reports that you refer to.

88th Update 2008-12-25 21:11:43 UTC

Ecoterra Intl. - Stay Calm & Solve it Peaceful & Fast !

Ecoterra International – Update & Media Release on the stand-off concerning the Ukrainian weapons-ship hi-jacked by Somali pirates.

Our thoughts are with all the 360 seafarers who are presently held captive in Somalia and who cannot celebrate a Merry Christmas together with their families in peace! Likewise we wish all unbiased naval forces, who honestly try to contribute to justice and humanity in the Somali waters quiet festive days.

We also can make sea-piracy in Somalia an issue of the past - with empathy and strength and through coastal and marine development as well as protection!

New EA Seafarers Assistance Programme Emergency Helpline: +254-738-497979
East African Seafarers Assistance Programme - Media Officer: +254-733-385868

Day 92 - 2191 hours into the FAINA Crisis - Update Summary

Efforts for a peaceful release continued, but the now three months long stand-off concerning Ukrainian MV FAINA is not yet solved finally, though intensive negotiations have continued.

Serious efforts are under way to bring all parties involved in the case of the FAINA together in order to allow for a united, coordinated, safe and fast release.

Ecoterra Intl. renewed it's call to solve the FAINA and the SIRIUS STAR cases with first priority and peaceful in order to avert a human and environmental disasters at the Somali coast. Anybody encouraging hot-headed and concerning such difficult situations inexperienced and untrained gunmen to try an attempt of a military solution must be held fully responsible for the surely resulting disaster.

Clearing-house:

News from other abducted ships --------

Alert: Turkish airforce F16 fighter-jets are set to run a reconnaissance and scaremonger mission tomorrow, after the Muslim Friday-prayers over Puntland and especially Eyl, sources revealed. So far it is clear that the Somali parliament has not agreed to any such violation of the Somali airspace, which would be a prerequisite to it being sanctioned under the latest UN security council resolution 1851. Turkey tries to flex its muscles being angry over the abduction in Somali waters of 3 Turkish vessels, one of which is tied financially to a Turkish MP, and had threatened earlier to attack the ships in order to free them by a military strike, even if that would mean that Turkey would have to sacrifice the crew. Though an official confirmation could not been obtained from the Turkish Forces Headquarters, observers and military attachés of other nations see such sabre-rattling as unwise attempt to compensate too much military testosterone, because the Turkish side would not gain anything from a few killed pirates, a dead crew and a sunk vessel, which certainly has been prepared to be blown up in case of any attack. It only would create a human and environmental disaster and contribute to military escalation.

Somali pirates have released a Yemeni fishing boat, Faluja, along with ten fishermen held earlier in the Gulf of Aden, the Yemen coastguard has confirmed. The coastguards in Aden as saying the fishermen have already arrived in Aden. On December 10, two Yemeni fishing boats, Faluja and al-Qana'a, were seized by Somali pirates while fishing in the Gulf of Aden. Seven fishermen of those who were onboard the two boats managed to escape the pirate attack. 5 fishermen remain so far with MSV AL-QUANA'A in Somalia.

The Yemeni fishing vessel, during whose capture a Kenyan man was killed, is said to have been grounded on the beaches near Hafun.

With the latest captures and releases now at least 18 foreign vessels with a total of at least 350 crew members (of which 92 are Filipinos) are held in Somali waters and are monitored on our actual case-list, while several other cases of ships, which were observed off the coast of Somalia and have been reported or had reportedly disappeared without trace or information, are still being followed. Over 132 incidences (including attempted attacks, averted attacks and successful sea-jackings) have been recorded to far for 2008 with until today 49 fully documented, factual sea-jacking cases (incl. the presently held 18). Mystery mother vessels Athena/Arena and Burum Ocean and not fully documented cases of vessels are not listed in the hi-jack count any more until clarification. Several other vessels with unclear fate (also not in the actual count), who were reported missing over the last ten years in this area, are still kept on our watch-list, though in some cases it is presumed that they sunk due to bad weather or being unfit to sail. In the last four years, 22 missing ships have been traced back with different names, flags and superstructures.

Other related news -------

The Yemeni government said on Wednesday it is creating a regional anti-piracy centre to battle the growing number of high-seas hijackings by Somali pirates in the area. The centre will act as a hub for the exchange of information about piracy and for the coordination of multi-national naval forces in international and Somali territorial waters, a Yemeni transport ministry spokesman was quoted as saying by the official Saba news agency. Yemen has already started work on building the centre which should be completed in about six months, with 10 Red Sea and Gulf of Aden countries taking part, the official said. Arab nations on the Red Sea met in Cairo in November and committed to cooperate in the fight against the pirates, but did not announce any concrete measures. In addition to Yemen, the official said that Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Somalia and Sudan would be involved in the centre. "It would be wrong to say that the creation of centre will lead to a regional or international force, because it is simply a technical and coordination centre," he said to AFP. When there are acts of piracy, "it will fall upon the naval forces of the closest country to intervene".

South Korea said Wednesday it would send a destroyer to keep pirates away from military equipment being shipped back from Iraq. A 3,500-ton destroyer carrying anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles and an anti-submarine helicopter has been made ready for the mission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff office said. The office said the warship would escort a 13,000-ton cargo ship carrying military equipment including 110 trucks and ammunition, which would leave Kuwait on Friday. The defence ministry said the destroyer would carry a special military force and was more than strong enough to deal with any pirate attacks. South Korean troops returned home last week after Seoul wound up a four-year military mission to help reconstruct war-torn Iraq. South Korea is also considering sending a warship to combat rampant piracy off Somalia, where its own ships and crews have been targeted several times. The defence ministry will ask parliament to approve the deployment. In September Somali pirates seized a Ukrainian freighter carrying a cargo of 33 tanks and grenade launchers. Seoul is thinking of sending a 4,500-ton destroyer carrying missiles and other modern weaponry early next year, according to Yonhap news agency.

Beneath the surface of daring maritime hijackings, a larger agenda appears to be in play, writes Galal Nassar in Al-Ahram Weekly. Piracy has topped the news recently from the Middle East and warships from around the world have converged around the Horn of Africa. It is important to bear in mind that, with the rise of piracy in the region, the West has trained its focus more intensely on security of the seas while leaving the domestic crisis in Somalia to play itself out.

Odd, isn't it, that not a minuscule fraction of all this media attention was drawn to the area when boats of Somali refugees were sinking in the same bodies of water? That, apparently, was just a routine game of Russian roulette played by people who were obviously not newsworthy and did not merit international humanitarian concern. In fact, more often than not, passing ships did not even pause, as is required by international law, to save the lives of those whose rusted boats were stranded in the middle of the sea and who had no hope of reaching shore alive. Nor were the countries of the world stirred into action by Yemen's appeal for relief for thousands of refugees who had managed to make it to its shores alive. Sanaa was left to deal with those gaunt and wasted survivors on its own. Even worse, the tragic events that have been unfolding on land in Somalia for several years and that have reaped an even more disastrous human roll have received just as little attention. And what is particularly amazing is that the man who caused all that destruction on land and the rise of piracy on the seas, by overthrowing the government that had managed to restore peace and security to the country was the first to dispatch warships to the Indian Ocean.

Somalia perches on the most important maritime channels in the world. Through this passageway passes Arab oil on its way to European and American markets. It is also a relatively inexpensive route for the shipment of Western industrial products to Asia and Africa. The maritime channel has special strategic significance for Washington and Israel. For the former, it serves as the vital link between the US's Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and its Fifth Fleet stationed off the coast of Bahrain and its Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean. Tel Aviv, meanwhile, has not forgotten that Egypt together with Yemen closed the Bab Al-Mandeb upon the outbreak of the 1973 October War, which came as an additional blow to Israeli and international shipping with the closure of the Suez Canal following the Israeli occupation of Sinai in 1967. Israel has been pressing for the internationalisation of the Red Sea. With its ships no longer confined to a narrow lane as they pass to and from the port of Eilat, it would have much greater maneuverability in those waters as well as the opportunity to secure supply lines for its naval units. There is no overstating what a military advantage this would bring to the Hebrew state and what a threat this would pose to Arab national security.

Because the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden are integrally connected with the Bab Al-Mandeb, the Red Sea and, some would add, the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, those powers are keen to see immediate results in these vitally strategic waters. Indeed, the Western drive to form an international naval force in the Red Sea is, perhaps, the most salient proof that the internationalisation of the Red Sea is coming and only waiting for the Western powers and Israel to reach an accommodation over their shares of the pie. During the coming months those powers will engage in intensive and, most likely, secretive talks and machinations with the purpose of assigning roles and dividing stakes. Naturally, Israeli aims will be given high priority. In approving the resolution this week, the Security Council effectively mandates that the Red Sea too will come under an international mandate (meaning under the control of the US and the Zionist entity), essentially seizing those waters from Arab sovereignty on the grounds that the Arabs have been unable to keep them secure. Western schemes to internationalise the Red Sea will strike a debilitating blow to Arab security, which is already weak and crumbling since the occupation of Iraq and the Israeli occupation of Arab territory and holy sites in Palestine at the expense of and to the ongoing detriment of Palestinian national and human rights. What should the Arabs do to forestall these plans? Perhaps the most important actions they should take are the following: first, work together under the umbrella of the Arab League and in cooperation with African countries to resolve the Somali crisis and bring peace to that war-torn country; second, revive an idea that had gained some support in the 1980s until it was shelved as the result of US pressure. This was to create an Arab Red Sea Organisation establishing a security system for the Red Sea basin.

David Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, was the first to voice the Zionist entity's ambition to gain control over the Red Sea. In 1949 he said, "We are surrounded on land. The sea is our only route of contact with the rest of the world. Developing Eilat will be a major goal towards which we will direct our steps". Countries overlooking the Red Sea sensed the danger. In 1950 Saudi Arabia and Egypt struck an agreement granting the latter military access to several strategically placed islands in the Gulf of Aqaba, the two most important of which are Tiran and Sanafir. The purpose was to restrict Israeli maritime activities. The action became one of the motives behind the tripartite aggression of 1956. Later, in 1967, Egypt's closure of the Gulf of Aqaba became the direct cause of the Six Day War in which Israel occupied extensive tracts of Arab land.

In the face of this development, the Arab nations, especially the frontline states with Israel and those bordering the Mediterranean, became more acutely aware of the threat of Israeli expansionism and the strategic importance of the Red Sea and the Bab Al-Mandeb in particular. These were the vital maritime links between the Israeli port of Eilat and Africa and Southeast Asia. Israeli naval displays in the Red Sea between 1970 and 1973 drove home the point to such an extent that Yemen declared itself an immediate party to the Arab-Israeli conflict. During this period Yemen alerted the Arab League to Zionist activities on the Eritrean coast near Bab Al-Mandeb. The League followed through on this alert and discovered that, indeed, Israel in cooperation with the US had rented several islands from Ethiopia. It further discovered an espionage network based on Barim Island in the centre of the straits whose task was to gather intelligence on the area straddling the southern entrance to the Red Sea and to safeguard the passage of Israeli ships. On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a simultaneous attack on Israel and, for the first time, the Arabs coordinated in asserting the right of sovereignty over their territorial waters by closing the Bab Al-Mandeb to Israeli ships. On 14 October of that year, Yemen deployed forces on several islands in the Red Sea in order to prevent Israel from occupying them.

From 1973 to 1979, the Arabs convened several conferences for the purpose of protecting Red Sea security from Zionist infiltration into the area. Among the most important resolutions to come out of these conferences were one declaring the Red Sea an Arab sea that would remain independent from international conflicts, and another calling for cooperation among Red Sea basin countries in the exploitation of its wealth for the benefit of the people of the region and against the policies of the Zionist entity. In all these conferences, Yemen played a crucial role in formulating a unified Arab vision on the prevention of Zionist infiltration. By virtue of its strategic location, Yemen was perhaps foremost among the Arab countries to appreciate the dangers of Israeli ambitions in the region and to observe the Israeli drive to establish closer relations with African nations near the southern entrance to the Red Sea. Thus, in October 1977, Sanaa sent a secret memorandum to the Arab League warning of the growth of an Israeli and Ethiopian military presence on the Eritrean coast and near Bab Al-Mandeb. It also reported that Ethiopia had sold a strip of the Eritrean coastline to Zionist intelligence agents, placing Israel in a position to directly threaten Yemeni islands and the southern portion of the strait.

The continued lack of a clear and cohesive collective Arab security policy for the Red Sea zone, the hostile relations between some Arab and African states and, more importantly, inter-Arab tensions in that area in particular, all worked in favour of Israeli designs. Tel Aviv scored a significant victory in this regard. It is embodied in the Camp David Accords of 16 March 1979 in the form of the recognition of Israel's right to freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal. The distortion in regional balances that this caused was instrumental in perpetuating political and economic instability, all the more so in view of the general climate that enabled Israel to establish an even greater presence and more powerful influence in the Red Sea area and to deploy these in ways inimical to Arab interests.

Controlling East Africa: The commander of the Israeli navy said, "Control over the Suez Canal only gives Egypt one key to the Red Sea. The second and more important key from the strategic point of view is the Bab Al-Mandeb. This could fall into Israeli hands if it could develop its naval force in the Red Sea zone". Elyahu Salbetter writes that Israeli defence strategists and planners are fully aware of the Arab threat to Israel in the Red Sea, which underscores the need for Israel to establish closer relations with non-Arab countries in east Africa. Certainly, since 1990 the political climate has been even more conducive to Israel's ends. With the aid of its strategic alliance with the US and its overall military superiority, Israel has succeeded in strengthening its political, economic and military ties with Red Sea nations.

Several Arab studies have concluded that Eritrea's occupation of the Hanish Islands in December 1995 was supported and engineered by Israel with the aim of gaining a stronger foothold in the southern Red Sea. Apparently that move had been a relatively long time in the planning. As early as 1990 an Israeli delegation visited Asmara to gather intelligence on the situation in Eritrea and the southern Red Sea area. Israeli strategists then drew up an urgent plan for a more vigorous foreign policy towards east Africa. Discussed in a five-hour secret Knesset session on 16 March 1992, the most important points in the plan were: To normalise relations with such African countries as Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia, Togo, Mozambique and Kenya, and to counter Arab influence in Africa; to strengthen Israeli military presence in the Red Sea and in Eritrea and Ethiopia; and to strengthen economic ties between Eritrea and Israel.

In addition to sending 1,700 military experts to help train the Eritrean army, Israel created a network of political and cultural loyalties by building large palaces, offering 60 grants for Eritrean students to study in Israel, and sponsoring various cultural exchanges. On 13 February 1993, an Israeli delegation of security and economic officials paid a secret five-day visit to Eritrea. The agreement in principle that resulted from that visit was officially signed in Tel Aviv, in March that year, between Yitzhak Rabin and Asyas Afourki. It provided that Israel would supply Asmara with military and agricultural experts and build national infrastructure in exchange for permission to maintain a permanent and full Israeli presence in Eritrea and for freedom of movement for Mossad agents in the country. The agreement further obliged Asmara to refrain from engaging in any cooperative activities with Arab countries and to postpone the idea of joining the Arab League indefinitely.

Following this agreement, Israel augmented its forces in Eritrea to 3,000 troops who took up station in military bases in areas near Sudan and Yemen. Of particular importance are the bases on Sorkin Mountain, overlooking Miyun Island near Bab Al-Mandeb. On this island, located at the entrance to the Red Sea, Israel installed radars that monitor the more than 17,000 ships that pass through the straits, and through which also passes 30 per cent of the world's oil production. In mid November 1995, Eritrean forces (without Israeli assistance) undertook a failed bid to occupy the Hanish Islands. The balances of power at the time were such as to enable Yemen to regain control over the strategic islands. Today, pirates have become part of the strategic equations and one can not help but to suspect that Israel is behind this threat to one of the most important maritime routes in the world.

In Somalia, the Islamic Courts Movement almost succeeded in putting an end to the reign of terror and violence of rival militias after it had brought most of the country under control and isolated the remnants of a weak and decaying government. Then Ethiopia intervened, on the grounds of having been invited in by that government, which it claimed to be legitimate, in order to drive out the ICM. The result was to open the way to the return of piracy and commerce in death and destruction. Today, as the Somali resistance is gaining more and more ground, "piracy" has become the catchword for the next round in the game of international intervention, this time to be played out -- in the beginning -- at sea. In short, international powers are in the process of turning piracy at sea into the avenue for preventing the ICM's rise to power on land and the reconstruction of the Somali state. It is the "war against terror" all over again, with a twist.

One can not help but to ask, as well, how it could happen that a couple of hundred pirates could operate only a stone's throw away from the place where the warship USS Cole was bombed? Remember, this is an area where US forces are at the ready, in which regional and international navies have command posts, and in which there have been dozens of intensive joint naval manoeuvres. Which brings us to the question, if the US military that is by some accounts prepared to make war on Iran cannot handle pirates then could squads of Iranian boatmen detain US freighters or oil tankers with impunity? Numerous senior military officials in the West have spoken about the training and tactical expertise these pirates possess. Is the purpose to caution ships away from the area? Or is it to excuse the inability of Western forces to deal with the threat? Or is it to rally support for another international interventionist drive?

Are we not reminded of the scenarios that accompanied the build-up preceding every bombardment and invasion of countries in the Middle East? In particular, should we not be alerted by experience with the game that preceded the invasion of Iraq, especially all the media play that was given to weapons of mass destruction and Iraqi military preparedness? Is it not more rational, in light of previous experience, to believe that certain powers have plans to establish control over the area and that magnifying the "piracy peril" is one of the means towards this end? Does it not also make sense that this falls in line with a tangential plan to end opposition to the presence of foreign military forces in the Gulf of Aden by twisting the economic screws? Is this not a likely interpretation of the sounding of the alarm that "piracy" will force commercial naval traffic to make the detour around the tip of Africa?

Which is more dangerous, pirates or the Islamic Courts Movement? A very similar question was raised with regard to Afghanistan: Which is more dangerous, the Taliban or drug trafficking? The Taliban was overthrown and drug trafficking thrived again. In Somalia, the ICM was ousted and piracy thrived again. If the world wants to end the trade of drugs as well as the death and destruction in Afghanistan it should force the withdrawal of international forces. The same applies to Somalia. If the world wants to end the piracy phenomenon and the threat to major maritime routes, it should lift its protective shield from the collapsed government in Somalia, pressure Ethiopia to leave, and allow the ICM back into power. There is no need for more occupation armies. The key to ending the real dangers and to halting death and destruction is to stop foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of nations and to let the people of nations enjoy the freedom of choosing their preferred form of rule.