Theoretical Foundations of Oromo Education and Moral Order

In an earlier article entitled ‘Asafa Dibaba and the Prevalence of the Oromo Moral Order’, we published the preliminary parts (Background, Introduction) of an essay composed by the famous Oromo Intellectual Asafa Dibaba. In the present article, we publish integrally the essay’s main parts that tackle the issue of the necessity of the Moral Education. The essay’s main part, under the title ‘Theoretical overtones’, is divided into four chapters. We are convinced that Asafa Dibaba’s criticism of the modern Western educational approaches and practices consists in a genuine introduction into an African Pedagogical Science.

III. Theoretical overtones

In answering basic methodological and philosophical questions relevant to moral education, different theories and models pop up in any article of this kind. The questions include: Is moral education necessary? What is moral or character education? Can we teach moral values, how? Is moral education indoctrination? Teaching ‘moral content,’ or what? This article at its best tries to review those models to come up with some judicious but practical suggestions.

1. Is moral education necessary?
The question "Is Moral Education Really Necessary?" made a research topic in the British Journal of Educational Studies as far back as 1970s (Phillips, 1979). Phillips rightly argues man may live without a thought of God. But he questions if man has ever lived without a thought of any moral consideration (p. 42). The question is linked with the way moral education is talked of in connection with education in general and school curriculum in particular. If moral education is to be on the timetable, then what does religious instruction do, and civic education? Both do their job, but the problem is religious instructions indoctrinate, rather than educate. So, if moral education has been this important where has it been? The answer is simply this, Phillips says—"it has been hidden, taken for granted, presupposed in the complexities of the curriculum" (p 43). In practice there are shared values of educational practices in school and/or in classroom far from being hidden.

In making the hidden values explicit through moral education, emphasis is not just on how people behave but also on reasons for their behavior and on what desirable kinds of behavior might be.

To Phillips, hidden values can be made explicit in three attempts: one, by justifying values in relation to the maintenance of the system they are said to belong to. To James Hemming (1968) value education is a means to a further end, the end being either maintenance of a particular society or of a particular educational system. The notion of maintaining a given system may be confusing: maintaining a unitary conception and elevation of a group of particular interests and their false description as the interests of all can be one source of confusion. There are countless movements—cooperating and competing—that a society involves at a given time; one is educational movement.

The second attempt is this: emphasis not just on the maintenance of a movement, but on the common involvement in it, an attempt known as the "socializing of social movements" (Phillips p47). The final justification of moral and educational values would be that they are the means whereby people maintain their social solidarity.

Now, these are the two attempts supposed to characterize moral education: one is the attempts to give the values a foundation in terms of the maintenance of educational system; and the second attempt is one that gives a similar foundation in terms of the social solidarity which comes from involvement in the educational system. The third attempt to make explicit the moral and educational values involved in educational practices is emphasis on the development of the individual child. This is an attempt that needs working on the content and approach of moral education while working through the dynamics of the developing child (Hemming in Phillips, p48). This attempt is very important because its effects are far-reaching. In our case, established methods, tested materials and examined procedures are in the lacking.

Phillips believes that the possibility of moral education depends on the involvement of values in educational enquiry. Although the importance of moral education is no doubt, but, issues of methodology and underlying philosophy equally need care. The partakers in the project are theoreticians and the practitioners, namely, teachers. This is a theory-practice gap we need to narrow. Practitioners would complain that too much of the theoretical writing ignores the pressing practical problem which must be taken into account in the classroom. And scholars who write on moral education complain that often those engaged in the practice of moral education ignore the work of the theoreticians. Now, attention is both to narrow the theory-practice gap and, in doing so, to increase our understanding and knowledge of the goals and purpose of moral education.

It is often assumed that people learn their basic values during the early years of childhood. It does not matter what it is meant by ‘learning basic values.’ If it is to mean that children simply learn their society’s basic rules of ‘right’ and ‘wrong,’ or, that children ‘internalize’ those moral rules to act upon them later in life, even as children when they are not being watched, is evidently contentious.

James Hemming defines morality as those "values which are specially venerated in society because they are regarded as essential to the good conduct of personal and social life." He adds that "they provide the dependable structure within which the affairs of the society and its members may be carried on." And Hemming concludes thus: "the values which an educational system will seek to foster will, therefore be, partly what might be called ‘the values of interpersonal relationships’ and partly the values by which the particular society maintains itself" (in Phillips 1976: 46).

Research studies indicate that students who are self-disciplined and who identify themselves with traditional values (e.g., religiosity, courage, and hard work) tend to score higher than students who do not identify with these qualities (Ginsburg and Hanson 1986). That is, the cultivation of character produces students who are both top achievers and also morally better. Such positive child behaviours as independence, cooperation, asking/answering questions and task persistence observable in classroom are traits relevant to good character and can best illustrate the relationship between improving character and academic achievement. There is also a fear that making good character a recognized educational standard may tend to be by itself a noncompetitive goal. This is because, this as an aim can be within the reach of many more students than is academic excellence (Wynne and Walberg 1985-86; Kagan 1981). However, it is believed that students who are morally good have already made it their conviction that hard work is part of being morally good. Proponents of character education further assert that improving the character of youth would help reverse the rise of variety of social problems, for example, drug abuse, rape, abortion. Character education should improve social wellbeing through its effects on these problems. But what precisely is moral/character education?

2. Moral Education or Character education?
What is character in this context? In discussion of moral education, the term has definite positive connotation, though it refers to relatively persistent qualities of the individual person (Pritchard, p471). Character, despite its vagueness, on the whole, is some discernible value that meets with widespread acceptance; if at all that is the case.

Let us see lists of incomplete and often sketchy descriptions of character forwarded by different institutions and scholars simply for purpose of illustration:

American Institute for Character Education (AICE): "courage, conviction, generosity, kindness, helpfulness, honesty, honnour, justice, tolerance, the sound use of time and talent, freedom of choice, freedom of speech, good citizenship, the right to be an individual, and the right of equal opportunity." [Goble and Brooks 1983, p46]

Bennet: "strength of mind, individuality, independence, moral quality, thoughtfulness, fidelity, kindness, diligence, honesty, fairness, self-discipline, respect for law, and taking one’s guidance by accepted and tested standards of right and wrong rather than, for example, by one’s personal preference." [1986a, p2]

Maryland’s Values Education Commission’s "Character Objectives":
"1. Personal integrity and honesty rooted in respect for the truth, intellectual curiosity, and love of learning. 2. A sense of duty to self, family, school and community. 3. Self-esteem rooted in the recognition of one’s potential. 4. Respect for the rights of all persons regardless of their race, religion, sex, age, physical condition, or mental state. 5. A recognition of the right of others to hold and express differing views combined with the capacity to make discriminating judgments among competing opinions. 6. A sense of justice, rectitude, fair play, a commitment to them. 7. A disposition of understanding, sympathy, concern and compassion, for others. 8. A sense of discipline and pride in one’s work; respect for the achievement of others. 9. Respect for one’s property and the property of others, including public property. 10. Courage to express one’s convictions." [Value Education Commission, Mayland 1979]

Wynne: "tact, honesty, obedience to legitimate authority, perseverance, good humour, loyalty." [1985, p4]

Now, let us analyze the above accounts of ‘character’: First, do the authorities agree on the fundamental elements of character? Lockwood (1985-86) among others questions the claim that there exists an accepted common tradition of American values, as is the abovementioned AICE’s claim of universal agreement on the values they list. Do they really mean the same thing even if they list the same word? "Honesty," for instance, only involves no lying or cheating, or does it require volunteering the truth when the situation calls for it? Should people be honest no matter what the consequences? See Wynne’s "obedience to a legitimate authority" and remember the case of our subject put in such a conflicting moral dilemma by his boss somewhere towards our start? Does Wynne allow us for justified civil disobedience, while Bennet’s "respect for law" precludes it?

One can infer from these relatively complex questions that it is unclear whether there is consensus about these values or not. One would assume a moderate position, like Grant, that holds that there is a common core of values shared by a plurality of perspectives. Such that accepting the values of rational moral discussion presupposes agreement on certain basic values, for example, respect for truth, honesty, fairness, order, and so on (Grant 1981, 1985; Peters 1973). As far as no one has worked out the precise meaning of the values alleged to constitute the common core, the ‘common core view’ also remains unconfirmed.

Second, the conflicting but accepted values. Elements of character listed by proponents of moral education are most often listed or explained separately. When to be "fair" can also mean "unkind," what does Bennet recommend to resolve such a moral conflict? And Wynne’s conflicting values, i.e., "honesty" and "loyalty," for one can be loyal to his legitimate authority and do something wrong that he knew morally and legally questionable? That AIEC’s "the right to be individual" is also conflicting with "good citizenship." These values invite for serious dilemmas, though they are not on extreme bipolar positions.

Third, still another problem of enlisting moral values is that moral perspective involves not just one value but a coherent system of values in a situation along with justification of the situation. So, can the meaning of a particular value be understood without reference to its place within the whole (Baer 1986)? That is, a full scale analysis of moral theories is very decisive for the establishment of a common core. Here the purpose of efforts in proposing for moral education is to encourage the formation of character through providing basic moral perspective, but not just to respond to all vexing questions of sophisticated moral philosophy.

There have been different views related to the teaching of moral education. Not until Lawrence Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental theory (Kohlberg 1971, 1976, 1981, 1983) and his proponents (e.g., Lind 2000), social scientists and/or moral philosophers have been interested in studying moral behavior, moral values or moral feelings; not moral judgment.

The focus of moral/character education differs in at least two respects: first, that character education endorses a specific content to be learned, a set of qualities and moral values (e.g. honesty, courage, and kindness; see the "bag of virtues" approach). Second, the view of formalists who are more concerned about conduct, attending to the kind of belief formation and justification used in moral decision making. One such approach is that of Lawrence Kohlberg’s cognitive developmental approach to moral education (1975). The approach sets aside such definite commitment to specific rules, emphasizing instead the process of moral reasoning and value selection. This emphasizes the motivational, relatively stable aspects of personality that direct an individual’s actions (Pritchard, 1988).

In making moral education possible Schell Daubner (1969) believes that the problem is that many teachers do not know how to carry on moral education (p61), since teacher education programs do not include courses on the teaching of morals.

Schell Daubner suggests the feasibility of ethical theory for the solution of moral problems in the classroom and that teachers can and will bring into play. Daubner argues moral principles constitute an important branch of ethical theory called "normative ethics" (p62). Normative ethics consists of a set of moral rules that are general or universally applicable principles from which to deduce judgment about particular cases, such as "Lying is right when it prevents human suffering." Some general principles seem to conflict. Ethical theories have primary or overarching principles used to settle a moral conflict when subordinate principles in the system seem to conflict. For example, "It is right to prevent human unhappiness or suffering," is a general principle consistent with the rather subordinate one: "It is right to tell a minor lie to help a person escape suffering" (p 63). Critical ethics, the second branch of ethical theory, is an attempt to justify those rules. It enables us to justify or defend against the general principles or rules set forth in the first division, i.e., normative ethics.

In a forthcoming article, we will publish the subsequent parts of Asafa Dibaba’s essay that consists in a groundbreaking Oromo approach to, and criticism of, the modern Western educational theories and practices.