Amhara and Tigray ‘Ethiopianist’ Regime: Osama Bin Laden’s Foremost Ally

In two previous articles entitled "Terrorist State ‘Ethiopia’ to Be Punished for Evil Role in Somalia – HRW Report Summary" and "So Much to Fear - War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia, HRW Report Recommendations", I re-published the Summary and the Recommendations of the HRW Report on Somalia.

In the present article, I republish chapters on the Methodology and the Background (text and notes). As the Report is mostly focused on Mogadishu, we have good reason to ponder on the possible results of the Abyssinian invasion.

After two years, the Abyssinian death squads are preparing to leave without having achieved practically anything. In fact the only result has been the unprecedented humanitarian disaster and the increased radicalization of all the Somalis.

This was anticipated, and even before the Abyssinian invasion of the Somali South, many voices have been raised to clarify that the only result of such a paranoid attempt would be further diffusion of the Islamic extremism, radicalism and fanaticism.

Accusing the Islamic Courts of Justice of Islamic Extremism, the ‘Ethiopianist’ regime of tyrant Zenawi helped the diffusion of Islamic Extremism to a previously unimaginable level, and proved to be the main terrorist organization in Africa and Osama Bin Laden’s foremost ally.

In forthcoming articles, I will republish further parts of the HRW Report.

Methodology
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/76418/section/6

This report is based largely on six weeks of field research in Kenya, Somaliland, and Djibouti between June and September 2008. This was supplemented with telephone interviews with Somalis in Mogadishu during September and October 2008, as well as interviews with policymakers and analysts outside the region. Travel to Somalia under circumstances that would have permitted research was not possible during this period because of security concerns for potential interviewees and local civil society partners, as well as Human Rights Watch staff.

In June and July, Human Rights Watch researchers conducted in-depth interviews with refugees who had recently fled Somalia in several different locations-the Dadaab refugee camps in northern Kenya; in Nairobi; in Hargeisa, Somaliland; and, in Djibouti. In September researchers carried out additional interviews in Nairobi and Djibouti. We interviewed more than 80 victims and eyewitnesses to the patterns of abuse documented in this report. For broader context we interviewed dozens of analysts, Somali civil society activists, humanitarian workers, diplomats, medical staff, and journalists, some of whom were also eyewitnesses to the events described in this report. We also met with TFG officials including Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein, with ARS officials, including Sheikh Sharif Ahmed and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, and with UN officials, including UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. We met with European Commission officials in Nairobi, but the Africa Bureau of the US State Department declined to provide any comment in response to Human Rights Watch's criticism of US government policy towards Somalia.

Because of security concerns, the identities of many of the people whose interviews are included in this report-including almost all of the victims and eyewitnesses we interviewed-have been withheld or their accounts have been presented under pseudonyms. We also omitted other identifying details about individuals or the locations where they were interviewed where we believed that information could put them at risk.

This report focuses largely, though not entirely, on events and patterns of abuse in Mogadishu in 2008. Mogadishu has been the site of the most consistent, brutal, and destructive fighting throughout the last two years.

This is in part a reflection of the fact that Mogadishu is considered the most important prize in this conflict and a place that no party to the conflict has yet managed to control. Mogadishu is also home to a large majority of the refugees Human Rights Watch interviewed about their experiences. This is both because the intense fighting there has driven far more people to flee than in any other place and because a greater proportion of Mogadishu's population can afford the expense of traveling to neighboring countries. The situation in other parts of south-central Somalia varies considerably, though where fighting has occurred it has often involved many of the same patterns of laws of war violations and human rights abuse documented in this report.

Human Rights Watch was often able to determine the weapons used in particular attacks documented in this report because civilians, especially in Mogadishu, have become experts at identifying different weaponry by their specific characteristics. Dozens of eyewitnesses consistently named specific weapons that were used, and described to Human Rights Watch the sound or sight of different types of weaponry even when they were unable to name the type of weapon.

For instance, individuals repeatedly named BM-21 rockets or "Katyushas," which they called "BM" or described as "whistling" due to the sound they made when launched and the loud noise upon impact. Numerous people accurately told Human Rights Watch that mortar shells, by contrast, were silent in their flight.

Background
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/76418/section/7

Since Ethiopian armed forces entered Mogadishu in December 2006, Somalia has suffered an increasingly brutal conflict that has devastated the country and laid waste to its capital. Lawlessness and violence have plagued Somalia since the collapse of its last central government in 1991. But the magnitude of the crisis facing the country today dwarfs everything else Somalis have endured throughout the last 10 years.[2]

Ethiopia intervened in Somalia to oust a coalition of shari'a (Islamic law) courts known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which had taken control of Mogadishu in mid-2006. Ethiopia-along with the United States-saw in the ICU a threat that could turn Somalia into a safe haven for al Qaeda and for rebel groups fighting against the Ethiopian government in its own Somali Region.[3] At the time, the ICU looked powerful enough to sweep away Somalia's moribund Transitional Federal Government (TFG). But that changed overnight with Ethiopia's decision to intervene.[4]

Until 2006 the TFG had not managed to enter the Somali capital or establish a physical presence anywhere outside the towns of Baidoa and Jowhar. Plagued with factional divisions, the TFG provided nothing in the way of basic services to Somali citizens and enjoyed little material support from a skeptical international community. But in December 2006 Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) forces acting at the invitation of the TFG quickly and decisively routed ICU militias, bringing the TFG to Mogadishu on their coattails. The TFG extended its administration to the capital, and the ENDF remained in Somalia to provide the military support it needed to survive.

Ethiopia and Somalia have a long history of bitter conflict and in 1977 the two countries fought a full-scale war when Somalia attempted to annex what is now Ethiopia's eastern Somali region. Ethiopia has legitimate security interests in Somalia.[5] But for many Somalis, the presence of ENDF forces in Mogadishu was an intolerable development, and tensions built rapidly among the local population.[6]

Within a week of the fall of Mogadishu, the first insurgent attacks against the TFG and ENDF began. In the early months of 2007, insurgent fighters including clan militias and former ICU forces assassinated TFG officials and staged rocket and mortar attacks against TFG and Ethiopian bases, police stations, and other installations. In March 2007, just three months after entering the capital, Ethiopian forces carried out their first major offensive against insurgent strongholds in northern Mogadishu. The indiscriminate ENDF rocket, mortar, and artillery bombardments that accompanied the operation devastated entire city blocks, killed hundreds of civilians, and caused tens of thousands to flee the city.[7]

In the two years since Ethiopian forces entered Mogadishu, Somalia has spiraled ever-deeper into bloody and unrestrained fighting. All sides have pursued military strategies with little or no concern for the civilians living in their urban battlefields. Insurgent fighters quickly adopted hit-and-run tactics that have remained a defining feature of the conflict, staging ambushes or mortar attacks and then fading back into the cover of the civilian population. Ethiopian and TFG forces developed patterns of responding to those attacks that have since become part of the day-to-day reality of life in Mogadishu-reacting to indiscriminate mortar attacks in kind, with devastating barrages of rocket, mortar, and artillery fire across populated neighborhoods. ENDF and TFG forces began sealing off sections of entire neighborhoods to conduct often-violent house-to-house searches for insurgent fighters and weaponry. The brunt of all this fighting has been borne not by the warring parties but by the hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped between them.

The Current Situation

In 2008 the human rights and humanitarian situation in Somalia deteriorated into unmitigated catastrophe. Several thousand civilians have been killed in fighting.[8] More than one million Somalis are now displaced from their homes and thousands flee across the country's borders every month.[9] Mogadishu, a bustling city of 1.2 million people in 2006, has seen more than 870,000 of its residents displaced by the armed conflict.[10] All sides have used indiscriminate force as a matter of routine, and in 2008 violence has taken on a new dimension with the targeted murders of aid workers and civil society activists.[11]

Militarily, the situation has reached an impasse following dramatic gains by insurgent forces. TFG and Ethiopian forces have lost the ability to exercise even limited influence across most of the country and appear to have given up trying to recapture territory they have lost. For example, ENDF forces in July negotiated a withdrawal to their base outside the strategic border town of Beletweyne, allowing an ICU administration to take control of the town.[12] The only major toeholds left to the TFG and ENDF are Baidoa and parts of Mogadishu, and in both places they are under a perpetual state of siege. But while the momentum has clearly swung in favor of the armed opposition, there is little prospect that TFG and ENDF forces will be forcibly dislodged from their remaining strongholds so long as Ethiopian forces remain committed to the conflict.

While the armed conflict continues with the civilian population trapped in the midst, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated drastically. Conflict, drought, and a collapse of the economy brought on in part by rampant hyperinflation have left more than 3.25 million Somalis in need of emergency assistance.[13] Yet humanitarian access to populations in need, already restricted by the hazards posed by fighting, has been severely curtailed by a wave of attacks and death threats against aid workers and members of Somali civil society. At the same time, rampant piracy off Somalia's northern coasts has restricted the amount of food aid coming into the country's ports. Hyperinflation has seen the cost of some food staples triple in just six months during 2008.[14] Many humanitarian workers worry that these factors could be building towards a "perfect storm" and that insecurity will prevent any adequate response to the disaster.[15]
In June 2008 TFG and opposition leaders reached agreement on a theoretical roadmap towards peace in Djibouti.[16] The Djibouti process enjoyed broad international support including the enthusiastic advocacy of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia (UN SRSG), Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. Many analysts believed that the negotiations represent Somalia's best chance at a durable negotiated peace in several years and many leading Somali civil society activists have traveled to Djibouti to participate in talks surrounding the accord.[17] But the process has so far failed to take root, partly because key armed opposition groups refused to participate in the process.

While several rounds of talks have been held in 2008, they have not translated into a lasting ceasefire or halt to the bloodshed. Nor have they facilitated an adequate response to the country's increasingly dire humanitarian situation. In October the parties to the Djibouti process agreed on the redeployment of Ethiopian forces from contested areas of Mogadishu and elsewhere and on a ceasefire to be implemented from November 5. But the days following November 5 saw only continued bloody fighting on the streets of Mogadishu.[18] And on October 29 a deadly wave of car bombings occurred simultaneously in Somaliland and Puntland, targeting government and UN offices as well as the Ethiopian consulate in Hargeisa.[19] At least 28 people were killed. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but southern Somalia's Al-Shabaab insurgents were widely suspected of involvement.[20]

Increasing Factionalization of the Somali Warring Parties

In part, the failure of the Djibouti process is a reflection of how deeply fragmented both the TFG and opposition have become. The Transitional Federal Government is bitterly divided between partisans of Prime Minister Nur "Adde" Hassan Hussein, who is widely seen as a moderate and enjoys broad support among the TFG's international partners, and supporters of TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf. The prime minister backs the Djibouti process; TFG officials close to the president are deeply skeptical of it and have not been closely involved with recent talks.[21] In August the chasm between the president and prime minister grew so wide that each pursued parliamentary resolutions to have the other removed from office. The Ethiopian government had to bring Yusuf and Nur Adde to Addis Ababa for mediation to prevent political collapse.[22]

The opposition to the TFG is even more badly divided, both politically and militarily. The ICU was divided along clan lines even before it was driven from power. Many of its leaders fled to Asmara, Eritrea after ENDF forces drove them out of Mogadishu in December 2006, and its leaders then formed a broader opposition group called the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS). But the ARS splintered between a core group that left Asmara for Djibouti and a smaller faction of hard-line dissidents who remain in Asmara today.[23]

Currently the broadest opposition coalition is the Djibouti-based faction of the ARS. The ARS is led by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, the leader of the ICU when it was still in Mogadishu, and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, a former speaker of the TFG parliament.[24] It includes former ICU members, TFG parliamentarians who opposed the ENDF's military intervention, members of the Somali Diaspora, and others.[25]

The members of the ICU leadership that remained behind in Asmara constituted some of its most hard-line elements and now operate under the leadership of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. Aweys, who has rejected the Djibouti process, is a former ICU official and was formerly a leading member of the now-defunct armed militant Islamist group, al-Itihaad al-Islaamiya.[26] Sheikh Sharif and Aweys have engaged in a very public and very bitter dispute over the leadership of the broader ARS.

The most important division within the opposition, however, is not within the ARS but between the ARS and other groups. ARS leaders in Djibouti have a strong influence over insurgent fighters in many areas. But they have little or no control over many of the groups fighting against the TFG and ENDF, including Islamist Al-Shabaab fighters inside of Somalia.
Even though Al-Shabaab began as the armed wing of the ICU under Sheikh Sharif, it has increasingly broken with the ARS during the past two years. Al-Shabaab is deeply fragmented itself and has spawned numerous splinter groups, but to the extent that it has central leadership this is concentrated in a handful of individuals who have remained inside Somalia to carry on the fight. The most prominent among Al-Shabaab's known leaders are Sheikh Mukhtar Robow and Hassan Turki, who control large swathes of territory in Bay and Bakool regions and in the far south of Somalia, respectively.

Al-Shabaab has rejected the Djibouti process altogether. Just one day following the signature of a ceasefire agreement between ARS and TFG officials in October 2008, Sheikh Robow publicly rejected it and vowed to keep on fighting. "We have already rejected the [peace] conference and its agreements," he said. "We are now saying again that we will not accept them."[27] This is significant because Al-Shabaab controls a much larger proportion of the military forces deployed against the ENDF and TFG than the leaders of the ARS-Djibouti. This is particularly true in Mogadishu, where ARS leaders freely admit that they have no control or influence over most of the opposition fighters on the ground.[28] The only administration that was firmly under the influence of the ARS-Djibouti as of October 2008 was one set up in the town of Jowhar, north of Mogadishu.[29]

At the time of writing there are no indications that the fighting in Somalia will end anytime soon. The Ethiopian government has shown increasing signs of impatience with the inability of the TFG to establish itself and speculation of a possible ENDF withdrawal was widespread in the latter half of 2008.[30] Many analysts believe this would be well-received by most Somalis but the likely short-term result would be a spike in bloodshed, and a possible collapse of the TFG, as Somali factions rushed to fill the vacuum.[31] One possible consequence of an ENDF withdrawal could be a drawn-out, violent power struggle between ARS and Al-Shabaab forces that would push Somalia still further into calamity.[32]

Many influential foreign governments have displayed considerably more interest in Somalia since the rise of the ICU in December 2006. But United States involvement in the crisis has been hobbled by Washington's broader policy of uncritical support f0r Ethiopia and a narrow emphasis on counter-terrorism concerns. Other international donors have focused many of their efforts on bolstering non-existent TFG "institutions," in some cases with disastrous or ineffectual results. The role of international actors in Somalia is discussed in more detail below.[33]

UN SRSG Ould-Abdallah has lobbied vigorously for a UN-sponsored international stabilization force, as have the Ethiopian government and TFG. But with Al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups hostile to the idea, and memories of UNOSOM's 1993-94 debacle fresh in many minds, there appears to be little international appetite to contribute troops to such a force.[34] The African Union has deployed a peacekeeping force to Somalia, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). However AMISOM has a limited mandate that does not include civilian protection and has never reached beyond a fraction of its intended strength. Only Uganda and Burundi have contributed troops to AMISOM, and the force's presence has not fundamentally altered the situation on the ground.[35]

Notes

[2] A recent analysis of the conflict by prominent Somalia expert Ken Menkhaus argued that "Seismic political, social, and security changes are occurring in the country, and none bode well for the people of Somalia or the international community." Ken Menkhaus, "Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare," ENOUGH Strategy Paper, September 2008, http://enoughproject.org/files/reports/somalia_rep090308.pdf (accessed October 16, 2008).

[3] For more on Ethiopia's security concerns in Somalia, see below, The Role of International Actors in Somalia.

[4] See, e.g., Rob Crilly, "Somalia's transitional government on the verge of collapse," Christian Science Monitor, August 4, 2006. The TFG was the product of one of more than a dozen peace conferences convened since 1991 and prior to 2006 looked poised to end in failure just as all previous attempts to forge a new national government had done. For more background on this see Human Rights Watch, Somalia-Shell Shocked: Civilians Under Siege in Mogadishu, vol. 19, no. 12(A), August 2007, http://hrw.org/reports/2007/somalia0807/ pp. 29-33.

[5] See below, The Role of International Actors in Somalia.

[6] One analyst recently wrote that Mogadishu's population was "shocked and sullen" in response to the sight of ENDF forces on the streets of the city. Menkhaus, Somalia: A Country in Peril, A Policy Nightmare, p. 2.

[7] Human Rights Watch, Shell Shocked.

[8] In December 2007 the Mogadishu-based Elman Human Rights Center estimated that 6,000 civilians had been killed in Somalia due to conflict since the end of 2006. As documented in this report many more civilians have been killed in 2008, but no organization has been able to produce a credible estimate of the total number of civilian casualties. Estimates put forward by Somali civil society groups are regarded with some skepticism by humanitarian workers and UN officials. Human Rights Watch interviews with NGO and humanitarian workers, Nairobi, September 2008.

[9] For more details on Somalia's IDP population see Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, Somalia country page, http://www.internaldisplacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/02EE5A59E76049F5802570A7004B80AB?OpenDocument (accessed October 27, 2008).

[10] See, Statement by 52 NGOs on the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Somalia, October 6, 2008, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EDIS-7K6LBP?OpenDocument (accessed October 23, 2008)

[11] See below, Attacks on Humanitarian Workers and Civil Society Activists.

[12] Human Rights Watch interviews with humanitarian workers, ARS officials, and civil society activists, Djibouti and Nairobi, September 2008. See also, e.g., Garowe Online, Somalia: Mortars Hit Baidoa, Islamist Rebels Capture Provincial Capital, July 8, 2008, http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Mortars_hit_Baidoa_Islamist_rebels_capture_provincial_capital_printer.shtml (accessed October 23, 2008). Beletweyne is of strategic importance because it lies near the road north from Mogadishu to the Ethiopian border, a key supply route for ENDF forces in the country. In 2008 Ethiopian forces withdrew from the town, which lies several kilometers off the main highway, to their base which sits adjacent to the road.

[13] See, Statement by 52 NGOs on the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in Somalia, October 6, 2008, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EDIS-7K6LBP?OpenDocument (accessed October 23, 2008); Cindy Holleman, "Conflict, Economic Crisis and Drought: a Humanitarian Emergency Out of Control," Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 40, October 2008, http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2944 (accessed October 20, 2008).(estimating that as many as 3.5 million Somalis could be in need of emergency assistance by the end of 2008).

[14] Holleman, "Conflict, Economic Crisis and Drought," Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, October 2008.

[15] Human Rights Watch interviews, Nairobi, July and September 2008; see Jeffrey Gettleman, "Food Crisis Meets Chaos in Horn of Africa," International Herald Tribune, May 17, 2008.

[16] The Djibouti agreement was formally signed in August 2008 by representatives of the TFG and ARS. The Djibouti agreement's central provisions provide for a cessation of hostilities; Ethiopian military withdrawal to be carried out in conjunction with the deployment of an international stabilization force; and, a commitment by all parties to allow unfettered humanitarian access to areas under their control.

[17] Human Rights Watch interviews with Somali civil society activists and independent analysts, Nairobi, Hargeisa, and Djibouti, July 2008.

[18] See, e.g., Garowe Online, "13 killed, 35 wounded in 'hours of fighting' in Mogadishu," November 9, 2008, http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_13_killed_35_wounded_in_hours_of_fighting_in_Mogadishu.shtml (accessed November 11, 2008); Agence France-Presse, "Five die in Mogadishu Fighting," November 9, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hPKFlsM4BaINF4EIkZUwIlOKUEuQ (accessed November 11, 2008).

[19] Near-simultaneous attacks struck an intelligence office of the Puntland Government in Garowe and, in Hargeisa, the UNDP office, and the Ethiopian consulate. See Alisha Ryu, "Suicide Car Bombings Kill Dozens in Northern Somalia," VOA News, October 29, 2008, http://voanews.com/english/2008-10-29-voa35.cfm (accessed November 11, 2008).

[20] Human Rights Watch interviews and email correspondence with journalists and independent analysts, November 2008; see also Hussein Ali Noor, "Suicide bombers kill at least 28 in Somalia," Reuters, October 29, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSL0534420._CH_.2400 (accessed November 11, 2008).

[21] Human Rights Watch interviews with senior diplomatic officials, Djibouti, September 2008.

[22] Human Rights Watch interviews with western diplomats and Somali civil society activists, Nairobi and Djibouti, September 2008. See Garowe Online, "Ethiopian Generals to Mediate Between Leaders," August 11, 2008, http://allafrica.com/stories/200808110421.html (accessed October 23, 2008).

[23] For more on the reasons for the core ARS leadership's departure from Djibouti, see below, The Role of International Actors in Somalia.

[24] Sharif Hassan was the Speaker of the TFG parliament until he fled the country after vocally opposing Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia in December 2006.

[25] The ARS central committee has 191 members. According to one member of the committee the largest blocs in the committee are made up of ICU members; "free parliamentarians" who have fled Somalia and abandoned their seats in the TFG parliament; and prominent Diaspora figures including intellectuals and businessmen. Human Rights Watch interview with ARS central committee member, Djibouti, July 16, 2008.

[26]Al-Itihaad al-Islaamiya was allegedly responsible for several bombings inside Ethiopia and fought against current TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf when he was president of northern Somalia's semi-autonomous region of Puntland. Al-Itihaad's military forces were crushed and largely eliminated by ENDF forces and Yusuf's militias in the 1990s. See Andre Le Sage, "Prospects for Al Itihad and Islamist Radicalism in Somalia," Review of African Political Economy, vol. 27, no. 89, September 2001; International Crisis Group, "Somalia's Islamists," Africa Report No. 100, December 12, 2005.

[27] See, "Insurgents Reject UN-Backed Deal for Somalia," Agence France-Presse, October 27, 2008.

[28] Human Rights Watch interviews with ARS Central Committee members, Djibouti, July 2008.

[29] The Jowhar administration is run by ICU officials and fighters who as of the time of writing had placed themselves largely under the control of Sheikh Sharif and the ARS-Djibouti. Human Rights Watch interviews with analysts, diplomats, and ARS officials, Djibouti and Nairobi, September 2008. ICU-dominated administrations have also taken control of the town of Beletweyne and other areas but the extent of ARS influence over the leadership of these groups is unclear.

[30] In October, for example, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stated that "We have explained to the international community that there is no readiness by the leadership in Somalia to take their responsibilities for peace and reconciliation." Tsegaye Tadesse, "Ethiopian troops to stay in Somalia, wait for AU," Reuters, October 16, 2008, http://africa.reuters.com/top/news/usnJOE49F0LU.html (accessed November 11 , 2008).

[31] One senior Western diplomat in Nairobi told Human Rights Watch that many western governments were concerned that if the TFG fell Ethiopia would "just revert back to a policy of arming their friends and making sure there is no strong central government in Somalia." Human Rights Watch interview with senior, Western diplomat, Nairobi, September 22, 2008.

[32] See Menkhaus, "Somalia: A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare."

[33] See below, The Role of International Actors in Somalia.

[34] For more on UNOSOM, see John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995); Human Rights Watch, Shell Shocked pp. 28-29.

[35] See below, The Role of International Actors in Somalia.


Note
Picture: TFG does not represent any authority and reflects a minority of the Somalia Diaspora; locally it is as hated as the racist Amhara and Tigray death squads to whom has been given the fallacious and ridiculous name of "Ethiopian National Army". Death is what they deserved, death is what was delivered to them. From: http://dusteye.wordpress.com/2007/03/22/