Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part III

In three previous articles entitled "Turkey – Azerbaijan – Armenia: Documents Incriminating Erdogan, Still Hidden in Turkey"
(http://www.pennsylvaniachronicle.com/articles/view/94901), "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part I" (http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/95492) and "Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia: Erdogan Cannot Be Allowed to Act as Turkish Premier Anymore. Part II" (http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/view/96354), I illustrated some of the reasons for which the theologically extremist, politically Islamist, historically ignorant, intellectually gullible, and diplomatically inexperienced prime minister of Turkey has to be removed by any means and at all costs.

In support of my approach to the (well hidden by the Western mass media and the Erdogan administration) subject of the forthcoming dissolution of Turkey, I brought to surface a critical document that remains widely – and catastrophically – unknown in Turkey, namely the Report presented to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe with respect to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Submitted in November 2004, the Report "The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference" demonstrates clearly that the countries with which Turkey has been allied, and the major powers involved in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, drastically prevent Turkey from implementing policies pertaining to the interests of Ankara and Baku that are identical; even worse the Erdogan – Gul administration is fully compliant with these powers.

Erdogan’s and Gul’s compliance with Anti-Turkish policies is revealed throughout this document, which demonstrates that there are international organizations ready to accept to consider, discuss and ponder about incredibly biased approaches, as is in the case of the Armenian –Azerbaijani conflict about Nagorno – Karabakh the inclusion of any reference to events occurred in the Ottoman Empire that are fallaciously described by the Armenian racists as ‘Genocide’. Nagorno – Karabakh was not part of the Ottoman Empire when the events that are fallaciously called by the Armenians as "genocide" took place.

The Islamist Turkish administration is guilty; either they studied the document and failed to reach the correct conclusion or they did not bother to take it into account because they are mere puppets of the Anglo-French Freemasonic establishments that dictate to them their demarches step by step. This means that either Erdogan and Gul are ignorant or they function as puppets; under either circumstances, the Turkish people and the Turkish army must resort to concerted action and eliminate them before they open the Armenian border.

Through effective swinging policies, the Anti-Turkish Freemasonic regimes of England and France intend to reproduce the Nagorno – Karabakh experiment in Turkey. The opening of the Turkish – Armenian borders will be followed by an influx of arms smuggled into parts of what the high traitor "president" of Turkey called "Kurdistan".

Subsequently, an explosion in the so-called Kurdistan of Turkey will become the "logical" reason for a certain degree of "autonomy"; later onm, a number of Armenians will try to alter the demographic data in a small area between Erzerum and Agri. At the final stage, they will call for international support to …… save them from a purported "second" genocide!

At this moment, nothing of all this seems possible; on the contrary, things seem to advance towards the opposite direction, and the tiny racist state of Armenia, this evil realm of hatred and rancor, seems predestined to get dissolved and become a province of Turkey - in due course of time. Armenia’s supporters want to use the tiny and impoverished realm in order to cause damage to Turkey that has always been their main target in the East. They have therefore to save Armenia from the rapidly worsening economic collapse; the best way to do so is to force Turkey to open the Armenian border.

Quite contrarily with the colonial powers, Turkey has nothing to win from the reopening of the Armenian border. Any formal recognition of Armenia plays in the Freemasonic game, consisting in a step toward the destruction of Turkey. Those who help the colonial powers in their Anti-Turkish agenda have no reasonable explanation to provide the Turkish public with about their paranoid and treacherous acts. They call their policy ‘peace’ whereas it signals a war at the prejudice of Turkey.

I will complete the republication of the document in forthcoming articles.

The Conflict Over the Nagorno-Karabakh Region Dealt With by the OSCE Minsk Conference

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Doc. 10364
29 November 2004

http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc04/EDOC10364.htm

The demise of the USSR and the slide into war

Comment: the early stages of the N-K conflict developed against complex and rapid political changes in the USSR, but also in Soviet Azerbaijan and Armenia. Without a deep knowledge of the epoch, many of the positions taken by key decision-makers of the time may seem unconvincing or irresponsible. The perception problem should be kept in mind, as this paper can only give the briefest of sketches about this period.

During Gorbachev’s "glasnost" times, N-K renewed its drive for a change of status. On the basis of a popular petition4, in February 1988, the N-K Supreme Soviet appealed to the Supreme Soviets of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the USSR to allow NKAO to join the Armenian SSR. In June1988, the Armenian lawmakers approved the request; two days later their Azerbaijani counterparts rejected it. Such a clash between Union Republics was without precedent in the USSR. In July 1988, Moscow decided to maintain the disputed region within Azerbaijan, but adopted "special measures for the accelerated development of NKAO". As the situation seemed to get worse, in January 1989, Moscow established direct governance over N-K.

The Azerbaijani view is that these were unjustified measures taken by Moscow under the influence of hard Armenian lobbying (in particular, of Mr. Gorbachev’s family) as part of a sinister plan to wrench N-K away from Azerbaijan.

On 24 February 1988, a direct confrontation between Azerbaijanis and Armenians near Askeran (in N-K, on the road Stepanakert-Agdam)5 degenerated into a skirmish. During the clashes, which left about 50 Armenians wounded, a local policeman, reportedly an Armenian, shot dead two Azerbaijanis - Bakhtiyar Uliyev, 16 and Ali Hajiyev, 23.

On 27 February 1988, while speaking on Central TV, the USSR Deputy Prosecutor General mentioned the nationality of those killed. Within hours, a pogrom against Armenian residents began in the city of Sumgait, 25 km North of Baku, where many Azerbaijani refugees resided. The pogrom lasted for three days. According to reports, phone calls for help to the local police and ambulance services went unanswered. Later, Moscow covered up the Sumgait affair as "hooliganism".

The Armenian view is that the Sumgait pogroms were prepared months in advance and implemented with the tacit approval, if not covert assistance, by the authorities. The Sumgait events conjured up ever-present memories of "Turks killing Armenians". In Yerevan, the "Karabakh Committee" was formed, soon to be headed by future President Levon Ter-Petrosian. In N-K, its counterpart was the "Krunk Committee" - from the Armenian word for crane, a symbol of longing for the homeland.

The Azerbaijani view is that, against the background of the expulsion of thousands of Azerbaijanis from the Meghri and Kafan districts of Armenia, the killing of the two young men triggered the outburst of violence in Sumgait. The violence was two-way: the official investigation reported 32 deaths - 6 Azerbaijanis and 26 Armenians.

In 1988-1989, the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) emerged as an alternative to the Communist Party. The Azerbaijani Communist Party, increasingly unable to govern, allowed APF to stage giant meetings in Baku in the summer of 1989 – also as a means to impress on Moscow the need to bring back N-K under Azerbaijani control. The APF used nationalism and the N-K issue to stir up popular support.

By end-1989, the N-K crisis, the Azerbaijani refugee problems and an assortment of local grievances had brought the situation in Baku close to explosion. When the Armenian and N-K legislatures adopted the joint resolution "On the reunification of N-K with Armenia" (1 December 1989), many in Azerbaijan thought that was the last straw.

In January 1990, the sporadic pogroms in Baku took on an organized character. Azerbaijani sources point out that the local militia was disarmed on orders from Moscow, thus preventing it from keeping law and order. The Armenian view is that the city was being cleared of Armenians house by house. The number of fatalities is not known. The Soviet Army Baku garrison, under Moscow commandment, stayed in the barracks.

On 15 January 1990, Moscow lawmakers imposed a state of emergency in N-K. Their Baku counterparts did not give approval, as required by the procedure. A week later Soviet tanks rolled out in Baku. The Soviet Army reportedly used armour and random fire to remove barricades, killing over 130 mostly very young civilians and wounding many times more. In Azerbaijan, this tragedy is known as the "Black January".

By the autumn of 1990, elections had taken place in all three South Caucasian Soviet Socialist Republics, The communists retained power only in Azerbaijan. Russian analysts note that support for Azerbaijan was acquiring added significance for the Kremlin, which aimed at safeguarding the Soviet Union. Indeed in March 1991, Azerbaijan voted "in favour" of the preservation of the USSR.

Starting in April 1991, Soviet forces and Azerbaijani militia stepped up the pressure on ethnic Armenian paramilitaries operating in N-K. Russia had already deployed troops to Yerevan, too. The Armenian side holds Moscow responsible for conducting deportations of Armenians of northern N-K in the spring of 1991. Twenty-six N-K villages were reportedly surrounded and ethnically cleansed by USSR and Azerbaijani forces in operations known as "Kaltso" (Ring), resulting in the killing of more than 150 civilians and the deportation of some 10.000 ethnic Armenians.

For their part, the Azerbaijani side holds Russia responsible for the decisive military assistance to Armenia as well as for episodes of anti-Azeri ethnic cleansing (notably, the role of the Russian 366th motorized regiment in the Khojali massacre).

The Nagorno-Karabakh war

After the August 1991 putsch failed, in September Moscow ordered the Soviet Army units to cease military actions and return to their barracks. On 2 September 1991, the "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" was declared. The newly emerged entity had its own "self-defense forces", which quickly swelled to some 15 000. Violence in N-K increased dramatically. In November 1991, Azerbaijan adopted a law "On Abolishing NKAO". In 1992, the N-K conflict escalated into a full-scale war, which saw episodes of aerial bombardments of Stepanakert, tank battles in the north and trench war along the Iranian border.

In February 1992, almost day-to-day four years after the Sumgait events, the ethnic Armenian forces attacked the only airport in N-K, in Khojali, to the North of the local capital. At the time, the population of Khojali was 7000. The Azerbaijani view is that the taking of Khojali, which left some 150 defenders of the airport dead, was followed by unprecedented brutalities against the civilian population. In one day, reportedly 613 unarmed people were massacred and close to 1300 were captured – many of them while trying to flee through an alleged humanitarian corridor. The Armenian side contests this view and the number of casualties.

The Khojali massacre sparked an exodus of Azerbaijanis and precipitated a political crisis in Baku. Five years later, in 1997, President Aliyev issued a Decree referring to the tragedy as the "Khojali genocide".

In May 1992, Armenian forces overtook Shusha (or Shushi, in Armenian) and the Lachin district of Azerbaijan, establishing a link between N-K and Armenia proper – the so-called "Lachin corridor". The fall of traditionally Azerbaijani Shusha, a fortress reputed for its strong defences, is one of the most controversial events in the war. Azerbaijani political forces and individuals have been accused by their opponents but also by regional actors (Iran) of willingly surrendering Shusha for political reasons of the moment.

In June 1992, the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) Chairman Ebulfez Elcibey won the presidential election. Born in N-K, a former dissident having spent time in Soviet prisons, Mr Elcibey became a prominent nationalist. Under his presidency, Azerbaijan launched a fresh military offensive, which eventually turned unsuccessful. In June 1993, the APF was ousted from power by the forces of rebel army colonel Suret Gusseinov. Mr Geidar Aliyev replaced Elcibey.

By October 1993, ethnic Armenian forces succeeded in occupying almost all of N-K, as well as large areas in south-western Azerbaijan. Hundreds of thousands of refugees fled to other parts of Azerbaijan. The map on the next page represents the official position of Azerbaijan as regards occupied territories and refugees.

In May 1994 Azerbaijan, N-K and Armenia, with the mediation of Russia, Kyrgyzstan and the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly signed the Bishkek Protocol and a few days later, the 1994 Moscow cease-fire, which holds to this day.

Two pictures

Armenian refugee – living in makeshift shelter
Azerbaijani refugee - burning sheep manure for heating, Sabical Camp No 1, 1997
Photo Onnik Krikorian
Photo Betty Blair
Photocopies

Figures about refugees and internally displaced persons are disputed on both sides. Therefore the numbers given below are of indicative value. The total number of Armenians who left their homes in Azerbaijan is estimated at 300.000. Around 30.000 of them were resettled in N-K and the Lachin district. The total number of exiled Azerbaijanis is estimated at 800 000, including some 200.000 refugees from Armenia and around 600.000 internally displaced persons from the zone of conflict. The latter figure counts practically all 50.000 Azerbaijanis from N-K.

Perceptions of the military conflict

The official line of Armenia and the N-K de facto authorities is that Azerbaijan had the stronger army, formed on the basis of the military equipment of the 4th Soviet Army stationed in the Azerbaijani SSR6. Nevertheless, N-K forces won the victory because their soldiers were fighting for their own homes. The Armenian logic is: we won the war because our cause is just. Azerbaijan lost the war and must come to terms with this reality.

Map

Picture

N-K men carrying their dead

In addition, while there are Russian military bases in Armenia and Russian troops guard its borders with Turkey and Iran, Azerbaijan was unfairly placed in 1992 under a "US embargo" under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act - because of Armenian lobbying7. The continuing Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land creates a strong perception of injustice done to Azerbaijan, further aggravated by the feeling that the international community tolerates the status quo.

The Azerbaijani logic is reversely identical to the Armenian one: we will never accept Armenia’s war gains. Our cause is just therefore we will prevail.

The legal side of the dispute

National aspirations. On 1 December 1989, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the N-K legislature adopted a joint resolution "On the reunification of N-K with Armenia". The resolution has not been withdrawn or otherwise invalidated.

On 23 August 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR referred to the above document in the "Declaration of Independence of Armenia". Two out of the six preambular paragraphs of the Declaration read as follows:

"Aware of its historic responsibility for the destiny of the Armenian people engaged in the realization of the aspirations of all Armenians and the restoration of historical justice";

"Based on the December 1, 1989 joint decision of the Armenian SSR Supreme Council and the Artsakh National Council on the "Reunification of the Armenian SSR and the Mountainous Region of Karabakh,"…

For the Armenian founding fathers, the independence of Armenia is inseparable from the restoration of historic justice and the unification of N-K with Armenia. The acting Constitution of Armenia, adopted on 5 July 1995, elevates these to the rank of national aspirations, in the following reference to the Declaration of Independence:

"Recognizing as a basis the fundamental principles of Armenian statehood and the national aspirations engraved in the Declaration of Independence of Armenia…"

The Azerbaijani side in the conflict points a finger to the Constitution of Armenia to prove that "Greater Armenia" aspirations are at the at the core of the Armenian domestic and foreign policy. They underscore that Yerevan has never really renounced the territorial claims to its neighbours.

Legal history. On 30 August 1991, the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijani SSR declared "the restoration of the state independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in 1918-1920". According to Armenian lawyers, this act legally nullifies the USSR set-up. Moreover, N-K was not internationally recognized as part of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic of 1918-1920. Therefore, in the Armenian view, Azerbaijan has no legal claim over N-K.

Validity of referendum. On 2 September 1991 the Regional Councils of NKAO and of the Shahumian district (on the Northern tip of N-K) proclaimed a new state - the N-K Republic. On 10 December 1991, a "referendum" on independence took place. On 6 January 1992, the "Parliament" of N-K officially declared independence.

The Armenian side maintains that the N-K independence referendum was conducted in accordance with the USSR law on the "Procedure for Solving Issues of Secession of a Soviet Republic from the USSR" of 3 April 1990. Article 3 of this law provided autonomous regions within the Soviet republics with the right to determine independently, by referendum, whether they wished to remain within the USSR or join the republic seceding from the USSR8. It would however seem that according to this law N-K would have the choice of two options – to remain within the USSR or to join independent Azerbaijan; N-K independence does not seem possible.

The Azerbaijani side points to the USSR Constitution of 1977, namely Article 78 stipulating: «The territory of Union Republics may be altered by mutual agreement of the Republics concerned, subject to ratification by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics».

Unlike the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics, the Autonomous Regions in the former USSR had neither constitutions, nor the right of secession from the USSR.

International law. In their legal disputes, both sides often refer to recognized principles of International Law, such as the right to self-determination and the respect for territorial integrity. Council of Europe experts, in providing legal assistance in a different conflict have examined arguments based on the Soviet legal doctrine, which traditionally treated self-determination outside of its legal context, in effect - much as a political concept. For information, Appendix I contains the relevant excerpts of Document CM/Inf (94) 27 of 2 September 1994 "Expertise on a Special Legal Status for the Gagauzes in Moldova".

The broader geopolitical context

The Caspian basin, very rich in oil and extremely rich in natural gas, has traditional problems in bringing the energy to the consumer markets. The shortest and cheapest route is to the South through Iran. This route (both existing pipelines and projects) is opposed, mainly by the US, on political and strategic grounds. Idem for the (more recent) Eastern route through Afghanistan. All Westward pipelines bring the oil and gas to Black Sea terminals, notably Novorossiysk. Novorossiysk also serves the bigger part of the oil coming from Northern Russian energy fields. The figure on the next page gives the main pipelines and their capacity in thousands of barrels per day.

Photocopy

Analysts agree that Russia has both an economic and a strategic interest to keep control over the Westward flow of Caspian energy. A project named Blue Stream is underway to lay a 24-inch gas pipeline on the bottom of the Black Sea to link Novorossiysk with the Turkish coast in order to bypass the Bosphorus.

The pipeline project, which has given rise to most controversy during its 10 years of gestation, is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project (BTC). Construction is now scheduled to begin in March 2003 and the first oil is to flow in 2005. BTC consists of a 1777 km-long, 42 inch-oil pipeline and a 700 km-long gas pipeline, also known as the South Caucasus Gas Pipeline. The gas will run parallel to the oil, but the pipeline is shorter as it will link to the existing Turkish gas distribution system.

The main problem of the BTC project is instability in the region. The energy route will pass some 60 km from Chechnya and 10-15 km from Armenia and N-K. The pipeline was also seen as too long and costly, but that was largely offset with the confirmation of the commercial viability of the huge Shah Deniz gas site (400 billion m3, 100 km South of Baku).

Map

The BTC carrying capacity will be one million barrels per day. That is double the size of any of the existing pipelines. The gas pipeline will carry 7 bn m3 per year by 2006 and later – double that volume. To give an idea of the scale of what is at stake: the projected oil demand of OECD countries (minus Mexico) by 2020 is close to 50 million barrels per day, with the countries in question producing themselves around 20 million barrels per day. In other words, BTC capacity will be equal to 1/30 of the oil needs of the industrialized world.

Georgia supports the BTC, from which it stands to gain yearly some 70 million usd. in transit fees. As long as the present stalemate in relations of Armenia with Azerbaijan and Turkey continues, the BTC stands to isolate further Armenia.

Map

Because of the N-K conflict, the BTC will bypass Armenia

Turkey and Azerbaijan obviously favour the project. However, the BTC will bypass two regional powers with compelling interest in oil and gas – Russia and Iran.

Whereas Iran has direct access to Asian oil markets, whose forecast growth exceeds tenfold the projected oil demand increase in Europe and the US, Russia will be particularly affected. Most of its energy exports come to Novorossiysk from oil fields in Northern Russia, increasingly expensive to exploit, through aging pipelines with lesser debit. Experts predict that several years after BTC becomes operational, market forces will squeeze smaller the Russian share of the energy trade, itself a major income source for the budget of Russia.

Pundits recall that back in 1993, Russia supported Mr Aliyev against Mr Elcibey, who was seen as much more anti-Russian. In June 1993, the month Mr Aliyev came to power, he suspended a deal with a Western consortium (BP, Amoco, Pennzoil and others) to develop three Azerbaijani oil deposits. This agreement was crucial for the Baku-Ceyhan project. Fifteen months later, on 20 September 1994, when President Aliyev had consolidated his power, he signed "the deal of the century", prompting a failed coup d’etat attempt in Baku and Ganja (where supporters of the ousted 1e Minister Suret Gusseinov took part). Russia opposed the deal, quoting the unresolved delimitation of the Caspian Sea bed.

According to US analysts, after September 2001, Moscow realised Russia cannot rely only on close relations with Armenia to guarantee its regional interests against growing US presence. Five days after the Baku-Ceyhan launching ceremony, Presidents Putin and Aliyev signed a treaty on the division of the Caspian Sea bed. Russian companies are considering participation in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. In January 2002, Baku rented to Russia the Gabala radiolocation station (RLS), close to the city of Mingacevir in central Azerbaijan. The Gabala RLS was the last but one of nine facilities the Soviet Union built to ensure its early warning capability. Put in operation in 1988, the up to 350 MW station is capable of monitoring the Persian Gulf, much of Africa and can "see" as far as Australia.

Map

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project

Note
Picture: Under the pretext of self-determination for the Armenian majority of Nagorno Karabakh (in red colour), Armenia – supported by the Freemasonic regimes of England and Francem and the easily maneuverable regime of Moscow – invaded almost one fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory (in green colour). Despite these detrimental events, the racist state of Armenia is not denounced but fervently supported by the West as a tool of destruction of Turkey, Iran and the entire Islamic World.