Snaking Towards Independence

Even if they wanted to - and unfortunately some do - European governments cannot look in the other direction over Kosovo any longer. Weekend elections in the predominantly ethnic Albanian former province of Serbia now point more clearly than ever towards an imminent declaration of independence. Such an outcome has been widely expected for many months. But it does not make the consequences any easier to manage. The prospects for Kosovo and the Balkans now look more dangerous and uncertain than they have done for a decade.

Saturday's Kosovo polls were poorly supported, in part because of a total boycott by the small Serb minority but mainly because of bad weather and because so many Albanians themselves are disenchanted with the drifting economic and political situation since Nato drove the Serbian regular troops out in 1999. Nevertheless, two important things happened this weekend - and neither of them can be ignored. The first is that pro-independence parties were re-elected. This means a declaration of independence around December 10, the deadline for currently deadlocked talks with Serbia on Kosovo's future. The second is a shift in power within Kosovo from the old prewar Albanian leadership to the younger generation that came of age during the war against Serbia.

Saturday's main winner, the Democratic party led by the former guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci - known by his soldiers as "the snake" - has long been the bridesmaid of Kosovan politics. This time, however, the party boosted its share of the poll at the expense of its main rival, the more moderate Democratic League, the party of the late Kosovan leader Ibrahim Rugova. The shift was not total, so the two parties are likely to form a coalition government in the coming days. Independence is the number-one goal on both parties' agendas - so the results boost that cause. But Mr Thaci's victory bears some comparison with the emergence of Gerry Adams and Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland at the expense of the more moderate SDLP. It will be seen in Belgrade as a sign that Kosovo and its backers cannot be trusted.

The immediate goal is that an explosion can be averted by Serbia agreeing before the deadline to a version of the "supervised independence" set out in the UN mediator Martti Ahtisaari's plan. Yet the gap between Serbia, encouraged by Russia, and the Nato powers is vast. In that case everything will depend on how Kosovan Serbs - and crucially Serbia itself - respond to the inevitable declaration. If law and order break down, the humanitarian and military situation in Kosovo could deteriorate very quickly. Conflicts in neighboring Bosnia and Macedonia may also be reignited, while even Serbia itself could become unstable. European governments will then face existential decisions. Do they intervene in their own regional backyard - possibly in a Balkan winter? Or do they stand aside and allow - or appear to allow - Kosovo's Muslims to be abandoned to their fate? There is a great deal at stake.

It remains possible that a decisive diplomatic embrace of an independent Kosovo next month may dissuade the ethnic groups from starting to shoot it out and may also discourage Belgrade from ratcheting up the tension. The United States, Britain and France are all clearly set on this course. Germany is more hesitant. Yet there is significant international opposition, not just from Moscow. Spain as ever is nervous about encouraging separatists, while Greece fears the knock-on effects in Macedonia. Belgrade, moreover, cannot easily stand aside if crowds take to the streets demanding defense of their Serb brothers. Either way, the level of Nato's involvement is likely to rise, whether as a guarantor of an uneasy peace or more directly. And since the US is neither in a position nor a mood to sort this one out for us, the buck may stop with Europe. It will be no use hiding under the duvet over Kosovo when duty calls.