ICG Report Reveals Freemasonic Plans for Destruction of Turkey, Diffusion of Pseudo-Islamic Terror

With the recently released ICG Report "Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the Kurds" one gets an insightful with respect to the urgency and the obsession with which the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge fuels chaos throughout the world, and more particularly the Middle East.

I will progressively republish the controversial Report that serves only to inanely suggest to the government of Turkey to recognize US-promoted terrorists like Talabani and Barzani who have risen to power, selected by their Western masters, in order to contribute to the formation of a terrorist and explosive pseudo-state ‘Kurdistan’ that will be the Hell-on-Earth for almost all its inhabitants.

In the formation of their gangsters and death squads, Talabani and Barzani have been assisted by Al Qaeda, which is another colonial fabrication that has been used for the implementation of the terrorist plans conceived by the Freemasonic masters of the colonial regimes of London, Paris and Washington.

I will analyze extensively in forthcoming articles; here I republish the Executive Summary, the Recommendations and the Introduction of the irrelevant, paranoid and inflammatory "Report".

Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the Kurds

Middle East Report N°80

28 October 2008

Executive Summary and Recommendations

A long-festering conflict over Kirkuk and other disputed territories is threatening to disrupt the current fragile relative peace in Iraq by blocking legislative progress and political accommodation. Two events in particular stand out: a two-month stalemate in July-September in negotiations over a provincial elections law in which Kirkuk’s unresolved status was the principal obstacle and, during this period, a campaign by the Iraqi army in and around the Kurdish-controlled disputed district of Khanaqin. To avoid a breakdown over the issue of Kirkuk, the current piecemeal approach should be discarded in favour of a grand bargain involving all core issues: Kirkuk and other disputed territories, revenue sharing and the hydrocarbons law, as well as federalism and constitutional revisions.

Despite some progress, Iraq’s legislative agenda, promoted by the U.S. in order to capitalise on recent security gains, is bogged down. The main culprit is a dispute over territories claimed by the Kurds as historically belonging to Kurdistan – territories that contain as much as 13 per cent of Iraq’s proven oil reserves. This conflict reflects a deep schism between Arabs and Kurds that began with the creation of modern Iraq after World War I; has simmered for decades, marked by intermittent conflict and accommodation; and was revitalised due to the vacuum and resulting opportunities generated by the Baath regime’s demise in 2003. In its ethnically-driven intensity, ability to drag in regional players such as Turkey and Iran and potentially devastating impact on efforts to rebuild a fragmented state, it matches and arguably exceeds the Sunni-Shiite divide that spawned the 2005-2007 sectarian war.

Stymied in their quest to incorporate disputed territories into the Kurdistan region by constitutional means, Kurdish leaders have signalled their intent to hold politics in Baghdad hostage to their demands. At the same time, the Iraqi government’s growing military assertiveness is challenging the Kurds’ de facto control over these territories. Rising acrimony and frustration are jeopardising the current relative peace, undermining prospects for national unity and, in the longer term, threatening Iraq’s territorial integrity.

Rather than items that can be individually and sequentially addressed, Iraq’s principal conflicts – concerning oil, disputed territories, federalism and constitutional revisions – have become thoroughly interwoven. Federalism cannot be implemented without agreement on how the oil industry will be managed and revenues will be distributed. Progress on a federal hydrocarbons law and a companion revenue-sharing law is inconceivable without agreement on the disposition of disputed territories that boast major oil fields, such as Kirkuk. And the constitution review has faltered over failure to settle all those questions, the solutions to which will need to be reflected in amendments reached by consensus.

How to move forward? If there is a way out, it lies in a comprehensive approach that takes into account the principal stakeholders’ core requirements. A sober assessment of these requirements suggests a possible package deal revolving around a fundamental "oil-for-soil" trade-off: in exchange for at least deferring their exclusive claim on Kirkuk for ten years, the Kurds would obtain demarcation and security guarantees for their internal boundary with the rest of Iraq, as well as the right to manage and profit from their own mineral wealth. Such a deal would codify the significant gains the Kurds have made since they achieved limited autonomy in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War and especially after April 2003, while simultaneously respecting an Arab-Iraqi – as well as neighbouring states’ – red line regarding Kirkuk.

This package entails painful concessions from all sides, which they are unlikely to make without strong international involvement. The UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has been providing technical support on a range of issues and, since late 2007, has devoted the bulk of its efforts to the question of disputed internal boundaries. It will need stronger backing from the U.S. and its allies, which have an abiding interest in Iraq’s stabilisation yet have played a passive bystander role that has confused Iraqi stakeholders and encouraged them to press maximalist demands. The U.S. should make it a priority to steer Iraq’s political actors toward a grand bargain they are unlikely to reach on their own and to secure its outcome through political, financial and diplomatic support.

There is little time to waste. As U.S. forces are set to draw down in the next couple of years, Washington’s leverage will diminish and, along with it, chances for a workable deal. This serves no one’s interest. The most likely alternative to an agreement is a new outbreak of violent strife over unsettled claims in a fragmented polity governed by chaos and fear.

Recommendations

To the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI):

1. Provide assistance to the principal stakeholders in negotiations aimed at achieving a grand bargain.

2. Delineate an internal boundary between the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq by making specific administrative status recommendations for disputed districts or sub-districts, using the criteria employed in its phase one proposal of 5 June 2008.

3. Assist the committee to be established under Article 23 of the September 2008 provincial elections law in recommending rules governing Kirkuk’s elections, with seats divided among Arabs, Turkomans, Kurds and Christians according to either a 24-24-48-4 or a 23-23-46-8 per cent formula prior to elections held as caucuses within each community.

To the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG):

4. Formally request the UN Security Council to empower UNAMI to guide negotiations on a grand bargain.

5. Until such a bargain is reached:

a) accelerate negotiations over a federal hydrocarbons and associated laws and avoid unilateral moves – including signing oil and gas contracts and, in the case of the KRG, developing oil and gas fields in disputed territories;

b) reach agreement, with UNAMI’s technical assistance, on a definition of "disputed territories"; and

c) reach an interim agreement, with UNAMI’s assistance, for joint administration and security in disputed territories claimed by the Kurds.

To the Government of Iraq:

6. As part of a grand bargain:

a) adopt and implement UNAMI’s recommendation for an internal boundary between the Kurdistan region and the rest of Iraq;

b) establish Kirkuk governorate as a stand-alone governorate or a uni-governorate federal region for an interim period of ten years;

c) establish a power-sharing arrangement in Kirkuk, consistent with Article 23 of the provincial elections law, by which senior executive (governor, deputy governor), administrative (directors general and their deputies) and quasi-legislative (district, sub-district and city council) positions are distributed among Arabs, Turkomans, Kurds and Christians according to a 32-32-32-4 per cent formula;

d) adopt and implement the recommendations on Kirkuk to be issued by the committee established under Article 23 of the provincial elections law; and

e) enact a federal hydrocarbons and companion revenue-sharing law mandating equitable development of oil and gas throughout Iraq, including the Kurdistan region; accepting the KRG oil and gas law; and granting the KRG the right to both manage its own fields and export oil and gas.

7. Ensure provincial elections are held no later than 31 January 2009 as per the new law and in a free, fair, inclusive and transparent manner.

8. Acknowledge publicly as human rights crimes the former regime’s Arabisation policy, the 1988 Anfal campaign and gas attacks against Kurdish civilians, most notably at Halabja; recognise the victims’ suffering; and offer financial compensation to survivors.

To the Kurdistan Regional Government:

9. Address Turkey’s concerns about the PKK’s (Kurdistan Workers Party) ability to use the Kurdistan region as a staging area for attacks in Turkey by limiting its movement, preventing it from using the region to launch attacks, denying it access to media and disarming its fighters in areas under effective KRG control;

To the Government of Turkey:

10. In the context of an Iraqi grand bargain:

a) establish formal ties with the Kurdistan regional government;

b) work with the Iraqi government and the KRG to allow oil and gas transport from the Kurdistan region to/through Turkey;

c) pursue an economic open-border policy with Iraq, including its Kurdistan region; and

d) encourage investments by Turkish entrepreneurs in the Kurdistan region and cease all military activity inside Iraq so long as the KRG takes the above steps.

To the U.S. Government:

11. Promote the notion of a grand bargain and support efforts by UNAMI, the Iraqi government, the KRG and all other stakeholders to reach it.

12. Send an unambiguous signal to the Kurdish leadership that it opposes a quest to incorporate Kirkuk but is prepared to establish appropriate security arrangements for the Kurdistan region and, in particular, to offer guarantees to protect any agreed-upon internal boundary.

To the UN Security Council:

13. Upon request from the Iraqi government, empower UNAMI to guide negotiations toward a grand bargain.

Kirkuk/Brussels, 28 October 2008

Oil for Soil: Toward a Grand Bargain on Iraq and the Kurds

Introduction

While many areas of Iraq witnessed a return to relative calm in 2008, a brewing conflict over (so-called)1 disputed territories has broken into the open and begun to contaminate negotiations over pivotal legislation, such as the hydrocarbons law, 2 and revisions to the constitution.3 While districts whose administrative disposition is disputed can be found in other parts of Iraq, the current fight concerns territories claimed by the Kurds. These stretch in a broad band across five governorates from the Syrian border in the north west to the Iranian border east of Baghdad. 4 Home to a mixed population of Kurds, Turkomans, Arabs, Shabak and Chaldo-Assyrians, 5 they are claimed by Kurds as "historically and geographically a part of Kurdistan", 6 At their heart is Kirkuk, a city and governorate that lie atop an oil field holding as much as 13 per cent of Iraq’s proven reserves. The presence of oil has raised both the stakes and tensions, vastly complicating efforts at finding a peaceful solution to Kirkuk’s status.

After propelling their peshmerga fighters into these territories ahead of U.S. forces and establishing de facto control in April 2003, the Kurdish parties’ chief strategy for formally incorporating them into the Kurdistan region has been mostly – albeit not entirely – peaceful and legal. 7 At key points during the country’s constitutional and political development, the Kurds inserted operative clauses designed to facilitate their quest. In the process they created a legal record attesting to the legitimacy of their claim and the non-violent means deployed to realise it.

Their strongest weapon has been the constitution, which the vast majority of the electorate approved in a referendum in October 2005. Article 140, in particular, provides for successive steps – "normalisation", 8 a census and a referendum no later than 31 December 2007 – whose full implementation the Kurds believed would fulfil their ambition. 9 Qader Aziz, the Kurdistan regional government (KRG) presidency’s Article 140 envoy, identified three guarantees that helped allay the Kurds’ deep distrust of the Iraqi government (in which the Kurdish parties are represented, but as a minority):

Article 22 of the 2006 governing accord, which set deadlines for "normalisation", census and referendum, and which was approved by the council of representatives; the preamble to the constitution, which arguably gives the Kurds an opt-out-of-Iraq clause in case the constitution is not implemented; 11 and the December 2007 referendum deadline contained in the article itself. 12

Kurdish leaders chose this path because they believed that through their alliance with the U.S. and their presence in the principal state institutions they could force Article 140’s implementation. They also strongly consider that theirs is a just cause to which any reasonable person should subscribe, 13 whose realisation has suffered unnecessary and unfair delays 14 and which requires no compromise. 15

The Kurds’ chosen method has not brought them the intended results, however. The December 2007 deadline passed without a referendum. Following mediation by the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), headed by the Secretary-General’s special representative for Iraq, Staffan de Mistura, five top Iraqi leaders agreed to delay Article 140 and accepted UNAMI’s offer to facilitate its implementation during the following six months. 16 No progress was made in the subsequent period, so the 30 June 2008 deadline not only passed without any result, but also without a new extension or even a public statement of any sort. The Article 140 process had died in the eyes of most actors, save the Kurds, who insisted this was merely another delay, not a cancellation. 17

Faced with a political debacle at home, 18 the Kurdish leadership pulled out its trump card: its veto power over legislative progress, and even over the government, in Baghdad. A Kurdish official said, "the Kurds could withdraw from Iraq. But Kurdish leaders are not ready to do that. Still, we could put pressure on the federal government as a tactic. We could agree to form a new government only on the basis of its agreement to implement Article 140". 19 Another official put it even more bluntly: "If I can’t have it my way, I’m going to block your way. If there is no solution to Kirkuk, then there will be no provincial council elections in Kirkuk, no review of the constitution and so on". 20

Even before the June 2008 deadline had passed, the unresolved question of Kirkuk and other disputed territories had started to contaminate negotiations over both critical pieces of legislation, such as the long-awaited hydrocarbons law and the electoral law, as well as the constitutional revision, which has been at a standstill since 2006. 21 The most dramatic example came with the deadlock over the provincial elections law in July 2008. When the council of representatives tried to pass a bill that would have paved the way for governorate-level elections by 1 October, an ad hoc coalition of legislators headed by members of the minority Turkomans inserted an amendment that sought to remove Kirkuk elections from the mix. They proposed that such elections be held only once parties there had agreed that the three largest communities would divide provincial council seats equally among them, setting aside some for the Christians. 22

Kirkuk’s Arabs and Turkomans oppose provincial elections in Kirkuk, fearing they would lose as a result of what they term demographic manipulations by the Kurds since April 2003. They have learned the consequences of defeat – the Kurds have succeeded in advancing their interests since gaining control over the provincial council in January 2005 – and do not want to repeat the exercise. 23 Instead, they insist on a pre-agreed 32-32-32-4 per cent power-sharing formula that would divide senior executive positions in Kirkuk governorate as well as seats on both the provincial and city councils equally among Arabs, Turkomans and Kurds, with a small share for the minority Christians. Moreover, they claim that Jalal Talabani, the Iraqi president and an ethnic Kurd, agreed to such a formula when he visited Kirkuk in January 2008. 24

By contrast, Kurdish leaders are neutral on whether to hold or postpone elections in Kirkuk; either way, they calculate, they would come out ahead. If elections are conducted, they are convinced they will win; if they are postponed the current council, which the Kurds dominate, would continue to perform its duties. And while they accept the power-sharing formula proposed by Arabs and Turkomans in some instances, they adamantly oppose it as it pertains to the provincial council and accept it for the governorate’s administration only if it pertains to all positions, not just senior ones. 25

The Kurdish chairman of the provincial council, Rizgar Ali, said he would consider power sharing on the council but not under the formula proposed by the Arabs and Turkomans: "Yes, we agree with power sharing, but the Kurds should not lose the majority they gained [in the January 2005 elections]". 26

The council passed the law with the Kirkuk amendment over a Kurdish walk-out on 22 July. Subsequently, it was vetoed by two members of the presidency council, Talabani and Vice-President Adel Abd-al-Mahdi (a senior official in the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, ISCI, which is allied with the Kurdistan Alliance), who sent it back to the council. There it remained stuck on the Kirkuk clause, and the council went on summer recess without setting a firm date for provincial elections, despite enormous pressure from the Bush administration.

In late September, UNAMI brokered a compromise. Legislators passed the law, setting elections for fourteen governorates no later than 31 January 2009 27 and (in Article 23) stipulating a separate process for Kirkuk without prejudging the eventual power-sharing arrangement. However, while this solved the problem of provincial elections in the rest of Iraq, it did little to break the deadlock over Kirkuk: Arabs and Turkomans continue to press for the 32-32-32-4 formula on the provincial council, which Kurds will be able to block in the yet-to-be-created committee charged with reaching a consensual decision. 28

The original proposal to take the Kirkuk question out of the electoral law, which delayed successful passage for more than two months, came from Turkey. Ankara pushed the initiative through its Turkoman allies in the council of representatives. This is an index of the degree to which the Kirkuk question has become internationalised and the influence countries such as Turkey (and, on other occasions, Iran) 29 can bring to bear. 30

In August, amid growing tensions over the elections law, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government, which had begun to assert itself vis-à-vis non-state actors (Muqtada Sadr’s Mahdi Army, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Sunni "awakening" councils), turned its sights on the disputed territories. Claiming the state’s sovereign rights throughout Iraqi territory, and using an on-going offensive against al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters in Diyala governorate as cover, federal troops pushed into three sub-districts that the Kurds consider disputed and had been under the KRG’s de facto control since April 2003; they threatened to displace the KRG in the disputed Khanaqin district as well. If the three sub-districts (Jalawla, Saadiya and Qara Tepe) have a mixed population of Arabs, Kurds and Turkomans, 31 Khanaqin is heavily Kurdish and is viewed by Kurds as a symbol of Saddam Hussein’s expulsion campaign. 32

Maliki’s move stunned the Kurds, who saw it as a harbinger of a resurgent central state intent on suppressing them. 33 Moreover, they feared that if they made any concessions in Diyala governorate, Maliki would challenge them next in Ninewa and Kirkuk. Some saw an Iranian hand behind Maliki’s offensive; others decried the apparent bystander role assumed by the Kurds’ U.S. ally. 34 But what the two events – severe legislative hiccups over the Kirkuk question and federal military inroads into disputed territories – demonstrated was how central the territorial question has become in Iraqi politics and the risks it poses to longer-term stability.

Notes

1 Terminology is a veritable minefield all its own in this conflict. For example, Kurds contend they are reclaiming these territories, while non-Kurds view the Kurds’ bid akin to annexation by the Kurdistan region. Kurds accept the term "disputed"; non-Kurds say these territories are disputed only because the Kurds claim them.

2 Iraq has a package of four draft laws that together define the terms for future management and development of the country’s oil and gas reserves and distribution of income from their sale. The most important is the draft hydrocarbons framework legislation (henceforth, the hydrocarbons law) that would create the basic regulatory and policy development framework. According to released versions, it would set up a federal oil and gas council (FOGC), a powerful decision-making body representative of Iraqi society. FOGC would determine all national policies and plans for the sector and have authority to review contracts. The law would establish criteria for contracts and, importantly, allow foreign participation in the oil sector under proper contractual conditions, while maintaining federal government control. At least in the current draft, it also would give governments of governorates and regions, such as the KRG, the ability to make their own deals in certain cases, although revenues and ultimate control would still be federal. Under the draft revenue-sharing law, the federal government would collect and distribute all revenue, with national priorities such as defence and foreign affairs funded first and the remainder distributed to regions and governorates not part of regions according to population; the Kurdistan region would receive 17 per cent pending a future census. The last two packages of draft laws would reorganise the ministry of oil and establish an Iraqi national oil company (INOC). None of this legislation has been passed.

3 For a discussion, see Crisis Group Middle East Report N°75, Iraq After the Surge II: The Need for a New Political Strategy, 30 April 2008.

4 See the map at Appendix B below. One could also include Suleimaniya governorate, which, although recognised in the constitution as belonging to the Kurdistan region, comprises districts that originally belonged to Kirkuk governorate. Kurdish leaders say they want them to become part of Kirkuk to maximise chances Kirkuk will join the Kurdistan region via a referendum.

5 Moreover, these areas represent a wide array of religions as well: Muslims (both Sunnis and Shiites), Yazidis and Christians (both Orthodox and Catholic).

6 Kurds repeat this phrase like a mantra. Crisis Group interviews, Kurdistan region and disputed territories, June 2008.

7 "In 2003, we could have pushed much harder, but we decided to live voluntarily in Iraq, in a voluntary union. We are not Arabs but nevertheless decided to be part of an Iraq that has oppressed us for so long. You should appreciate that". Crisis Group interview, Falah Mustafa Bakir, chief of foreign relations department attached to the KRG prime minister’s office, Erbil, 29 June 2008. There is evidence that especially in 2003 a number of so-called "newcomer" Arabs (Wafidin), ie, Iraqis settled in these areas by the previous regime as part of Arabisation, either were driven out by Kurdish peshmerga forces (in April) or pre-emptively left fearing reprisal. See, "Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq", Human Rights Watch, 2004, at http://hrw.org/reports/
2004/iraq0804/iraq0804.pdf. In addition, there have been constant accusations that Kurdish parties have occupied public properties and destroyed population records in disputed territories.

8 By "normalisation" the Kurds mean measures to reverse changes to the disputed territories’ make-up that occurred under the former regime’s Arabisation policies. These measures include, most importantly, the return of people forced out of these areas (mostly Kurds and Turkomans), the departure (voluntary, with compensation) of Arabs settled there, restitution of properties and the restoration of these areas’ pre-1968 administrative boundaries.

9 The Kurds believe that if and when Arabisation is fully reversed, they will have a demographic majority in the disputed territories, which they could then convert into a victory in a referendum on status.

10 In June 2006, the Kurds gave their support to the Maliki government (which emerged from the December 2005 elections) only after certain conditions concerning Kirkuk and other matters had been met. Article 22 stipulates that normalisation in the disputed territories should be completed by 31 March 2007, a census held by 31 July of that year and a referendum organised by 30 November.

11 The concluding sentence of the preamble reads: "Adherence to this constitution preserves for Iraq its free union of people, land and sovereignty". The Kurds have interpreted this to mean that non-adherence, for example through non-implementation of Article 140, would give ground to that union’s dissolution. In this report, references to the constitution are based on the original Arabic version available from the Iraqi presidency’s website, www.iraqipresidency.net. An English translation can be found at www.krg.org/articles/
detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=04030000&rnr=107&anr=12329 but such translations of the constitution have tended to be very poor. The translations rendered in this report are Crisis Group’s own.

12 Crisis Group interview, Suleimaniya, 26 June 2008.

13 A KRG official said the following regarding the disputed territories: "We want a solution that is satisfactory, just and constitutional, and that provides compensation for past abuses. What have the Kurds got for living with Iraq? The social fabric of society has been destroyed. People should see the Kurds as victims, not as oppressors". Crisis Group interview, Falah Mustafa Bakir, chief of KRG foreign relations department, Erbil, 29 June 2008.

14 A KRG official said, "we have been patient. To agree to a referendum [via the 2005 constitution] was a major concession". Ibid.

15 "We reject any compromise. Our cause is just and by compromise the situation will not be solved". Crisis Group interview, Salam Abdallah, journalist, Khanaqin, 25 June 2008.

16 The five leaders were: Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the three members of the presidency council (President Jalal Talabani, Vice-President Adel Abd-al-Mahdi and Vice-President Tareq al-Hashimi) and the prime minister of the Kurdistan region, Nechirvan Barzani. See wire reports, 17 December 2007.

17 Crisis Group interviews, Kurdistan region and disputed territories, June 2008.

18 The Kurdish leadership has been widely criticised in the Kurdish media for its failure to deliver Kirkuk by deadline, or at all. For example, Shorsh Haji, a UK-based Kurdish writer, reflected broad elite discontent by saying that if the Kurds lose Kirkuk, the leadership should be held responsible, and that if it fails in joining Kirkuk to the Kurdistan region, the people should stop voting for their leaders in elections and never again fall for their promises. Hawlati (independent weekly), 9 August 2008.

19 Crisis Group interview, Qader Aziz, KRG presidency envoy for Article 140, Suleimaniya, 26 June 2008.

20 Crisis Group interview, Mohammed Ihsan, KRG minister for extra-regional (disputed territories) affairs, Erbil, 20 June 2008. Other Kurdish officials have made similar threats. For example, the KRG prime minister’s foreign relations department chief, Falah Mustafa Bakir, said, "we will not work for the sake of Iraq, or to save Iraq, if Iraq does not work with us on Article 140". Crisis Group interview, Erbil, 29 June 2008.

21 See Crisis Group Report, Iraq After the Surge II, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

22 The idea was that the parties representing the main communities would agree to share power equally and that separate elections would then be held within each community for its allocated seats.

23 Since the January 2005 elections, the (Kurdish) Kirkuk Brotherhood List has held 26 of 41 provincial council seats, the remaining fifteen being occupied by Turkoman (nine) and Arab (six) parties. These latter parties claim the elections were fraudulent. They have taken their seats on the council but argue the results should not be considered a fair reflection of their strength. At the same time, they oppose new elections without a prior power-sharing arrangement. Indeed, they fear the Kurds will win, due to "demographic manipulations" since April 2003, ie, the large influx into Kirkuk. Kurds claim they were expelled in the course of Arabisation, but others argue that many new residents never lived in Kirkuk, and some came from Turkey and Iran. Crisis Group interview, Hassan Turan, Kirkuk provincial council member, Turkoman Justice Party, Kirkuk, 18 June 2008.

24 Crisis Group interviews, Turkoman political representatives, Amman, 13 May 2008.

25 Crisis Group email communication, Awad Amin, Kirkuk provincial council member for the Kurdistan Toilers’ Party, 5 October 2008. Kurdish leaders recognise they have monopolised senior executive positions in Kirkuk since April 2003 but contend that Arabs and Turkomans continue to predominate in the middle and lower ranks of the civil service due to job discrimination against Kurds during Arabisation.

26 Crisis Group interview, Kirkuk, 18 June 2008.

27 The provincial elections law is based on the February 2008 law on powers of governorates not organised in regions. For that reason, it does not cover the three Kurdish governorates that together constitute the Kurdistan region. Provincial elections thus are not scheduled to take place in those three governorates until the Kurdish parliament has passed its own pertinent legislation. With Kirkuk excluded as well, this leaves fourteen governorates in which elections should take place by 31 January 2009.

28 The agreed process is contained in Article 23 of the provincial elections law passed by the council of representatives on 24 September 2008 and approved by the presidency council on 3 October. It stipulates that no elections will take place in Kirkuk until a power-sharing arrangement is in place; the council of representatives is to set up a committee broadly reflecting Kirkuk’s ethnic composition (two Kurds, two Arabs, two Turkomans, one Christian) by 1 November 2008; by 31 March 2009, the committee is to make consensus recommendations to the council of representatives on power sharing, violations against public and private property and Kirkuk’s demographic changes; the current provincial council will remain in power and the status of Kirkuk governorate unchanged until provincial elections are held; based on the committee’s recommendations, the council of representatives will pass a special law for Kirkuk elections; if it does not, the matter will revert to the presidency council, which, with UN assistance, is to "determine the appropriate terms" for provincial elections in Kirkuk.

29 A Kurdish leader compared Iranian policy toward Iraqi Kurds with Turkey’s: "The Iranians work surreptitiously, while Turkey acts stubbornly without ever hiding its intentions". Crisis Group interview, Suleimaniya, June 2008. A senior KRG official said, "when Iran says ‘hello’, watch out! By contrast, when Turkey is your enemy, they tell you so, and they mean it!" Crisis Group interview, Erbil, June 2008.

30 A subsequent Crisis Group report will discuss Turkish perspectives toward Iraqi Kurds.

31 A Kurdish publicist said that, "objectively speaking, these three districts are majority Arab, not majority Kurdish", Crisis Group interview, Suleimaniya, 22 October 2008.

32 Khanaqin is historically a mixed district of Kurds (both Sunnis and Shiites), Arabs, Turkomans, Christians and Jews, but as a border town, it was emptied of its population during the Iran-Iraq war. After war’s end, its Kurdish population was not allowed to return. In April 2003, the KRG sent its peshmerga forces and civil servants from Suleimaniya to Khanaqin, where they established control and an administration that was tied to the KRG more than to Diyala governorate. In the relative peace since 2003, many displaced Kurds have returned to Khanaqin, creating new neighbourhoods in the desolate terrain left by the Iran-Iraq war.

33 Masrour Barzani, KRG President Masoud Barzani’s son and head of the security apparatus of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), said, "what happened in Khanaqin was something bad. The Iraqi Army’s entry was not for the purpose of combating terrorism, for Khanaqin is very secure. The army entered for political reasons. Some circles in the federal government believe that disputed territories should be under the federal government’s control. However, the idea of disputed territories means that no final decision has been made on their ownership. Why else would they be called disputed territories? Agreement should be worked out between the two sides over their ownership. Khanaqin is the most secure area in the Diyala Governorate. Saddam Hussein’s regime tried for many years to seize these areas by force but failed. Now, attempts are being made to take these areas from us by other means". Interviewed in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 18 September 2008

34 Iran has strong influence over the two Shiite Islamist parties in government, ISCI and the Daawa party. Amin Shwan, a Kurdish intellectual, put the Kurdish dilemma as follows: "We are seeing a new rift between ISCI and the Kurds, perhaps because of Iran, which takes a position on Kirkuk. [Iraq’s first elected prime minister] Ibrahim al-Jaafari kept stalling on Kirkuk [in 2005] and now Nouri al-Maliki is, too. This means Iran is putting pressure on ISCI, Daawa and Muqtada al-Sadr not to move on Article 140. So the Kurds feel that their only ally is the United States. But the U.S. is not a steadfast ally, and it does not have a policy on the Kurds. The U.S. does not support the Kurds on Kirkuk. It takes a bystander role, limiting itself to protocol announcements, mere niceties, really, and offering only rhetorical support of Article 140". Crisis Group interview, Kirkuk, 18 June 2008. Frustration with the U.S. appeared all around. An Arab leader in Kirkuk said, "from all our meetings with the Americans it is never clear what they want. They don’t have a vision or work plan. They only react to events. First they were concentrating on terrorism. Today it’s the budget; it’s the only thing they care about". Crisis Group interview, Rakan Saeed, Kirkuk deputy governor, Kirkuk, 19 June 2008.

Note
Picture: A map revealing the evil plans of chaos spread by the Apostate Freemasonic Lodge that controls London, Paris and Washington.