ARS and the Future of Somalia – What to Do?

As the two factions of ARS are deploying a reconciliation effort in Sanaa, it is perhaps useful to consider the extent of their task and responsibility to bring peace and unity to Somalia.

Key elements for ARS to go ahead

There are key elements that will lead ARS to success, and they must acknowledged as such by all sides and representatives. They are as follows:

1. Unity within a vast alliance that comprises elements of different ideological backgrounds and with varied approaches to Somalia’s political problem does not imply monolithic uniformity.

2. Political consistency is necessary for ARS, as it is for any front, party and movement, but it must be the result of truthful representation of ARS constituent members.

3. In fact, the political position of ARS (as regards any issue) must always reflect the ideas of the various currents that compose the great Somali Alliance. It must be a composition, not merely the imposition of the majority decision – let alone a unilateral pronouncement by some leading figures.

4. It would be very erroneous to assume that ARS is a political party in a functioning democracy; ARS is a national resistance organization that has been engaged to liberate Somalia and help establish a unitary, pacified Somalia ready for reconstruction. It is critical to bear this constantly in mind. In a functioning democracy, the political discord within a party results in the formation of two parties, which is a minor impact event; under current circumstances in Somalia, the political discord within ARS will result in chaos, which will be of phenomenal proportions and ultimate national disaster.

5. It will therefore be essential for all to realize that no one will get it done in the way he wants. Concessions and compromises have to be constant in order to maintain the flexibility of the vast organization that ARS is. In fact, this hinges upon political skills, namely negotiations, ability to share, and predisposition to accept an unacceptable issue here in order to get the others agree with what they don’t like there. Anyone who is not predisposed to accept this approach should leave voluntarily because he will definitely turn to be a liability sooner or later.

6. The present day differences are prelude to even greater divergence when things go ahead; in anticipation of this, and in view of the importance to fast pacify and reunify Somalia, concessions must be made even more straightforwardly.

7. As a matter of fact, the divergence of opinions must be viewed by ARS members as an extra advantage; then they all must contribute to making it function as such. One wing should play the role of moderates and the other side should become the intransigent; the latter will be the pretext for the former to be a more difficult interlocutor for the TFG.

With all this in mind, the members of ARS must set up a plan as regards Somalia’s pacification and reunification.

An eventual ARS inflexibility – Useful for US/UK Anti-Somali Plans?

ARS must get out of the trap where developments have pulled them; instead of merely ‘answering’ to incidents, ARS must shape events. This will be a critical moment for Somalia, as the national resistance forces, ARS included, have only responded to developments thus far. The Abyssinian ‘army’ of Amhara and Tigray thugs invaded Somalia; the ARS started the national resistance struggle.

However, it will be wrong to imagine that through war they will manage to force ailing Abyssinia to withdraw their gangsters easily. As the tyrannical regime of Meles Zenawi is about collapse, an eventual ARS decision for War may trigger most unfortunate developments for Somalia.

A first topic to debate therefore is War or Peace.

If there are within ARS people who believe that there has been a conspiracy against Somalia (mostly elaborated by the US, UK and Abyssinia), they first must answer to this:

- Are you ready to opt for war until Liberation, only to help the US/UK intelligence (assessing Zenawi’s survivability as nil) support a sudden military coup that would replace Zenawi by calling the (equally anti-Somali, racist, and tyrannical elements of Kinijit and/or Ginbot 7) to come to power, thus drawing greater support (than Zenawi) from the Amhara and an Oromo minority of Quislings and collaborators, and (after making an eventual compromise in Ogaden with ONLF) reinvigorating the Abyssinian military presence in Somalia?

Critical thinking has nothing to do with finding solutions to present problems; this is average thought. Critical thinking means reduction of one’s biases, which is a difficult process.

How many members of ARS are ready to say as regards any subject "I thought I knew but I only believed"?

And, more importantly, critical thinking has to lead to intelligence analysis for the purpose of correctly characterizing the known, and accurately identifying probabilities.

ARS will fail if the Alliance leaders fail to anticipate correctly.

It would therefore be wise to opt for peace as means for Somalia’s pacification.

How?

The recent ARS crisis with the polarization around two wings, one pro-Djibouti Agreement and another contra, may be helpful for one more reason; it helps them better understand the entire Somali society and political life of which they are just a part.

The only way to pacification and reunification is conversation, negotiation, mutual understanding, reciprocal concession, compromise, and flee ahead, which involves particularly patching up the old wounds. ARS leaders and members must understand that they consist in the only Somali political organization of proportions that enable majority vote in the forthcoming constituent Assembly and possibility to rule; even more significantly, as the outright majority of the Somalis view them as such, ARS bear the responsibility not to disappoint or let down the Somalis.

The following points would show to most of the Somalis that ARS can be trusted for the country’s future:

1. Decide and keep a unitary position as regards ARS stance towards Djibouti Agreement. Either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’.

2. If ‘No’ to Djibouti Agreement prevails among ARS, it is critically important that a counter-agreement be drafted and made publicly known – along with the ‘No’. Simple ‘No’ answers are for governments and ruling administrations. National resistance movements never say ‘No’ if they want to mark a success; they say ‘yes, but’. The eventual counter – agreement must be drafted in a way that TFG could accept it.

3. Demonizing the UN would not help; it would perpetuate the current situation, which can turn bitterly against Somalia, as we already said. The UN has no purpose to possibly harm one of its members. ARS would gain, if they viewed the UN positively. Strengthened with the recent HRW Report on Ogaden, ARS must view the UN as the venue of ceaseless denunciation of the lawless state of Abyssinia, the venomous and inhuman enemy of Somalia. So, they need the UN as audience first, in order to convince them, and then as supporters, in order to get their support against Abyssinia’s evil plans for Somalia, Ogaden, Oromia, Sidama Land, etc.

4. Vilifying the US would not help either; it simply cuts bridges with a big country, which under another administration could be very helpful and friendly. Denouncing the evil, inhuman and disastrous policies of Jendayi Frazer as unconstitutional is effective; engaging in Anti-Americanism would be appreciated only if it involved a bank check of US $ 100 million from the government of France which has been one of the leading promoters of Anti-Americanism worldwide. Otherwise, why offer France a present for nothing?

5. Depicting TFG President as an Abyssinian stooge does not contribute to an exit. Certainly, around the TFG President there are dangerous people, who pretending to do the best manage to destroy Somalia’s chances for peace; then, why not thinking about how to work closely with the TFG in order to spread discord among them, and extract friends and allies, while isolating the evil and nefarious elements?

6. Recognizing the role the tribal structure of Somalia has played thus far would not necessarily imply acceptance of its negative aspects. There are also positive facets in the tribal structure of the Somali social organization; if well studied and focalized, these positive elements can help ARS bring forth a solution. Why the Shebab proved to be able to strike some agreements for local pacification among tribal elders in some places? The same can happen at the national level with ARS.

ARS must therefore extend a great part of interest for, concern with, and devotion to the elders of all the Somali tribes and clans – including those located in the illegal pseudo-states of Somaliland and Puntland. Explain to them how ARS can rule, unify and pacify Somalia without them finding their position minimized, their interests damaged, and their role limited.

A plan must be elaborated with them about the political system of a unitary and peaceful Somalia whereby the tribal system will also be incorporated, by means of instituting a Senate to be elected on proportional basis in order to reflect every tribe’s and clan’s proportion out of Somalia’s total population. Elected separately and within every tribe and clan, the Somali Senators would be offered legislative power to ration and regulate the legislative power of the National Assembly’s deputies who would be elected in universal suffrage throughout Somalia.

7. Reaching out to all the other political forces, the TFG, and the Diaspora organizations, ARS should deploy an effort to convince them about the fact that, although their members may have a certain predilection for some political ideology, they would not act in terms of narrow-minded political interest, rather sharing political power with all the rest for an initial period after the first elections. They should do everything they can to eliminate the slightest doubt that they purposely act in order to bring about a Wahhabist regime in Somalia.

8. ARS leaders and members must set up a plan for a trustful cooperation with the TFG on the following subjects:
a – departure of the Abyssinian army from Somalia (any agreement, placed under the UN auspices, would be credible, only if it included a roadmap, a schedule to be followed, involving locations and dates of departure)
b – replacement of the Abyssinian army by UN peace keeping force
c – facilitation of the humanitarian NGOs ready to offer relief to IDPs and other Somalis in need
d – modalities of sharing power (in the administration, police and armed forces, involving gradual disarmament and integration into national security forces) during the period needed for the preparation of elections for Constituent Assembly.

9. With respect to religious policy, it will be critically important for ARS to demonstrate commitment for the promotion of the various Sufi schools and eliminate the penetration of Wahhabi fanatics, who reflect not a moment, not a achievement, not a glory from the Somali past. This element should then be used in order to subsequently obtain international political credentials for ARS proven contribution against fanaticism. This political option should be highlighted within a draft of New Somali Constitution that ARS should do their ingenious best to prepare in no time.

10. ARS should be engaged in diplomatic contacts with embassies, administrations and international bodies while in the process getting metamorphosed into an Islamic Democratic Party of Somalia, in a way parallel to the Italian Christian Democracy Party (Democrazia Cristiana) or the German Christliche Demokratische Partei (CDU), thus revealing and corroborating the compatibility of the Islamic religion with democratic political procedures.

It is precisely for this reason that ARS leaders should maintain the Djibouti agreement, eventually demanding additional specifications, terms and conditions. Somalia can be re-liberated fast and steadfastly; but it will take a deep conviction that ARS, instead of simply ‘replying’ to developments, will be able to trigger the events that will open the way until the elections for Constituent Assembly.

I terminate these suggestions, adding an informative report from the leading Somali portal Mareeg, as regards the Yemen meeting.

Somalia: Opposition representatives arrive in Yemen
http://www.mareeg.com/fidsan.php?sid=6667&tirsan=3&PHPSESSID=ef7d78bb4b4809a6bf1ea7726d2604d1

Representative of the Asmara-based faction of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia [ARS] have arrived in Sana'a Yemen on Saturday to participate in the reconciling talks due to open in Djibouti Sunday.

The representatives, six of them, lead by Dr. Umar Imam Abu Bakar, arrived in Sana'a later on Saturday.

These representatives are expected to attend a meeting in which other ARS officials will also attend in a bid to resolve the divisions regarding the Djibouti agreement, which was signed, by the government and a faction of the ARS.

Sheikh Abdirahman Mahmud Farah who is a member of the ARS told Mareeg online the talks are expected to commence soon and ARS members from both factions [Djibouti and Asmara-based factions] will hold face to face talks without any mediation in order to resolve their differences.

The agenda for the meeting is not yet known but sources indicate that the Alliance officials who attended the Djibouti talks will open the meeting to brief members on the Djibouti agreement which caused the divisions in particular the point pertaining to the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops.

Somali scholars and businessmen are also present in Yemen to reconcile members of the Alliance.

The opposition split over the signing of a controversial peace agreement last month.

The talks in Yemen follow recent comments by the principle Islamist signatory to the agreement who said the opposition will unite against the government if Ethiopian troops do not leave Somalia within four months.

In a telephone interview from the Somalia opposition group's base in Asmara, Eritrea, Islamist cleric Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys tells that representatives from his faction and allies of Sheik Sharif Sheik Ahmed have received permission from the Yemeni government to hold direct talks in Sana'a.

Aweys, who is influential among some clan and radical Islamist insurgents in Somalia, says he is not planning to attend the meeting. But he says he is ready to support whatever agreement is reached between the two sides.

The Islamist leader says the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) requested the meeting, because there are issues to discuss and Somalis often resolve differences by talking. He says everyone is expected to abide by what the majority decides.

Aweys and other hardliners in the alliance stayed away from U.N.-sponsored peace talks in Djibouti that led to the June 9 signing of an agreement between the more moderate Ahmed and the transitional federal government.

Opposition hardliners rejected the peace deal.

It stipulates that Ethiopian troops, who have backed the Somali transitional government since late 2006, would withdraw within 120 days if a U.N. stabilization force of sufficient strength is in place to replace them. Hardliners argue the agreement should have called for Ethiopians to withdraw immediately. They have threatened to remove Ahmed as chairman of the ARS for participating in the peace process.

U.S.-based Horn of Africa observer and commentator Professor Michael Weinstein says Ahmed has recently made comments that suggested he was eager to prove to Somalis that the opposition alliance is intact and that a clear timetable for an Ethiopian withdrawal has been set.

"He said that we are all on the same page in the ARS. We all want the Ethiopians out. We will liberate by negotiations, but if that does not work, we will rejoin the armed resistance and we are confident that if we liberate by negotiations, the militant faction of the ARS will join us. So it is all depending on 120 days, according to Sheik Sharif," he said.

Weinstein says Ahmed's comments may have helped soothe some of the anger, allowing an opposition reconciliation meeting to take place in Yemen. But he says Ahmed's words are deeply troubling for the international community, which must now find a way to quickly deploy a sizeable stabilization force in Somalia to keep the country from plunging further into violence.

Fighting between insurgents and Ethiopian and government troops for the past 18 months has killed more than 85-hundred people, displaced more than one million others, and has left Somalia in the midst of what the United Nations says is the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world.

Another armed Somali group which boycotted the talks in Djibouti, the Shabab, has not yet commented on the peace deal. Its leaders have long maintained that the Shabab, recently designated as a terrorist group by the United States for having ties to al-Qaida, would continue fighting until all Ethiopians left Somali soil.