Blair's Man in Basra Tells How Coalition Failures Provoked Iraqis

Britain's leading civilian in Basra after the fall of Iraq today publishes an indictment of Whitehall and Washington failures in the aftermath of the invasion.

When Sir Hilary Synnott accepted an invitation to be Iraq's "King of the South", he was told by the Foreign Office that it was "a bloody mess".

Just what kind of mess he reveals in Bad Days in Basra, denouncing what he calls Washington's "spectacular misjudgments" and UK government mistakes.

Synnott, a senior diplomat who had just retired, was asked by Tony Blair in the summer of 2003 to be the occupying coalition's chief civilian in southern Iraq. His book is highly critical of Whitehall, notably of the way the Foreign Office and Department for International Development failed to plan and pay for post war reconstruction. "The situation in 2003 in Whitehall was that there was simply a mismatch between policy imperatives and the ability to deliver on the ground," he told the Guardian yesterday.

Coalition shortcomings provoked growing anger among ordinary Iraqis which helped to feed the insurgency.

"Neither we nor the military ever managed to craft a harmonious relationship with civilian departments at home," Synnott says in his book. "There was insufficient grip, leadership and knowledge of the conditions ... and not enough understanding of what was needed."

The FCO "were even less engaged in post-conflict planning [than the military]. They were apparently no better aware than anyone else of the likely consequences of the removal of Saddam's control."

The problem, Synnott says, was compounded by the legacy of the relationship between Clare Short - international development secretary but vehemently opposed to Britain engaging in the conflict - and Robin Cook, the foreign secretary.

Though Cook resigned on the eve of the invasion and Short finally resigned in May 2003, the damage had been done. "The loss of time and of initiative was irretrievable," says Synnott. "DFID's reputation with other departments, and especially the military, whose contempt was seldom disguised, was severely damaged."

Synnott also makes clear where he believes the buck stops. "The key decision-makers, and especially Bush and Blair, must inevitably bear ultimate responsibility both for the war itself and for the failures surrounding the process by which success might be achieved."