Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part IV

In four previous articles entitled "Turkey – Azerbaijan – Armenia: Documents Incriminating Erdogan, Still Hidden in Turkey"
(http://www.pennsylvaniachronicle.com/articles/view/94901), "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part I" (http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/95492), "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part II" (http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/96354) and "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part III" (http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/96383), I illustrated some of the reasons for which the theologically extremist, politically Islamist, historically ignorant, intellectually gullible, and diplomatically inexperienced prime minister of Turkey has to be removed by any means and at all costs.

In support of my approach to the (well hidden by the Western mass media and the Erdogan administration) subject of the forthcoming dissolution of Turkey, I brought to surface a critical document that remains widely – and catastrophically – unknown in Turkey, namely the Report presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with respect to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Submitted in November 2004, the Report "The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference" demonstrates clearly that the countries with which Turkey has been allied, and the major powers involved in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, drastically prevent Turkey from implementing policies pertaining to the interests of Ankara and Baku that are identical; even worse the Erdogan – Gul administration is fully compliant with these powers.

Erdogan’s and Gul’s compliance with Anti-Turkish policies is revealed throughout this document, which demonstrates that there are international organizations ready to accept to consider, discuss and ponder about incredibly biased approaches, as is in the case of the Armenian –Azerbaijani conflict about Nagorno – Karabakh the inclusion of any reference to events occurred in the Ottoman Empire that are fallaciously described by the Armenian racists as ‘Genocide’. Nagorno – Karabakh was not part of the Ottoman Empire when the events that are fallaciously called by the Armenians as "genocide" took place.

The Islamist Turkish administration is guilty; either they studied the document and failed to reach the correct conclusion or they did not bother to take it into account because they are mere puppets of the Anglo-French Freemasonic establishments that dictate to them their demarches step by step. This means that either Erdogan and Gul are ignorant or they function as puppets; under either circumstances, the Turkish people and the Turkish army must resort to concerted action and eliminate them before they open the Armenian border.

Quite contrarily with the colonial powers, Turkey has nothing to win from the reopening of the Armenian border. Any formal recognition of Armenia plays in the Freemasonic game, consisting in a step toward the destruction of Turkey. Those who help the colonial powers in their Anti-Turkish agenda have no reasonable explanation to provide the Turkish public with about their paranoid and treacherous acts. They call their policy ‘peace’ whereas it signals a war at the prejudice of Turkey.

With the present article, I complete the republication of the critical document.

The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Doc. 10364
29 November 2004

http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC10364.htm

Mediation efforts in the N-K conflict

Iranian mediation. Iran made a short-lived effort in March - May 1992, when two meetings took place in Tehran, the second one on presidential level. In March, the first ever cease-fire between the belligerents was achieved, but it only lasted days.

According to Iranian analysts, the effort failed for a number of reasons, one of them being that Tehran was not perceived as impartial. Iran, a traditional rival of Russia and Turkey in the region, was thought to have an interest that the newly emerging Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia survive as independent "buffer states" between itself and Russia, while keeping them in balance by pressuring the stronger side. In the N-K conflict, this would imply constraining Armenian military advances.

Iran shares the same religion with all neighbouring countries except Armenia, but has the greatest affinity with the Azerbaijanis who, like the vast majority of Iranians, are Shiite Muslims (until Azerbaijani independence, Iran was the only State representing Shiite Muslims). On the other hand, Armenians are traditionally hostile to Iran’s rival Turkey, while Iran and Armenia have not had problems in recent history.

Iran has a sizeable Azerbaijani minority – the second largest in the country. The Azerbaijani Popular Front had a pro-Turkish orientation. At one point the APF openly appealed to Iranian Azerbaijanis to secede and join Azerbaijan. While allegations that Iran provided arms to Armenia were not proven, it is certain that Yerevan today enjoys very good relations with the Iranian neighbour.

In a little known episode, in September 1993, when Armenians launched an attack on Nakhichevan, Iranian troops crossed the border, with the official purpose to guarantee the security of the jointly managed dams on the Araz river and to establish camps for Azerbaijani refugees (Iran says it hosts over 4 million refugees from Azerbaijan and Iraq). After this event, there was no further military action in Nakhichevan.

Russian mediation. In October 1993, President Yeltsin of Russia proposed to his counterparts from the three South Caucasian states to adopt a declaration calling for the unblocking of lines of communication, joint protection of the borders of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with Turkey and Iran and .setting up of Russian military bases for this purpose. Presidents Ter-Petrosian and Shevardnadze agreed, but President Aliyev maintained that a declaration of this type could not be adopted until the Armenian forces had withdrawn from the occupied Azeri territories.

Earlier, in September 1991, President Yeltsin and President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan visited Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan. Following the visit, the first direct negotiations took place in Zheleznovodsk, Russia, with the participation of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as the N-K leadership.

Negotiating mechanisms

The UN Security Council adopted, in 1993, four resolutions on the N-K conflict9. They called for cessation of military activities and hostile acts, withdrawal of forces and resumption of negotiations, condemned the violation of the then established cease-fire and the excessive use of force in response thereto. The UN Security Council also referred to the forces that overtook the Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan as "local Armenian forces" and urged the Armenian government "to exert its influence" on the Armenians of N-K.

The Minsk process goes back to March 1992, when the CSCE Helsinki Meeting requested the Chairman-in-Office to convene a conference in Minsk on N-K peaceful settlement. The meeting named eleven States to participate in the conference. The conference never took place, but the name of the Belarusian capital remained attached to the process and the would-be participants became known as the Minsk Group. N-K was to be invited to the conference as an interested party. The formula "elected and other representatives of N-K" refers to the de facto authorities and the Azerbaijani refugees.

In 1994, the OSCE Budapest Summit "strongly endorsed the mediation efforts of the CSCE Minsk Group and expressed appreciation for the crucial contribution of the Russian Federation and the efforts by other individual members of the Minsk Group". In order to harmonize these into a single co-ordinated effort, a Co-Chairmanship for the process was established – Russia and Finland. In 1997, the Co-Chairmanship was revised to its current composition: the United States, Russian Federation and France.

The Minsk Group receives assistance from the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office, who resides in the region and a High-Level Planning Group made up of military experts seconded by OSCE participating States. The latter is a dormant body, which would come into action if and when the multinational OSCE peacekeeping force recommended by the Budapest Summit is established.

The Minsk Group has put forward several peace plans, which have been rejected as they were not seen to deal acceptably with major concerns of one or another party to the conflict,

Direct negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan at the highest level go back to the Zheleznovodsk meeting mentioned above. President Aliyev and Kocharyan have met nearly 20 times, with no breakthrough or decisive step forward in sight.

In December 2002, the OSCE Porto Ministerial meeting "welcomed the continuing meetings of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan and of their Special Representatives" and "encouraged the parties to continue their efforts, with the active support of the Co-Chairmen, aimed at reaching a just and enduring settlement".

Positions of the sides

Comment: the viewpoints of the parties to the conflict remain opposed as to the causes of the conflict, the way in which it should be resolved and which problems should be addressed first.

The key elements of the positions can be summarized as follows:

Pictures Flag 1 – Azerbaijan

Occupied territories must be liberated as a precondition for serious negotiations;

● with territories occupied, there can be no regional co-operation or "business as usual";

● the return of the refugees must be addressed at an early stage of the negotiations;

● Azerbaijan is prepared to grant N-K "the highest level of autonomy known in the world", or "in concrete terms – the status of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation";

● as the conflict is settled, Azerbaijan will re-establish normal relations with Armenia - (In Armenian terms – will lift the blockade).

Pictures Flag 2 – Armenia

● the blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey is illegal and must be lifted;

● Armenia has no territorial claims to Azerbaijan;

● N-K must be recognised as a party to the conflict and of the negotiating process;

● The occupied territories will be returned to Azerbaijan once the conflict is settled;

● The Lachin corridor must remain under Armenian sovereignty but will be compensated to Azerbaijan by equal territory from other parts of N-K;

● Armenia stands ready to develop regional co-operation and confidence-building measures.

Pictures Flag 3 – Nagorno Karabakh

* N-K has already covered its part of the road to compromise by renouncing the claim to union with Armenia and agreeing to be independent;

● N-K sovereign existence does not depend on international recognition, because N-K has (1) a territory and (2) population as well as (3) elected, organized and functioning authorities and is (4) capable of assuming and fulfilling international obligations.

Settlement options

The content of the proposals for settlement officially remains a secret. Nevertheless it is not difficult to see that any solution has to be one of or a mix of elements from the following main options:

(1) restitution of the status quo ante;

(2) self-rule of N-K within Azerbaijan;

(3) "common state" or a confederal/federal set-up (this option remains very unclear);

(4) independence or merging with Armenia for N-K with either

(5) a swap of territories or

(6) exchange of corridors in order to ensure continuity between Armenia and N-K on one side and Azerbaijan and its exclave Nakhichevan on the other side.

In 1996, the OSCE Lisbon summit elaborated three principles for settling the N-K conflict:

● territorial integrity of Armenia and Azerbaijan;

● N-K legal status to be based on self-determination and highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan;

● guaranteed security for N-K and its whole population.

The above principles could not be adopted by consensus due to Armenian disagreement.

According to Azerbaijani sources, in 1997, on the margins of the Second Council of Europe Summit, Presidents Aliyev and Kocharyan reached an understanding based on a swap of territories. Subsequently Armenia allegedly rejected the arrangement, which had also become known as the Sadarak agreement. The Armenian view is that a swap of territories is not possible as it would cut Armenia off its border with Iran.

In April 2001, further to their travel to Strasbourg on the occasion of the joint accession of Armenia and Azerbaijan to the Council of Europe, the two presidents met in Paris upon the invitation of President Chirac of France. Reportedly, an agreement was reached, referred to as the Paris principles. Subsequently, in a weeklong negotiation in a proximity format10 in Key West, US, the Paris agreement was put on paper. The bargaining seems to be about exchange of corridors, the Lachin corridor linking Armenia with N-K and the Meghri corridor linking Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan.

Photocopy and Map

In October 2002, there were vague press reports about new Azerbaijani proposals – notably, to divide contested lands with international mediation, with some localities choosing by referendum whether they belong to Armenia or to Azerbaijan. The same reports indicated that Baku had reiterated it would never accept that N-K become a new sovereign state.

Problems of Conflict Settlement

Comment: the following summary is based on writings by experts in conflict-prevention and negotiation.

The extent of historical mistrust between Azerbaijanis and Armenians is difficult to evaluate. Whereas both sides may be exaggerating at present, serious violent episodes date back at least to the end of the 19th century. At the same time, as recently as 1990, far more Armenians lived in Baku than in N-K. During the N-K war, Armenians maintained life-saving relations with Iranian Azerbaijanis.

Some experts argue that, generally speaking, in the South Caucasus the definition of ethnicity as well as the link between ethnicity and territory may be not so strong as in other regions where nation-building took place earlier and in different circumstances.

Armenians are mistrustful of all Turkic-speaking Muslims, whom they tend to view as a single people ("Turks"). Most Azerbaijanis and Armenians seem to believe that the N-K conflict is not simply between Governments or the military, but between their two peoples.

The internally displaced persons, in particular in Azerbaijan and especially those from N-K are known to be a bitter and intensely radicalised force, and have been responsible for attacks on Armenians in Baku. Here again, the problem may be exaggerated. Some observers believe that Baku is not doing enough to help refugees integrate – as integration would mean accepting the Armenian war gains.

Security problems.

Azerbaijan cannot feel secure while Armenians occupy seven of its provinces. However, if Baku forces were to re-establish control of Azerbaijani territories, the Armenian perception about the south-eastern part of their country would be one of vulnerability. In addition, Yerevan has particular worries about its long border with Turkey. Last October, Armenian Defence Minister Sarkisian told the press that the newly created joint Russian- Armenian military unit is to serve, inter alia as a deterrent against a possible Turkish incursion. Generally, security perceptions are a particular concern for Armenia and represent one of the main stumbling blocks in the attempts to find a settlement.

The state of democratic reform. Ethnic Armenians find it difficult to trust a government in Baku that they may perceive as authoritarian, corrupt, and intolerant of minorities; Azerbaijanis, for their part, cannot bring themselves to trust the government of a state they believe is constructed on a strictly ethnic basis - a state that acts as if it believes Armenia is for ethnic Armenians alone.

Domestic politics.

The way the N-K conflict has interlocked the actors in internal political life both in Yerevan and Baku may be the single biggest obstacle to solution. President Kocharyan, himself native of N-K, came to power after his predecessor Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign by N-K hardliners opposing his moves towards settlement. Some analysts note that, against the background of economic difficulties, Yerevan has little to deliver for the time being, except a war that was won and a national dream. In Azerbaijan, the predecessors of President Aliyev are seen to have lost the war. Partly for this reason, the present-day political opposition in Baku often takes a harder line on the conflict than the Government. President Aliyev, a native of the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, can hardly afford to be seen to give in to Yerevan.

Once, a high-ranking official from the region put the political problem in a nutshell: both in Armenia and Azerbaijan, N-K is both a source of power and a threat to power.

Guarantees.

N-K is very sensitive to the question of guarantees. N-K recalls the British guarantees of 1918-1920, which did not prevent the application of force by the first Azerbaijani Republic, and the "guarantees" of the Soviet Union, which permitted what Stepanakert sees as the de-Armenianization of Nakhichevan.

Regional issues.

Several analysts indicate that the conflict is unlikely to find a lasting settlement before the regional powers – Russia, Turkey and Iran – adapt to geo-political changes. In the post - 11 September world, these geo-political shifts are not necessarily a zero sum game where gain by one side is another side’s loss.

Common interest in settlement.

From 1988 to 1994, the GDP of Azerbaijan fell 73%. Azerbaijan needs to have the N-K conflict solved to gain stability for development based on oil wealth. According to experts, Azerbaijan has enough energy deposits to finance two generations of economic growth. There would be the immediate economic gain of a large segment of the population – the refugees and IDPs – returning to regular economic activity. Experts also caution that oil-based development is only guaranteed in a country with stable democratic institutions ("will Azerbaijan develop like Norway or like Nigeria").

From 1988 to 1994 Armenia saw its GDP fall by 60%. Particularly in Armenia, the economic situation was further aggravated by the 1999 Russian financial system crisis. For Armenia, not having diplomatic relations with two out of four neighbours is clearly an abnormal situation. Restoring regular relations with the outside world would not only bring transport costs back to normal but would also enable Armenia’s longer-term comparative advantages – the Diaspora support with its networking and lobbying power and capability to raise investment. There are expert calculations suggesting that Armenia could experience a short term increase of up to 40% of GDP. Some analysts broadly compare the Armenian "Diaspora factor" to the Azerbaijani "oil factor". In this context, the "Norway vs. Nigeria dilemma" is also valid for Yerevan.

The Council of Europe position

Armenia and Azerbaijan joined the Council of Europe simultaneously on 25 January 2001. For the first time in its history, the Organisation invited two new members with a bitter unresolved conflict between them. This was made possible by the prevailing understanding, both in the Parliamentary Assembly and in member States’ Governments that the accession of Azerbaijan and Armenia could help to establish the climate of trust needed for a solution to the N-K conflict.

Picture

The Political Affairs Committee held hearings on the N-K in 1998 and 1999. While voting positively on their accession demands, the Parliamentary Assembly asked Armenia and Azerbaijan to commit themselves, with regard to the N-K conflict:

● to continue efforts to settle the conflict by peaceful means only;

● to settle international and domestic disputes by peaceful means and according to the principles of international law (an obligation incumbent on all Council of Europe member states), resolutely rejecting any threatened use of force against its neighbours;

● (for Armenia) to use its considerable influence over the Armenians in N-K to foster a solution to the conflict;

The Presidents, Speakers of parliaments, Prime Ministers and the chairmen of the political parties represented in Parliaments of Armenia and Azerbaijan confirmed these commitments in writing.

The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan wrote separately to reiterate their countries’ commitment to a peaceful negotiated settlement of the N-K on the basis of a compromise acceptable to all concerned. President Aliyev stressed that Azerbaijan’s accession to the Council of Europe would be a major contribution to the negotiations process and stability in the region.

Comment: the commitments regarding N-K are spelled out in less detail compared to domestic law and human rights obligations. Nevertheless, the Organisation regards them as seriously as any other commitments. They are subject to monitoring procedures.

In September 2002, the Parliamentary Assembly adopted Resolutions 1304 and 1305(2002) on the honouring of obligations by Armenia and Azerbaijan, where it:

● recognized that Armenia and Azerbaijan maintained regular high-level contacts with a view to reach a suitable and peaceful solution to the conflict,

● acknowledged in particular the positive influence of Armenia on the Armenians in N-K,

● voiced concern with the prevailing frustration in Azeri society at the deadlocked negotiations on the conflict, which is more and more frequently expressed,

● expressed hope that the negotiation process - including a recent meeting of the Presidents would soon lead to an acceptable settlement of the territorial conflict in line with the principles of the Council of Europe and international law,

The Assembly has appointed Mr. Terry Davis (UK, Soc) Rapporteur on N-K.

The Committee of Ministers monitoring Group, also known as "GT-Suivi Ago" follows regularly N-K conflict settlement efforts. It asks questions in writing, urges Yerevan and Baku to build confidence and, generally, impresses on the two countries the position of the member States’ Governments.

In April 2002, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers, further to a visit to the South Caucasus region, reported, "the most difficult challenge the member States face are their unresolved conflicts. Indeed, the conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia undermine the European efforts to assist Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and threaten to effectively put limits on the process of democratisation".

In January 2003, the Enlarged Bureau of the Committee of Ministers’ Deputies held an exchange of views with the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Group and the Special Representatives of the two Presidents.

Within the framework of its assistance activities, the Council of Europe can bring to the sides in the conflict the European experience of post-conflict reconciliation and "work on the past". It can also promote regional co-operation as one of the means of post-conflict rehabilitation, and it can apply the Organisation know-how in working with the civil society for awareness raising and confidence-building. If a solution requires legal expertise, the Council of Europe, through the Venice Commission, remains prepared to help the Minsk Group work out the legal aspects of N-K status and protection of minorities.

Comment: In the end, Nagorno-Karabakh is part of the shared history and common suffering of the Armenian and Azerbaijani people. A common solution must be found for a better future.

Note
Picture: The existing and the prospect pipelines highlight the geo-strategic importance of the entire Caucasus region.