Dangerous 'Ethiopia', not Anodyne Somalia, is Africa's Most Failed State

There are several lobbyists in Washington D.C. who repetitively and erroneously try to portray Somalia as a Failed State; as a matter of fact, their analysis is deeply partial and can only lead to disastrous policy decision making. 
 
Certainly, according to research carried out by the Crisis States Research Center and standards set by the Fund for Peace, Somalia belongs to the top 20 Failed States. The London based Center is part of the reputable Development Studies Institute (DESTIN) that belongs to the venerated London School of Economics; however, the seminars and research are conducted – as one could expect - on the basis of strict economic – political – military consideration, leaving critical parameters out.

The same concerns the independent, Washington D.C.-based Fund for Peace, athough it is also an educational organization; its Failed States Index does not take into account key parameters that, if taken into consideration, would help reach different results. In fact, the concept is relatively new, and one should anticipate many reconsiderations, modifications, and adjustments in the approach to the subject.

The Crisis States Research Centre

According to the definition provided in their website's home page (http://www.crisisstates.com/index.htm) "the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) is a leading centre of interdisciplinary research into processes of war, state collapse and reconstruction in fragile states. By identifying the ways in which war and conflict affect the future possibilities for state building, by distilling the lessons learnt from past experiences of state reconstruction and by analysing the impact of key international interventions, Centre research seeks to build academic knowledge, contribute to the development of theory, and inform current and future policy making".

The Fund for Peace

The Fund for Peace is an independent Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit research and educational organization. Since its founding in 1957 by investment banker Randolph Compton, The Fund for Peace has been dedicated to preventing war and alleviating the conditions that cause war. Recently, research at The Fund for Peace has focused predominantly on identifying and reducing conflict stemming from weak or failed states.
 
Definitions: Failed State, Fragile State, Crisis State

At this point, we will advise for caution when approaching to a subject that is expected to be differently viewed – through a wider standpoint – in the years ahead. We will reproduce here definitions offered in the Wikipedia where reference is made to the definitions provided by the Crisis States Research Centre; as a matter of fact, this is currently the prevailing conventional approach.
 
Failed State

The Crisis States Research Centre defines a "failed state" as a condition of "state collapse" – e.g. a state that can no longer perform its basic security and development functions and that has no effective control over its territory and borders. A failed state is one that can no longer reproduce the conditions for its own existence. This term is used in very contradictory ways in the policy community (for instance, there is a tendency to label a "poorly performing" state as "failed" – a tendency the Crisis States Research Centre rejects). The opposite of a "failed state" is an "enduring state" and the absolute dividing line between these two conditions is difficult to ascertain at the margins. Even in a failed state, some elements of the state, such as local state organisations, might continue to exist.

Fragile State

A fragile state is a state significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its sub-systems. (It is a state that is particularly vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts). In a fragile state, institutional arrangements embody and perhaps preserve the conditions of crisis: in economic terms, this could be institutions (importantly, property rights) that reinforce stagnation or low growth rates, or embody extreme inequality (in wealth, in access to land, in access to the means to make a living); in social terms institutions may embody extreme inequality or lack of access altogether to health or education; in political terms, institutions may entrench exclusionary coalitions in power (in ethnic, religious, or perhaps regional terms), or extreme factionalism or significantly fragmented security organisations. Drawing on insights related to "institutional multiplicity" – ubiquitous in our research so far: In fragile states, statutory institutional arrangements are vulnerable to challenges by rival institutional systems be they derived from traditional authorities, devised by communities under conditions of stress that see little of the state (in terms of security, development or welfare), or be they derived from warlords, or other non-state power brokers.

The opposite of a "fragile state" is a "stable state" – one where dominant or statutory institutional arrangements appear able to withstand internal and external shocks and contestation remains within the boundaries of reigning institutional arrangements.

Crisis State

A crisis state is a state under acute stress, where reigning institutions face serious contestation and are potentially unable to manage conflict and shocks. In other words, there is a danger of state collapse. This is not an absolute condition, but a condition at a given point of time, so a state can reach a crisis condition and recover from it, or can remain in crisis over relatively long periods of time, or a crisis state can unravel and collapse.

Such a process could lead to the formation of new states, to war and chaos, or to the consolidation of the ancien régime.

Specific crises within the subsystems of the state can also exist—for instance, an economic crisis, a public health crisis like HIV/AIDS, a public order crisis, or a constitutional crisis—with each on its own not amounting to a generalised condition of a crisis state although a subsystem crisis can be sufficiently severe and/or protracted that it gives rise to the generalised condition of a crisis state.

The opposite of a crisis state is a resilient state, where institutions are generally able to cope with conflict, to manage sub-state crises, to respond to contestation, wherever the state sits between fragility and stability.

A Failed State vs. a 'Successful' – 'Enduring' State

Before stating the basic conventional indicators of a failed state, we have to specify that as the definition is a negative one, we have to first clarify a positive definition, namely elucidate what a 'successful' or 'enduring state is.

A state can be considered as 'successful' if it maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders. This automatically turns dictatorial states as definitely failed states, because the use of physical force within their borders is not legitimate.

It can therefore be easily understood that the dictatorial inclusion of invaded territories and subjugated nations within a tyranny automatically implies a failure. Perpetration of acts of oppression - especially the installation of settlers in the invaded and annexed territories, their attitude and behaviour as dominant warlords, the formation of militias geared to terrorize the subjugated peoples, and any violation of Human Rights, as well as unfair and partial treatment of all aspects of social and economic life - is sheer indication of a failed state.

Longer this failed state lasts, instead of being considered as 'enduring', it consists in a major regional threat, and through the perpetuation of its failure, it can even turn out to be a global threat. Its existence is therefore dubious.
Apparently for some cases there may a difficulty in determining the legitimacy of the use of force; cases like the Spanish Civil War, the Greek Civil War, the suppression of the Communists in post-WW II France and Italy are indicative cases on which political analysts and researchers can deliberate.

However, it is very clear that there is no legitimacy in the use of force, when this applies to a situation ensued from
1. the invasion of territories, inhabited by culturally, ethnically and religiously very different nations,

2. the demolition of earlier forms of states that had prevailed prior to the invasions in the territories in question

3. the subsequent subjugation of foreign nations, and

4. the imposition of deliberately tyrannical measures, involving
a) land expropriation,

b) cultural and educational strangulation through

i) the imposition of a foreign language (namely that of the invading state),

ii) a severe religious discrimination, through systematic diffusion of the religion of the invading armies (which may be unholy and even Satanic for the religious standards of the subjugated nations),

iii) the prohibition of the practice and the study of the native language, literature, art, religion, history, and culture,

iv) the proscription of the native language and writing system from the Primary and Secondary Education, as well as from the universities and colleges and

c) social and political structures' destruction, involving interdiction of earlier social practices, dismantling of the pre-existing social order, and imposition of alien social attitudes, behaviour and practices pertaining to the invading state. 

As Max Weber remains still a point of reference, it is essential to highlight at this point that according to the German Founder of the first University Department of Sociology, the state needs legitimacy if it intends to use force.

Widely Accepted Indicators of a Failed State
 
We will first present here commonly accepted indicators; we will then examine the inclusion of further indicators pertaining to significant parameters that have not been taken into consideration. Further on, we will compare Somalia and Abyssinia – fallaciously and mendaciously re-baptized as 'Ethiopia', and then draw the necessary conclusions.

Widely accepted indicators of a Failed State include the following:

1) A state whose central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory. (The level of control required to avoid being considered a failed state varies considerably amongst authorities).

2) Legitimate authority to make collective decisions has been eroded.

3) Reasonable public services can not be provided.

4) Widespread corruption and criminality

5) Refugees and involuntary movement of populations

6) Sharp economic decline

7) Failed interaction with other states

The Fund for Peace, and the Twelve Indicators of State Vulnerability

Since 2005, the Fund for Peace and the magazine Foreign Policy cooperate in publishing an annual index called the Failed States Index. The list only assesses sovereign states, leaving consequently aside non-widely (or not not yet) recognized states, like Taiwan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, Transnistria, Somaliland, Western Sahara, Palestine, Puntland, Maakhir, etc.

Ranking is based on the total scores of the 12 indicators. For each indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0-120. The index's ranks are based on twelve indicators of state vulnerability - four social, two economic and six political.

This shows precisely the limits of the approach; without the inclusion of parameters pertaining to the cultural, religious, and educational conditions of society, one cannot assess the viability of a state completely. The reason is precisely the fact, as we said already, that the evaluation ('enduring' / 'successful' or 'failed' state) hinges on the "state monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within its borders". When a state uses illegitimately physical force to prohibit, hinder, abolish and/or interrupt practices of religious, educational and cultural nature, this has to be taken into account.

The Four Social Indicators

1. Demographic pressures
Including the pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources. The pressure from a population's settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards.

2. Massive movement of refugees and internally displaced peoples
Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, lack of clean water, land competition, and turmoil that can spiral into larger humanitarian and security problems, both within and between countries.

3. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance
Based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries. Including atrocities committed with impunity against communal groups and/or specific groups singled out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression. Institutionalized political exclusion. Public scapegoating of groups believed to have acquired wealth, status or power as evidenced in the emergence of "hate" radio, pamphleteering and stereotypical or nationalistic political rhetoric.

4. Chronic and sustained human flight
Both the "brain drain" of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents and voluntary emigration of "the middle class." Growth of exile/expat communities are also used as part of this indicator.

The Two Economic Indicators

5. Uneven economic development along group lines
Determined by group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, and economic status. Also measured by group-based poverty levels, infant mortality rates, education levels.

6. Sharp and/or severe economic decline
Measured by a progressive economic decline of the society as a whole (using: per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures.) A sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments. Collapse or devaluation of the national currency and a growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight. Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments.

The Six Political Indicators

7. Criminalization and/or delegitimisation of the state
Endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites and resistance to transparency, accountability and political representation. Includes any widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes.

8. Progressive deterioration of public services
A disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation. Also using the state apparatus for agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies.

9. Widespread violation of human rights
An emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated. Outbreaks of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent civilians. A rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices. Any widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups or cultural institutions (e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution.)

10. Security apparatus as ‘state within a state’
An emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected "enemies," or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition. An "army within an army" that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique. Emergence of rival militias, guerilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaigns against state security forces.

11. Rise of factionalised elites
A fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines. Any use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism or of communal solidarity (e.g., "ethnic cleansing" or "defending the faith.")

12. Intervention of other states or external factors
Military or Para-military engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict. Intervention by donors, especially if there is a tendency towards over-dependence on foreign aid or peacekeeping missions.

Educational, Cultural, Religious Indicators Obmitted

From the aforementioned it becomes clearly understood that, although religion, education and culture are not completely disregarded, they are not taken properly into account. By adding further parameters, one would simply view the sociopolitical phenomena of the modern states as holistically as possible. One should therefore consider including following additional parameters:

1. Imposition – on a particular ethnic group living on their fatherland – of a language that is other than the native. The imposition of a foreign language (and more particularly that of the invading state) at the level of local (eventually departmental, provincial or federal) administration, mass media, education, and sports highly demonstrates a criminal intention of eradicating one of the pillars of national unity for any nation / ethnic group allover the world.

2. Prohibition of the native language and the writing system in use, at the level of the Primary and Secondary Education, throughout a region, area or province inhabited by an indigenous ethno-linguistic group. Like no 1, this parameter fully proves a state's failure to properly address the obvious needs of the local populations.

3. Lack of universities, colleges, academies, and research institutions in a province or region inhabited by an independent ethno-linguistic group with a minimum population of 0.5 – 1 million people. It is quite understandable that small ethno-linguistic groups (with a population limited to a few dozens of thousands) may have some difficulty to constitute fully accredited nations; but this does not concern small nations like Kosovo, Montenegro, Transnistria, Slovenia, Malta, Estonia, and Iceland that may have – like the latter four examples – a completely different linguistic means of communications – for which universities and research centers should be set up.

Included in this parameter is every hindrance put in the way of thoroughly, adequately and completely studying the native language, literature, art, religion, history, and culture, publishing and propagating related material in any multimedia form. It goes without saying that if the academic and intellectual class of an ethnic group or nation comprised within the borders of a state under examination is not allowed to publish its version of National History, to propagate the characteristics and the concepts they find as most significant and most funadmental for their National Identity, the state in which this ethnic group or nation is included has tragically failed to justify the reason of this nation's inclusion within the state under examination.

4. Proscription of the free practice of the indigenous language, literature, art, and culture throughout the region or province – fatherland for the indigenous ethnic group or nation. Any attack to or prohibition of the free cultural life of an independent ethnic group or nation clearly demonstrates the total failure of the state whereby this nation happens to be included.

5. Severe religious discrimination and attempts of uprooting existing faiths, religious systems, rituals, cults, and practices of an independent ethno-linguistic group / nation or a separate religious group other than the one that represents the main religious group of the same nation. Included here are attempts to perform religious rites and furthermore to build religious buildings that may be considered as means of desecration by the indigenous ethnic group or nation. Any attack to religious freedom of, and any imposition of an alien religion on, an ethnic group or nation demonstrates perfectly well the failure of the state in which this nation or religious group happens to be included.
 
A Missing Socio-political Dimension

At this point, we want to focus on a very critical point of state failure that is mostly of administrative nature, and can therefore be classified among either the social or the religious parameters. We restate here that the approach and the related research are in their beginnings, and one should expect additions, readjustments and modifications.

As preamble, I would underscore the importance of the study model in a political research; it seems that the study model is a national state whereby prevails a nation that represents more than 95% of the total population, being altogether - linguistically and religiously, ethnically and culturally - united (f.i. Denmark).

Yet, one should consider that among multinational states whereby more than five (5) ethnic groups / nations cohabitate under prejudicial terms for most of them, the possibility of a Failed State increases dramatically. We would therefore advise for a better study model; Sudan, 'Ethiopia', Algeria, and Iran represent far better study models than Turkey, Thailand, Malyasia, and Korea in this regard.

The sociopolitical parameter we would advise to add is the following:
 
1. Institutionalization of treacherous and misrepresentative, bogus-elites selected among oppressed, subjugated peoples, and expanded use of them as tools of national subjugation, extermination, and ultimate extinction.

According to this practice, the invading state's administration proceeds as follows: they select a few people among the subjugated nation, at times it can be just 10 or 20 individuals among a 5 million people nation, and under protection of death squads, militias and army they impose them as local administrators, mayors, heads of municipality, deputies, leaders of virtual political parties, and at times, if trust is built, army officers, central administrators, and even diplomats. From all the positions they hold, these criminal high traitors contribute to their own nation's ultimate destruction. They form the modern Vidkun Quislings of Africa and Asia, and their unconditional extermination should be the rightful concern of every human being.
 
The above mentioned practice cannot be included in the Fund for Peace six political indicators, although it may look affiliated to indicators 8, 10 and 11.

The institutionalization of selected treacherous and misrepresentative, bogus-elites demonstrates that the state we examine had been a failed state prior to its expansion, and that through military expansion, occupation of foreign lands, and subjugation of innocent peoples it diffuses state-promoted terrorism, and generates dangerous reactions with certainly regional and eventually global impact. It consists in a cancerous tumor that must be cut off as soon as possible.

'Ethiopia' in Somalia? Send Pakistani Army to Afghanistan!

Before comparing the two neighboring countries, one has to remind that both Somalia and 'Ethiopia' are included among the top 20 failed states of the world. This is essential because it helps understand that one failed state cannot help another failed state solve its problematic affairs.

To keep the analogies, we will highlight the issue through an indicative question:

- Could anyone possibly think that the remedy for Afghanistan's troubles would be a partly Pakistani invasion and the subsequent control of some regions previously controlled by Islamic Terrorists?

Well, if Pakistan, as Muslim nation but failed state (no 12 in the list), cannot be viewed as remedy of Afghanistan's problems (no 8 in the list), how can one imagine that Abyssinia – rebaptized as 'Ethiopia' (no 18 in the list) by its heretic, Monophysitic, bogus-Christian elites – can help Muslim Somalia (no 3 in the list), except by contributing to an Islamist explosive reaction? 

Fake 'Ethiopia' vs. Divided Somalia

We will first compare the two nations according to the seven widely accepted indicators of a Failed State, as follows:

1) A state whose central government is so weak or ineffective that it has little practical control over much of its territory.  

This certainly concerns Somalia rather than 'Ethiopia'; with Somaliland attempting to pursue a secessionist agenda (imposed to its president by the Africa's most dangerous butcher, the Abyssinian dictator Zenawi) and with the Abyssinian army in the south, almost half of Somalia's territory is out of control of the pro-Unity forces. The latter are manifested in Puntland, Maakhir, and in the Liberation Fighters of Mogadishu.

However, Abyssinia – fallaciously called 'Ethiopia' – is also concerned. Parts of Ogaden are completely out of the hands of the Abyssinian tribal dictator Zenawi, being defended by the brave fighters of the Ogaden National Liberation Front. In addition, parts of Oromia seem to be in turmoil and gradually slipping away. FIO, OLF, and other Oromo Liberation forces are about to prepare the coffin of the Amhara – Tigray elite of Africa's most appalling tyranny.

2) Legitimate authority to make collective decisions has been eroded.

In Somalia, we don't have collective decisions because the Somaliland rulers tried unsuccessfully for 16 years to get international recognition and secede, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) does not represent any reality anymore, and the newly risen National Somali Alliance ARS attempts first to kick the Abyssinian occupation forces out. It is estimated that ARS will cooperate with the Puntland and Maakhir leaderships, incorporating also Somalis from the TFG, and the Diaspora. However, there is legitimacy as regards ARS in the South, and the regional administrations in Central and Northeastern Somalia (Puntland, Maakhir). The legitimacy of the president of Somaliland has been repeatedly questioned by opposition forces, the Kulmiye party and the Northern Somalis for Peace and Unity.

In 'Ethiopia', there is no legitimate authority; Meles Zenawi tribal tyranny represents approximately 8% of the total population of the country; more than 70% of the entire population want to achieve Liberation, fighting for Independence.

The Tigray led tyranny is rejected with absolute wrath and vehement indignation by all the butchered Oromos, the massacred Ogadenis, the tyrannized Sidamas, the estrangled Afars, the oppressed Kaffas, the slaughtered Anuak, the exterminated Agaw, the terrorized Kambattas, the suppressed Shekachos, and the exploited Wolayitas.

At the same time, the Neo-Nazi Amharas with their Abysso-Fascist Kinijit party attempt to convince American legislators that they are able to replace the Tigray-controlled Morgue with an Amhara-inspired Cemetery!

Muslim Amharas and Tigrays are mercilessly dispersed, displaced and executed in extrajudicial procedures, and therefore adhere in great numbers to various new Islamist groups, while Washington D.C. calmly sleeps – at the eve of the Islamic Rebellion of 'Ethiopia'.

Legitimate authority in 'Ethiopia' is zero.

3) Reasonable public services can not be provided.

Public services exist only partly and dividedly in Somalia; they are not worse than those offered in 'Ethiopia'. To some extent, they are better.

In occupied Sidama Land, an entire African Nation as large as Croatia, is deprived of Education in its basic forms, namely schools, colleges and universities.

Multi-divided Somalia managed to found and develop several universities, either in Puntland or in Somaliland.

Quite, contrarily, the world's most undisputed wreckage, the monstrous Abyssinian tyranny, failed to offer a Sidama University to a 5 million nation that has been deliberately kept marginalized for more than a century!

4) Widespread corruption and criminality

Somalia is in war, and the occupation forces face a terrible blow due to the determined nature of the heroic Mogadishu fighters. If criminality exists, it is - like in Nazi occupied Europe - due to the Neo-Nazi Abyssinian racist invaders. In other parts of Somalia, the government of Somaliland has been repeatedly accused of corruption; to lesser extent similar accusations targeted the Puntland administration.

In the Abyssinian relic, corruption has been the lifestyle of the Amhara and Tigray gangsters for over a century. Indicative is their disreputable and inhuman practice of settlements in the occupied lands of Biyya Oromo, Ogaden, Sidama Land, Afar Land, Kaffa Kingdom, Shekacho Land, etc. Few hundreds of Amhara and Tigray go and settle among millions of subjugated peoples; for this to be done, disproportionally great parts of cultivated lands are taken - without any chance for appealing to Justice - from the legitimate and rightful owners, and given to the settlers.

Any reaction is characterized as criminal by the occupying Amhara and Tigray Abyssinian armies, and extrajudicial killings take place immediately. The European and American public opinions have still to discover the numerous genocides perpetrated by the Abyssinians in all the occupied territories. Books like those of Prof. Mekuria Bulcha and Seyoum Hameso are highly recommended for this purpose.

To worsen the incredible practices of corruption, schools and hospitals are built in all these vast lands exclusively for the settlers, any major economic and administrative activity is allowed to them only, and they are the sole participants in the ridiculous elections of Cannibal Zenawi. The rest have to live with less than half a dollar per day, and if sick, pitilessly die.

These things never happened, and do not actually happen in Somalia.

5) Refugees and involuntary movement of populations

In Somalia, refugees are due to the war, and the Abyssinian invasion; contrarily to this, Abyssinian totalitarian practices live no space for life to all the subjugated nations, causing therefore a tremendously great number of refugees.

Even worse, Abyssinia – under monarchical, communist and pseudo-republican regimes – practiced extensively deportation and population transportation in order to alter the demographic data in various parts of the invaded and annexed lands.

Even at this very moment, the criminal Abyssinian dictator Zenawi implements a policy of involuntary exodus in Ogaden, which he just stopped because as measure it would destabilize to death Somaliland, and his puppet, president Rayaale of Hargeysa.

In this case, again 'Ethiopia' has failed far worse than Somalia; in brief, the Amhara and Tigray Abyssinian tribes perpetarted 100 times more appalling and more enduring crimes than the Hutu in Rwanda in 1994. 

6) Sharp economic decline

Both countries are at the bottom of all economic indicators; Somalia was better off, but certainly the Civil War and the Abyssinian invasion deteriorated the situation.

For 'Ethiopia' the only remedy is demolition.

When all the oppressed and tyrannized nations of Abyssinia will shape independent countries, the only plunged in economic misery and underdevelopment will be the Amhara and the Tigray Abyssinians who lived for more than a century as real parasites, criminally exploiting the natural resources of all the invaded lands and subjugated nations.

7) Failed interaction with other states

Here again Somalia is far better off. Somalia never invaded Kenya or Djibouti; the Ogaden invasion, undertaken by the late President Siad Bare in 1977, was a fully justified and absolutely rightful decision in view of the terrible Abyssinian oppression of the Ogadeni Somalis, who constitute the totality of Ogaden's population.

Contrarily, the murderous Medieval – Neo Nazi elites of the racist Amhara and Tigray Abyssinians, after having invaded a dozen of nations at the end of the 19th century and during the first half of the 20th century, after having imposed an inhuman and dehumanizing tyranny - for an entire century - on all the subjugated peoples, after having done all they could to prevent Eritrea from becoming an independent state, they invaded Somalia, while editing and radjusting their Neo-Nazi plans for a Greater Ethiopia from the borders of Egypt to the borders of Kenya (in this regard, see: Horn of Africa and Forgery, from Kebra Negast to Mammo Muchie – last of a series of articles /  http://www.buzzle.com/articles/horn-of-africa-and-forgery-from-kebra-negast-to-mammo-muchie.html).

There is no measure of comparison between Peaceful and Anodyne – even when in strife – Somalia and the venomous contamination of the Racist Abyssinians. Perhaps the most convincing point is precisely this:

- Whereas international scholarship and political analysts evaluate the failed interaction with other states as failure for the invading state, the uncultured and uneducated, barbaric and racist masses and elites of Abyssinia – in total and dangerous contardiction with the rest of the world – consider it as success!
 
That is why the immediate destruction of fake 'Ethiopia' becomes the most urgent need in the War against the Islamic Terrorism; as Africa's most failed state, fake 'Ethiopia' provokes the world's most terrible Islamic Volcano.

When the rightful reactions of hundreds of millions of African Muslims against the Abyssinian hyena will have been canalized in the sewerage of Ossama Bin Laden, the world's superpower will have to nuke all the region from Gibraltar to Mozambique to eradicate the Islamic Terrorism. We will continue with further parallelisms between Anodyne Somalia and Malignant Abyssinia, as there is more to be discussed about failed states.

Note
Picture
Those fighters of Mogadishu relic Abyssinia cannot and will not defeat; America should count on this.