Eta and Islamist Militants: How the Extremist Movements Work

There is a huge gulf between the violent militants Eta and those belonging to radical Muslim groups in their methods and aims.

Eta's attacks, though murderous, kill on nothing like the scale of many Islamic militant attacks. Eta's attacks are carefully calibrated expressions of power and part of a sometimes chaotic but nonetheless coherent ideologically based political program with evident and consistently explained, if evolving, aims. They do not involve the suicide of participants, either – rather the opposite. Eta also has a well-organized political wing, espousing what is purported to be a non-violent democratic strategy that acts in concert with those practicing violence.

Yet in terms of how extremist movements work on the ground, there are some broad similarities that are worth noting if only to throw the deep differences into relief. Many of these are common to all sorts of radical groups, violent or not, as well as sects and similar organizations.

First, there is a broad cultural and historical hinterland. The militants do not function in isolation but are embedded within social, political or cultural activism of a broad movement. They are a minority and, in many ways, see themselves as an elite vanguard, revolutionary or religious. For Eta, this hinterland is the Basque National Liberation Movement.

Second, there is the role played by small-group dynamics. One of the most extraordinary episodes in Islamic militancy of recent years involved the effective mass suicide of almost an entire football team in a completely hopeless attack on army and police positions in southern Thailand. In the Basque country, many militants grew up together, playing football or mountaineering.

Personal networks are hugely important in recruiting. Islamic militant cells, especially in Europe, have often used outdoor adventure activities to bring otherwise disparate individuals together. As one British security source said last year: "That moment when someone takes someone else's rucksack because they are exhausted is worth a decade of indoctrination in terms of preparing a group for violent action."

Third, although Eta sympathizers insist there is no religious connotation to the images of dead or imprisoned militants in the nationalist bars, they comprise nonetheless a pantheon of "martyrs'" Their stories – or their "sacrifice" – not only inspires aspirant militants with the prospect of joining these hallowed ranks in the event of capture or death but also legitimizes "the struggle" by providing evidence of what is seen as the violent repression of the faceless enemy, the Spanish state.

There is also the sense of lives given in a defensive struggle against an overwhelming faceless force, which not only justifies the continuing fight but dehumanizes the enemy. Despite Eta's secular nature, the strong local Catholic traditions with its own martyrs may have some influence here, too – as they did in Ireland.

Another point common to many militant groups is a particularly style of dressing. Militant Islamic groups have evolved – especially in the west – a form of "jihadi chic" which has nothing much to do with local dress in the Arab world, south Asia or the far east and a lot to do with a globalised idea of what an Islamic militant should look like.

The sleeveless combat jacket with its many pockets, for example, is hardly traditional clothing nor particularly useful in the UK, France or Germany but is a powerful signifier of a whole way of thinking and acting.

In the Basque country, the nationalist style includes a sort of 1980s-style mullet haircut, big earrings, piercings, mountain style jackets especially from North Face and hiking boots, the ensemble sometimes topped off with an ethnic scarf of some description. The look represents the vision nationalists have of the Basques – a rugged, self-reliant and restive mountain people – but with a touch of international, anti-globalisation, internationalist solidarity, all the while remaining solidly proletarian.

A final element worth noting is Eta's organization. In recent years, Islamic militant organizations have become much "flatter" – less hierarchic, less organized, based more on autonomous cells. So has Eta – under the pressure of security operations. Islamic militants swarm their attacks, drawing together disparate resources and personnel for individual strikes and then dispersing what is left.

Eta, which once had carefully designated commandos for different geographic areas, now does something similar. But the flatter, more resilient structure also means more amateurism and less strategic direction, especially as many senior, experienced leaders are in prison. And that increases the possibility of a significant attack that inflicts casualties intolerable to a support base that is already wavering. Once the supporters in the broader community start to distance themselves, any militant group, of whatever ideology, is in deep trouble.