Tyrannized Voivodina and Sanjak Ready to Secede from Dangerous, Racist State Serbia
Voivodina and Sanjak are not proper Serbian territories but have been peremptorily given to Serbia because of French pro-Serbian favoritism back in the 1910s and 1920s.
After many decades of tyranny which took various shapes, the Slovenes, the Croatians, the Bosnians, the Macedonians, the Montenegrins and the Kosovars achieved their national goal of independence and freedom. Unfortunately, the Voivodinians and the Sanjakis still live under Serbian racism and terrorism.
In fact, the pathetic Serbian nationalism, which has permanently been harbored there, is currently rising dangerously again. This is what a devastating HRW Report reveals about the unrepentant Serbia, a medieval and rancorous realm of excruciating tyranny, merciless murder and unfathomable racism that the perfidious French statesmen and diplomats want to help adhere to the EU.
To better illustrate the tragic events that signal further secessions from the Balkan Hell ‘Serbia’, I republish the entire HRW Report "Hostages of Tension - Intimidation and Harassment of Ethnic Albanians in Serbia after Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence"; in the present article, I republish further parts (Background, Institutional and Legal Framework for Investigating and Prosecuting Offenses with Ethnic or Religious Motives), and in forthcoming articles, I will complete and further comment.
Hostages of Tension - Intimidation and Harassment of Ethnic Albanians in Serbia after Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence
http://hrw.org/reports/2008/serbia1108/
Background
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/serbia1108/3.htm#_Toc212362266
Acts of violence against ethnic Albanian and other minority-owned businesses in February 2008 were not the first incidents of this kind in Serbia. Serbia saw a wave of attacks against minorities between late 2003 and 2005, including arson attacks on mosques that peaked in reaction to the anti-minority (primarily anti-Serbian and anti-Roma) riots in Kosovo in March 2004.
Some ethnic Albanians were also targeted in the spring of 1999, during the NATO bombing of Serbia, with homes and businesses subject to arson and Molotov cocktail attacks.2
A Human Rights Watch report into the 2003-2005 attacks in 2005, concluding that the Serbian government, police and courts failed to respond adequately to the violence.3 The report documented attacks on mosques and minority cultural centers, as well as attacks on individuals belonging to minority communities and their property. The authorities responded too late to violence and downplayed the ethnic motivations behind the attacks. The criminal justice system dealt with the attacks as misdemeanors rather than ethnically-motivated crimes, resulting in lenient sentences.
The 2005 Human Rights Watch report was widely covered by the Serbian media. The Serbian government minister described the report in media interviews in October 2005 as "simplified" but did not dispute its findings in a subsequent meeting with Human Rights Watch and other NGOs later the same month. Nevertheless, the Serbian authorities failed to implement the recommendations contained in the report.
The European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) sent several ad hoc delegations of committee members in 2005. The European Parliament subsequently adopted a resolution in March 2005 (prior to the publication of the Human Rights Watch report) calling on Serbia to increase protection of minority communities and ensure the police played a more active role in that protection.
After the release of the "Dangerous Indifference" report, the European Parliament discussed the situation in Vojvodina during the Brussels visit of the Minister of Human and Minority Rights Rasim Ljajic on October 13, 2005, pressing for the Serbian government to tackle inter-ethnic crime more efficiently. The EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated on October 10, 2005 that Serbia’s progress towards Europe would depend on the degree in which it respects the rights of the minorities.
Kosovo’s declaration of independence on February 17, 2008, immediately provoked renewed mass protests and patriotic rallies across Serbia. Although most protests were peaceful, a few spiraled out of control, resulting in vandalism and, in Belgrade, widespread rioting. Groups attacked the embassies of Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Turkey, UK and US and a number of McDonald’s and other foreign-owned commercial premises, some of which were looted.4
During further mass protests in Belgrade on February 21, some groups among the crowds chanted "Kill, kill the Shiptars (a derogatory term for Albanians)," while others chanted "Knife, wire, Srebrenica," a reference to the mass killing of Muslims by Serbs in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica in 1995.5 Several hundred broke loose from the otherwise peaceful crowd and attacked police and TV crews covering the protests.6 Besides embassies and foreign-owned commercial premises, rioters also damaged cars, as well as public property such as benches and street lamps.7
The Belgrade independent news organization B92 was the target of attempted arson during the mass protests in Belgrade on February 21; the attempt was thwarted by a police cordon around the building. B92 continued to receive threats in the following days. A well-known human rights activist was also targeted. The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) started to collect signatures to lodge a criminal complaint against Natasa Kandic, the Executive Director of the Humanitarian Law Center, accusing her of acting against the constitutional order and threatening the state’s independence and integrity by attending the Kosovo Assembly’s session at which independence was proclaimed. Some media outlets supported the action against Kandic.8
There was a mixed response from the Serbian government to the rapidly unfolding events. President Boris Tadic, on state visit to Romania, called for calm and an immediate end to the violence.9 However, some members of the Serbian government condoned the violence in response to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The minister for infrastructure, Velimir Ilic, initially described violence in the immediate aftermath of the protest in Belgrade as "democratic."10 After the riots spread, with foreign embassies attacked and widespread damage of publicly and privately owned property, he called for an investigation on what happened and who is responsible for the acts of violence.
In the weeks that followed, a wave of attacks on Albanian-owned property and businesses swept through Vojvodina and various other locations throughout Serbia. According to the information from major general Mladen Kuribak, the head of the Uniformed Police Directorate11, the police across Serbia registered 221 incidents connected to Kosovo’s declaration of independence during the period of February 17-March 20, 2008, most of them involving attacks on property.12 The figures do not differentiate between incidents with an ethnic motivation and ordinary crimes.
However, the attacks do not appear to be representative of the attitudes of the local population in the areas visited by Human Rights Watch. According to Albanian-business owners whose shops were attacked, the majority of citizens continued to frequent their shops after Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Although the state media was silent about the attacks on the minority-owned businesses, some independent journalists and civil society activists were proactive in investigating and condemning the attacks, writing articles and publishing press releases about them. Human rights activists, accompanied by the national and regional ombudsmen and the mayor of Sombor organized a solidarity visit to the boycotted bakery there.
Notes
2 Several of the victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch were also either attacked or had their properties attacked in 1999. Some of the 1999 retaliation attacks were documented by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia in its report "Status of Albanians in Serbia during and after the NATO Intervention," http://www.helsinki.org.yu/reports_t11.html (accessed August 28, 2008).
3 Human Rights Watch, Dangerous Indifference: Violence against Minorities in Serbia, vol.17, no. 7(D), October 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/serbia1005/.
4 B92, "Bilans Jucerasnjih Nereda," ["The Balance of Yesterday’s Riots"] February 22, 2008, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=22&nav_id=285931 (accessed May 21, 2008). The damage to public property amounted to 8.2 million dinars (around EUR 100 000). 192 people were arrested and one of the protesters died inside. A post-mortem identified suffocation with smoke inside the building as the cause of death.
5 Human Rights Watch telephone conversation with a Serbian human rights activist, February 22, 2008.
6 Two journalists from Russia Today (a globally broadcasted English language channel from Russia) were beaten, and journalists from the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad, Serbian National TV, and Serbian National Radio were attacked or threatened. Human Rights Watch interview with an independent journalist who asked not to be identified, Belgrade, April 6, 2008.
7 B92, "Bilans Jucerasnjih Nereda," ["The Balance of Yesterday’s Riots"] February 22, 2008, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=22&nav_id=285931 (accessed May 21, 2008).
8 Dailies Kurir and Vecernje Novosti respectively referred to Kandic as a "traitor" and "the woman who does not exist." B92, "Istraziti Pretnje Natasi Kandic," ["Investigation of the Threats Against Natasa Kandic"] February 24, 2008, http://xs4.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=24&nav_category=640&nav_id=286219 (accessed May 20, 2008).
9 BBC Serbian language service, "Jedna zrtva nereda u Beogradu," ["One Victim of the Riots in Belgrade"] February 22, 2008, http://www.bbc.co.uk/serbian/news/2008/02/printable/080221_belgrade_kosovo.shtml (accessed May 20, 2008).
10 Blic, "Ilic: Demokratija je i kada se razbije neki prozor na ambasadi," ["Ilic: It is Democracy When Some Windows are Broken on the Embassies"] February 20, 2008. You Tube, http://youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Tv68QA6tQ&feature=related (accessed May 25, 2008).
11 The head of the Uniformed Police Directorate is a senior official in charge of all uniformed officers in the Serbian police, who make up the vast majority of the force.
12 Human Rights Watch interview with major general Mladen Kuribak, head of the Uniformed Police Directorate, Belgrade, April 24, 2008.
Institutional and Legal Framework for Investigating and Prosecuting Offenses with Ethnic or Religious Motives
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/serbia1108/4.htm#_Toc212362267
Structure of the Police, Prosecuting and Judicial Authorities
Police
The police in Serbia, including the autonomous province of Vojvodina, are centralized. The minister of interior has the power to appoint local police commanders in the municipalities. The proportion of ethnic minorities in the Serbian police remains below the percentage of the minorities in the overall population. In 2005 Human Rights Watch recommended that the government of Serbia intensify efforts to ensure greater participation of minorities in the police in Vojvodina. At the time of this writing, the level of representation remains comparable to that in 2005.
Since 2004, the Serbian authorities, advised by Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have been encouraged to reform policing structures and methods, including by introducing a community model of policing. This approach seeks to enhance collaboration and communication between the police and communities, in order to create trust, reduce community fears and apprehension, thereby promoting operational problem-solving. It emphasizes the decentralization of control, giving local forces greater autonomy. An important aspect is building capacity to investigate hate crimes. Community policing has been used in other post conflict areas, including Bosnia and Kosovo, motivated by the desire to improve police cooperation with citizens, especially minority communities.
Over the past four years, the OSCE has organized a number of pilot trainings by international experts for selected groups of high-ranking police officials.13 These constitute only the first small step towards training the entire police force and larger-scale police reform proposals are still pending with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. At the time of this writing, the reforms have not yet been agreed, and there is no timeline for their implementation.14
According to one international official close to the process, there remains resistance at high levels within the Ministry of the Interior, apparently resulting from fear that reform would eventually lead to decentralization of police structures and diffusion of power away from Belgrade. The change of government in July, and the appointment of a new Interior minister, does not appear to have altered this.15
Human Rights Watch wrote to the head of the Uniformed Police Directorate, in August 2008 seeking comment on the status of police reform (see Annex II). His response referred to a series of ongoing measures to improve relations between the police and the minority communities, including training workshops for the police, the creation of local "safety councils" with representatives of minority communities and the police, and outreach to encourage recruitment of minorities. 16 While welcome, the measures have yet to translate into effective investigation of attacks on minorities or greater minority representation in the police. Nor do the measures amount to the introduction of a community policing model, not least because the police remain under centralized control.
Criminal courts and public prosecutors
Serbia is divided into districts. Districts are, in turn, divided into municipalities. Most districts and municipalities have their own criminal courts and prosecutors. District and municipal-level judges and prosecutors are selected by the Serbian parliament in the capital Belgrade. District courts, as a general rule, have jurisdiction over crimes punishable with prison sentences exceeding ten years, while municipal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate lesser offenses. Serbian legislation also lists specific crimes which, although not punishable with more than ten years of imprisonment, are within the competence of district courts. Incitement to ethnic, racial and religious hatred is one of these crimes.
Misdemeanor judges
Minor offences defined as "misdemeanors" are dealt with outside the criminal justice system by misdemeanor judges, who are appointed by the Serbian executive branch. Despite their formal titles, they are not members of the judiciary. Administrative agencies, inspectorates, and other bodies "empowered with public authority" are in charge of initiating misdemeanor proceedings.
The law on misdemeanors, adopted in 2006, and which entered into force on January 1, 2007, identifies a misdemeanor as "an unlawful, wrongfully committed act, which has been identified by the competent authority as misdemeanor."17 Misdemeanors can be prescribed by law or decree, or by decision of an assembly of a town or city. Misdemeanor sanctions include: penalties, cautions, orders of court and corrective measures. According to the law on misdemeanors, "a fine, penalty of imprisonment, community service or penalty points, including the cancellation of a driver’s license, can be prescribed for a misdemeanor."18
This updated misdemeanor law does not differ from the old version as far as specifying types of punishable conducts, and the provisions on specific misdemeanors are identical. One substantial change in the new misdemeanor law is the provision elevating the misdemeanor system, which would elevate misdemeanors judges into members of judiciary. However, this provision is still to be implemented at the time of this writing.19
Misdemeanor judges operate in most municipalities in Serbia. Appeals of their decisions go to one of the misdemeanor chambers that exist throughout Serbia.20 The misdemeanor chamber in Novi Sad, for example, hears appeals of the decisions by misdemeanor judges in Vojvodina.
Investigating and prosecuting offences
In Serbia, responsibility for carrying out investigations is diffused among the police, investigative judges and prosecutors. A shortcoming of this system is that it is conducive to confusion over who leads the process and who has ultimate oversight authority over it. The new criminal code empowers prosecutors and investigative judges to work with the police and supervise their activities more closely.
The process starts when the police receive a report of an alleged offense. They are charged with conducting a preliminary investigation in order to gather initial information about the case. On the basis of their preliminary investigation, the police evaluate the appropriateness of legal proceedings.
There are four bodies authorized under the law to refer a case for prosecution as either a misdemeanor or a criminal offense: the police, misdemeanor judges, the office of the public prosecutor, and judges in the criminal courts. The police can refer a case either to a public prosecutor or misdemeanor judge, depending on their assessment of the gravity of the offense. If the police opt for misdemeanor charges, it is open to a misdemeanor judge to determine that the act constitutes a criminal offense rather than a misdemeanor. In that case, the misdemeanor judge can declare a lack of jurisdiction and refer the case to the competent public prosecutor. The misdemeanor judge can also complete the misdemeanor proceedings and report the case to the competent criminal prosecutor. This is not considered double jeopardy (prosecution for the same offense more than once) because misdemeanor proceedings are administrative rather than judicial, and because a finding of guilt does not constitute conviction on a criminal charge.
In case of charges determined by the police to be of a criminal nature, a district prosecutor has to accept these charges and send them to an investigative judge to supervise the police investigation. Under the new criminal code enacted in June 2006 (which entered into force in June 2007), a district prosecutor can assume the similar role to an investigative judge in terms of overseeing the police investigation. This new role for prosecutors further diffuses responsibilities for investigations, making it harder to assess where responsibility for inaction may lie.
An investigative judge works in a close cooperation with the police to collect all information pertinent to the proceedings and to secure evidence.21 When there is sufficient evidence to support an indictment, an investigative judge needs to hand the file over to a prosecutor, who then drafts an indictment. The role of an investigative judges ends at this points. With respect to the incidents addressed in this report, prosecutions are initiated by offices of public prosecutor.22
Prosecuting Offences with an Ethnic or Religious Motivation
There are three legal avenues for prosecuting offences with an ethnic motivation. The first option is to charge the suspect with general public order offenses under the criminal code, such as violent behavior or participation in group violence.
The second option is to treat the offense as a misdemeanor, an administrative charge that may encompass public order offenses, which are under the jurisdiction of the misdemeanor courts (outside of the criminal justice system) and prosecuted by municipal prosecutors.
The third way to charge suspects is to use Article 317 of the criminal code, which prohibits incitement to ethnic, racial and religious hatred. For an offense to qualify as an Article 317 crime, it is not necessary that the perpetrators’ motive is hatred. Criminal responsibility under Article 317 attaches when the perpetrator intended to incite hatred against the victim group, or knew that hatred was a likely result and was reckless as to whether such hatred resulted ("advertent recklessness"). District courts have jurisdiction over alleged Article 317 crimes, which are prosecuted by district prosecutors.
Human Rights Watch has previously advocated for the more robust use of the Article 317 (Article 134 of the old criminal code), in order to ensure that ethnically and religiously motivated crimes result in criminal convictions against adults. In 2005, we reported out that most crimes committed against national minorities as acts of retaliation in response to events in Kosovo (the anti-Serbian riots) were classified as misdemeanors and in some cases ordinary offenses of violent behavior. This classification resulted in light punishments—and in case of misdemeanors in symbolic penalties.
Despite the introduction of the 2006 criminal code, the way offenses with ethnic or religious motivation are being prosecuted has not changed. In 2008 Article 317 (Article 134 of the previous criminal code), which prohibits incitement to ethnic, racial and religious hatred was still not used to prosecute cases of inter-ethnic violence.
Absence of hate crimes legislation
Furthermore, Serbian criminal law still lacks a clear provision that would allow for the imposition of greater sentences for ethnically aggravated forms of offences, which Human Rights Watch recommended in 2005. Article 54 of the criminal code called "General Rules on Sentencing" states that the "court shall determine the penalty for the perpetrator of a criminal offence within boundaries prescribed by the law for that crime, and taking into consideration the purpose of punishment as well as all mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and in particular: degree of guilt, motives out of which the offense was committed . . ."23 But neither Article 54 nor any other provision of the criminal code explicitly states that the court may impose a harsher penalty if the victim has been targeted because of his or her actual or perceived race, religion, or ethnicity. Moreover, in practice prosecutors do not tend to argue that ethnic motivation is a factor justifying a higher sentence under Article 54 and judges do not take such motivation into account when passing sentence.24
International human rights law permits but does not require states to adopt "hate crime" legislation, apart from the requirement to prohibit violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another color or ethnic origin.25
Typically, "hate crime" laws permit higher sentences for criminal acts that are aggravated by racial, ethnic, religious or other hatred. Human Rights Watch supports the enactment of such laws as long as they are appropriately enforced to protect the rights of all ethnic, racial, and other groups.
Serbia’s Obligations under International Human Rights Law
The clearest statement’s of Serbia’s duties in the area of protection of minorities is set out in the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities26, Article 6(2), which provides that:
"The Parties undertake to take appropriate measures to protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity."
The main monitoring body of experts for this treaty, its Advisory Committee, is currently considering Serbia’s second state report. The Committee is due to make its official visit to monitor Serbia’s compliance with the treaty on November 3-7, 2008.
Moreover, Article 4 of the International Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and Article 20 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contain the requirement to prohibit violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another color or ethnic origin.
The Article 14 of the Protocol no. 12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which entered into force in Serbia in 2005, adds:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.27
Finally, the Article 21 of the Declaration on the Rights of Person belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minority affirms the right for national minorities to participate effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life, and particularly to participate in decisions at national and regional levels which concern the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live.28
The last report of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) on Serbia, adopted on 14 December 2007 (and made public on April 28, 2008) recommends that Serbia ratify the revised European Social Charter, signed by Serbia in 2005, which reinforces the principle of non-discrimination for the whole set of rights stipulated by the Charter.29
Notes
13 Human Rights Watch phone interview with an international official working in Serbia, May 19, 2008.
14 Human Rights Watch e-mail correspondence with an international official in Belgrade, August 19, 2008.
15 Human Rights Watch email correspondence with international official working in Serbia, May 19, 2008.
16 Written response from the Serbian Uniform Police Directorate to Human Rights Watch, September 16, 2008.
17 Serbian Law on Misdemeanors, http://www.undp.org.yu/tareas/reports/details.cfm?id=119&navPage=6 (accessed September 1, 2008).
18 Ibid.
19 The revised and current versions of the Law on Misdemeanors are available on the Serbian Parliament’s website, http://www.parlament.sr.gov.yu/content/lat/akta/zakoni.asp (accessed October 4, 2008).
20 ABA CEELI, "Comparative Overview of Basic Principles on the Position of the Prosecution Service," February 21, 2007, http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/serb_basic_principles_prosecution.pdf (accessed May 21, 2008).
21 Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, http://www.abanet.org/rol/news/news-serbia-cpc-training.shtml (accessed September 1, 2008).
22 Zakon o Krivicnom Postupku [Serbian Criminal Procedure Law], http://www.projuris.org/DOC/zakoni/krivicno_pravo/krivicni_postupak/01.ZAKONIK_O_KRIVICNOM_POSTUPKU_(2006).pdf (accessed May 21, 2008).
23 Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia, November 2006, http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/dc/a9/576c23dc41967e427086bf4c2b45.pdf (accessed August 16, 2008).
24 In contrast, the Croatian Criminal Code, amended in 2006, contains such an explicit provision. Amendments to the Penal Code, Narodne novine [Official Gazette], no. 71/2006, June 28, 2006, article 14 (amending article 89).
25 This provision is granted by both Art.4 of the International Convention for Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and Art. 20 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
26 Serbia is the successor state to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which acceded to the treaty on 11 May 2001. Council of Europe, http://coe.org/rs/eng/tdoc.sr/serbia-and-coe/conid_26 (accessed August 31, 2008).
27 Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/177.htm (accessed September 22, 2008).
28 International Declaration on the Rights of Person belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minority, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_minori.htm (accessed September 22, 2008).
29 Council of Europe, European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), Report on Serbia adopted on 14 December 2007 and made public on 29 April 2008, http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/ecri/1-ecri/2-country-by-country_approach/serbia/serbia_cbc_3.asp#P209_44483 (accessed September 22, 2008).
Note:
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